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Letter from the Editor 
 On behalf  of  the editorial board, I am proud to present 
the Spring 2017 edition of  the Penn History Review. Since its 
inception over twenty-five years ago, the PHR has dedicated 
itself  to promoting the work of  undergraduate history students 
at the University of  Pennsylvania and schools across the nation. 
In this issue, you will find a diverse selection of  papers that cover 
topics from nineteenth-century Great Britain to America in the 
1960s, addressing questions of  diplomacy, identity, and the role 
of  the press. Each one of  these works exemplifies the core values 
of  the Penn History Review: originality, thorough research, and 
high-quality writing. We hope that they provide both intellectual 
engagement and an enjoyable read.
 In our first article, “Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy: 
Public Art Museums, Exhibitions, and Cultural Control in Victorian 
Britain, Julia Fine examines the role of  the aristocracy in shaping 
displays of  public art in Victorian Britain. Using parliamentary 
records, newspaper articles, and art-related treatises, she traces 
the evolution of  projects such as the South Kensington Museum 
and the Great Exhibition of  1851. Her work also explores the 
work of  government committees and reports, indicating that 
the state was interested in controlling these public displays. The 
paper reveals that aristocrats still held some sway in the art world, 
but their influence significantly decreased throughout the latter 
half  of  the nineteenth century.
 The next piece is David Murrell’s An Affair on Every 
Continent: French Reaction to the Foreign Press during the Dreyfus 
Affair. The work analyzes the infamous case of  Alfred Dreyfus, 
whose story captivated France and the world from 1894 to 1906. 
Focusing on the role of  the media, Murrell shows that the French 
government was largely unable to censor discussion of  the affair 
in the international press, although it was successful in suppressing 
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some theater productions. Moreover, he demonstrates that the 
affair served as a preview of  the mass media pressures that 
would become prevalent in twentieth-century European states.  
 The third paper, Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict, 
was written by Chloé Nurik. Relying on a wide array of  primary 
source documents, she highlights changing notions of  masculinity 
among college students in 1920s America. Her work details the 
traditions and rituals that were prevalent at schools such as 
Harvard, Yale, and Penn during this time period. In addition, the 
article traces the impact of  fraternities, college sports, and other 
influential extracurricular activities. Ultimately, she finds that 
young men preserved key aspects of  character-based masculinity, 
while also incorporating modernized elements such as physical 
appearance and social popularity.   
 In The Big Stick Split in Two: Roosevelt vs. Hay on the Anglo-
American Relationship, William Shirey provides a compelling 
analysis of  the relationship between the United States and Great 
Britain during the Roosevelt administration. In particular, he 
uses the Alaskan boundary crisis of  the early 1900s as a lens to 
examine the diplomatic approaches of  Theodore Roosevelt and 
his Anglophilic secretary of  state, John Hay. The paper concludes 
that President Roosevelt’s belligerence often threatened relations 
between the two countries, and thus other members of  his 
administration played a more important role in rapprochement 
than historians have acknowledged. 
 Our final piece, “We of  the South”: President Lyndon Johnson, 
Jonathan Worth Daniels, and the Re-Southernization of  the White House, 
was authored by Simon Panitz from the University of  North 
Carolina. He focuses on the complex relationship between 
Lyndon Johnson and North Carolina newspaper editor Jonathan 
Worth Daniels, who worked to help the president carry the Tar 
Heel State in the election of  1964. Panitz explores the personal 
backgrounds of  both Johnson and Daniels, with particular 
emphasis on the influence of  their fathers. The article also 
highlights the collaborative nature of  the relationship between 
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the two men, as they worked together to promote civil rights in 
the 1960s.
 In addition to these works, we have included abstracts 
from the senior honors theses of  several Penn history majors. 
The thesis program is a year-long commitment that requires 
intensive research, original historical analysis, and tremendous 
dedication. By including these abstracts, we hope to showcase 
the outstanding scholarship that these students have produced 
over the past year. Congratulations to all of  the seniors who 
completed this formidable challenge!
 The editorial board would also like to thank a number of  
people who helped make this edition possible. We are extremely 
grateful to Dr. Siyen Fei, the Undergraduate Chair of  the 
History Department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the department’s 
Associate Director of  Undergraduate Studies. Both of  them 
have provided helpful guidance and insight throughout the 
editing and publishing process. We would also like to thank the 
faculty members at Penn and other universities who promoted 
our publication, in addition to the many students who submitted 
their excellent work for consideration. Thank you as well to each 
one of  our authors, who worked tirelessly to refine their articles 
for publication.
 Lastly, I would like to thank all of  our editors for their 
exceptionally hard work on this edition of  the Penn History Review. 
We will greatly miss our graduating seniors, Andrés De Los Ríos, 
Aaron Mandelbaum, Gregory Olberding, and Dan Thompson. 
Their enthusiasm for history and commitment to publishing 
excellent scholarship have helped shape the PHR over the past 
several years. I am especially indebted to Aaron, our Editor-in-
Chief  emeritus, for his invaluable advice and assistance over the 
course of  this semester. Without his dedication, this edition 
would not have been possible. At the same time, we are excited 
to welcome on two new editors, Julia Barr and Helen Berhanu, 
who have already made a positive impact on our journal.
Penn History Review     9 
Letter from the Editor
 Congratulations again to all of  the authors and editors 
who contributed to this edition of  the Penn History Review! 
Michael J. Torcello
Editor-in-Chief
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“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy:
Public Art Museums, Exhibitions, and 
Cultural Control in Victorian Britain
Julia Fine
“The advancement of  the Fine Arts and Practical Science will be 
readily recognized by you as worthy of  the Attention of  a great 
and enlightened Nation. I have directed that a comprehensive 
Scheme shall be laid before you, having in view the Promotion 
of  these Objects, towards which I invite your Aid and 
Co-operation.”1
 With these words delivered to both the House of  
Commons and the House of  Lords, Queen Victoria opened 
Parliament on November 11, 1852. Her firm direction to 
prioritize the encouragement of  art was a clear advancement 
from the early rejections of  national collections at the turn of  
the nineteenth century and the ensuing governmental disinterest 
in the National Gallery. Victoria’s interest in this subject derived 
chiefly from her German-born husband, Prince Albert, who was 
keenly devoted to the state of  arts and sciences in the country. 
His influence was seen in many different events and institutions, 
including the 1851 Great Exhibition, the South Kensington 
complex, and the 1857 Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition.2 
Since the end of  Charles I’s reign in 1649, the British monarchy 
had not played a predominant role in either the patronage or 
display of  art; the prince’s active involvement in the cultural 
realm thus represented a significant shift. This, however, did not 
indicate a return to elite, aristocratic control. Rather, the prince 
aligned himself  with the emerging professional class, as opposed 
to the traditional ruling aristocracy, who viewed him with scorn.3 
Indeed, his passion for art was connected with his desire for 
“the Progress and Improvement of  the Public.”4 To Albert, the 
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cultivation of  popular interest in the arts was of  direct value to 
the development of  British industrial craft. This ethos was shared 
by leading cultural bureaucrats including Henry Cole, who would 
play a critical role in the emerging South Kensington Museum. 
New conceptions about the functions of  a public art museum 
and what it should house were developed in this mid-Victorian 
period, and they were articulated by figures like the prince and 
professionals such as Cole and the curator J.C. Robinson. The 
definition of  fine art expanded from simply referring to painting 
and sculpture to encompassing the decorative arts, a term coined 
by Robinson referring to art objects that are also functional.5 
As laid out by the 1836 Select Committee, increasing emphasis 
was placed on the education of  the working classes, both for 
their moral elevation and for the improvement of  manufactures. 
How were these novel concerns embodied in art museums and 
exhibitions? Did the transfer of  control from elite connoisseurs 
to middle-class experts result in the exclusion of  the aristocracy 
from the art world, or was the presence of  the old guard still felt 
in these institutions? Ultimately, aristocratic control markedly 
diminished, but did not disappear completely. 
Art, MAnufActures, And IncreAsed Access
 The South Kensington Museum, now known as the 
Victoria & Albert Museum, grew out of  two pivotal events: the 
1836 Select Committee and the 1851 Great Exhibition. While 
the Select Committee was instrumental in the reform of  the 
National Gallery in 1855, it also introduced new ideas of  what 
art museums could contain and the effect that they could have. 
During the proceedings of  the 1860 Select Committee on the 
South Kensington Museum, Henry Cole, the museum’s first 
director, was asked to describe the origins of  its collection. 
He responded by pointing to the conclusions reached by the 
committee members in 1836. He quoted directly from the 
report, referring to its statement that “the Arts have received 
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little encouragement in this country” and that in a nation such 
as England, where industry reigned supreme, “the connexion 
between art and manufacture is most important.”6 The 1836 
report also posited that it would be beneficial to develop a system 
of  public galleries and museums of  art throughout the country, 
and the members proposed a specific acquisition policy. Cole 
quoted from the report, “Besides casts and paintings, copies of  
the arabesques of  Raphael, the designs at Pompeii, specimens 
from the era of  the revival of  the arts, everything, in short, which 
exhibits in combination the efforts of  the artist and the workman, 
should be sought for in the formation of  such institutions.” In 
addition to historical objects, the committee concluded that 
modern examples should also be included; the combination 
would educate the viewer in the principles of  design.7 According 
to Cole, these ideas served as a guide to the South Kensington 
Museum, and as a result of  this report, the first Government 
School of  Design was opened in 1837 in Somerset House, which 
the Royal Academy had recently vacated. Eventually, through a 
series of  gradual developments, the Schools of  Design evolved 
to create the Museum.8 
 In fact, the Government had already concluded that 
action needed to be taken to remedy the sorry state of  Britain’s 
manufactures before the report was ultimately published 
on August 16, 1836. In July of  that year, the Board of  Trade 
asked the treasury to provide money for a School of  Design.9 
The House of  Commons voted in favor of  a £1,500 grant for 
such a project, “with a view to the improvement of  the national 
manufactures.”10 The president of  the Board of  Trade, Charles 
Poulett Thomson, called a meeting of  artists and businessmen to 
become the Council of  the School.11 Thomson was a supporter 
of  free trade and parliamentary reform, and he originally won 
his seat in Parliament due to the support of  the utilitarian Jeremy 
Bentham and the Radical Joseph Hume.12 However, he staffed 
the council exclusively with Royal Academicians, which infuriated 
critics like the MP William Ewart and the artist Benjamin Robert 
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Haydon, who had not wanted the School to be subservient to the 
old guard.13 They set up a rival institution called the Society for 
Promoting the Arts of  Design, which did not help the fledgling 
Government School.14 As Cole reported, the first school was 
housed in Somerset House in London, and more were opened 
in various manufacturing cities throughout the country. By the 
1840s, schools had been opened in Manchester, Birmingham, 
Coventry, Sheffield, Nottingham, York, Newcastle upon Tyne, 
and Glasgow.15 This coincided with increased access to art and art 
education through a flourishing press; affordable drawing books 
removed the activity from the realm of  elite women and artists 
and brought it to a wider section of  society. Similarly, illustrated 
periodicals like the Penny Magazine of  the Society for the Diffusion 
of  Useful Knowledge introduced a new, working class audience to 
aesthetic and visual culture.16
 While the original mission of  the School did not 
prioritize building a collection for a museum, various specimens 
were acquired under the superintendence of  the Scottish painter 
William Dyce, appointed in 1838. His dream, never achieved, 
was to form a museum of  industrial, or ornamental, art. He did, 
however, acquire plaster casts of  antique sculpture; his most 
important purchase was a copy of  Raphael’s fresco paintings of  
decorative patterns in the Vatican, known as the Loggie. Dyce 
found the responsibilities of  the position too difficult, and 
another Scottish artist, Charles Heath Wilson, assumed the 
role.17 He was determined to build for the students a collection 
of  more than just plaster casts. In one of  his annual reports to 
Parliament, he noted that the School had begun to acquire “real 
specimens of  various kinds of  ornamental manufactures, and 
decorative work” including:
patterns of  stained-paper hangings, rich 
embroidered silks, and tissues of  silk and glass, 
printed calicos, wood carving, ornaments of  
lacquered embossed metal, models in papier-
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maché, imitations of  antique stained glass from 
Nuremburg, iron castings in panel work, fancy 
earthenware, enameled tiles, and several examples 
of  decorative painting, in tempera, enamel, fresco, 
encaustic, &c., including some valuable coloured 
tracings from fresco ornaments in Mantua.18
The report further noted that the School’s collection was open to 
the public on Mondays between one and three o’clock. However, 
the rooms in Somerset House did not provide adequate space 
for the growing number of  objects, and thus not only were they 
generally unavailable to the public, but they were also difficult for 
the students to view freely.19
 The School of  Design was dogged by criticism throughout 
the first decade of  its existence. A letter from a professor in the 
School, Richard Redgrave (who would later hold a position at the 
South Kensington Museum), to the prime minister, Lord John 
Russell, encapsulated many of  the critics’ complaints. There 
was a concern that students were simply being taught to copy; 
Redgrave wrote that “Nature, as the true source of  ornamental 
design, [should] be more fully insisted upon” and that “the 
principles of  taste only are to be sought in the application of  antique 
art to the wants of  the age.” In this way, the originality of  British 
design would be improved, thus increasing the competitiveness 
of  their manufactures in the foreign market.20 He further noted 
that biennial exhibitions of  works of  design should be instituted 
for both the students and the public, as this would “improve 
their taste.”21 Public exhibitions were becoming an integral part 
of  the new educative mission for art. Eventually, critiques of  
the School led to a Select Committee on the School of  Design 
in 1849, which concluded that the School had not achieved its 
goal of  design improvement. Upon the report’s release, the Art 
Journal reported that there had been a “universally acknowledged 
necessity” for such an institution, and yet “the shadow of  twelve 
years’ disheartening failure casts its gloom.”22 However, reforms 
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were not undertaken at that point.23 It took one of  the most 
momentous events in the history of  Victorian Britain, along with 
a prominent and influential civil servant, to effect change and 
transform the fledgling collection of  the School of  Design into 
a fully formed public museum. 
 The Great Exhibition of  1851, or the Universal 
Exhibition of  the Works of  all Nations, was the accomplishment 
of  a variety of  administrators and civil servants, but credit is 
largely given to Prince Albert and Henry Cole for both its 
creation and extension into permanent institutions. Albert 
came to England already steeped in Saxon traditions of  a love 
for art collecting,24 and he was well-versed in all of  Western art 
history, ranging from the Gothic to the Mannerist to the pictures 
popularized during an Italian Grand Tour.25 In fact, his taste in 
painting was advanced compared to the elite connoisseurs in 
control of  the National Gallery before Charles Eastlake became 
director.26 He also believed that art was intimately connected 
to the character and industrial wealth of  the nation.27 As such, 
he was appointed for membership in the rather inactive Society 
for the Encouragement of  Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, 
founded in 1754. He assumed the presidency in 1843, and in 
1847 the Society held a successful exhibition of  manufactures 
that was visited by over twenty thousand people. Two more were 
held in the ensuing years, so a national exhibition featuring wares 
from around the world was announced for 1851, to be divided 
into four sections: “Raw Materials of  Manufactures – British 
Colonial, and Foreign, Machinery and Mechanical Inventions, 
Manufactures, Sculpture and Plastic Art generally.” The focus 
of  this exhibition was not on the fine arts. A Royal Commission 
was enacted, and it included notables from all walks of  life, 
including members of  the aristocracy such as Earl Granville, the 
Duke of  Buccleuch, and the Earl of  Ellesmere. Members from 
both political parties were present, with Whig Prime Minister 
Lord John Russell as a representative for the Government and 
Sir Robert Peel for the Tory opposition. Wealthy city dwellers 
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including Thomas Baring and prominent cultural figures like 
Eastlake rounded out the group.28 However, just as the trustees 
of  the National Gallery were rendered largely figureheads after 
the 1855 reform, the commission members did not play an 
active role in running the exhibition and simply lent an air of  
prestige. Albert led an executive committee that included Henry 
Cole, Charles Wentworth Dilke, Colonel William Reid, and the 
scientist Lyon Playfair.29 Funding for the building, known as 
the Crystal Palace and designed by Joseph Paxton, came from 
wealthy businessmen committed to free trade, who tended to 
be more supportive of  the prince than the hereditary classes. In 
particular, £20,000 was guaranteed from the railway contractor 
Samuel Morton Peto.30
 The exhibition proved to be a tremendous success, with 
over six million visitors. The revenue from the entrance fees 
ranging from one shilling to three pounds left the Commission 
with a surplus of  £186,000. The ability to stage the exhibition 
was a confirmation of  Victorian superiority, and it symbolized 
the era’s supreme self-confidence. There was, however, great 
concern over the poor design quality of  the British manufactures 
on exhibit, prompting Ralph Wornum, a lecturer at the School 
of  Design, to write a prize-winning article in the Art Journal, 
entitled “The Exhibition as a Lesson in Taste,” about the 
inferiority of  English wares.31 Indeed, the British Quarterly Review 
remarked, “We have learnt from the Great Exhibition that there 
are numerous points in which we are inferior to the foreigner, 
and in some, as in the principles of  design, and the science of  
coloured harmony, we are lamentably ignorant.”32 France had 
1,710 exhibits at the Crystal Palace and collected 1,043 awards, as 
compared to Britain’s 2,155 awards for 6,861 exhibits.33 This was 
a national embarrassment and provided further proof  that the 
School of  Design had not achieved its mission. Henry Cole had 
long campaigned against what he regarded as the failures of  the 
School. From 1849 to 1852, he published the Journal of  Design and 
Manufactures, dedicated to Prince Albert, which claimed to provide 
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“utility to all branches of  commerce influenced by ornamental 
design” and worked to “aid in the reform of  our Schools of  
Design.”34 It stressed Cole’s principles of  taste, which rested on 
the notions that form and function must coexist harmoniously 
and the beauty of  an object must match its purpose.35 Cole had 
been appointed to the Society for the Encouragement of  Arts in 
1846, and as such he played a leading role in the exhibition. This 
experience, in conjunction with his leading advocacy against 
the School of  Design in its current state, made him the natural 
choice to be appointed as the School’s new head, at a time when 
its inadequacy had been proven so decisively. Thus, in January 
1852, the Board of  Trade named him to this new role; this 
appointment was a critical step toward the creation of  the South 
Kensington Museum.36
 Henry Cole was born in 1808 and grew up in a middle-class 
household. In 1826, his family rented space in a London home 
owned by the writer Thomas Love Peacock, who had a profound 
effect on Cole’s later activities and beliefs. He introduced a young 
Cole to John Stuart Mill and his circle of  philosophic radicals, 
informed by the principles of  Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. 
While he never became a political activist, these Benthamite 
views, steeped in rhetoric against privilege, suffused his work. In 
Cole’s first civil service job, he waged a reform campaign against 
the Tory aristocracy-run Record Commission. Later, in his role 
as cultural bureaucrat, he consistently prioritized working-class 
artisans.37 His interest in the art world began in the 1840s, when 
he published cheap guidebooks to historic sites and museums, 
including the National Gallery, under the pseudonym Felix 
Summerly. These were expressly created for the poorer working 
class; in the National Gallery catalogue, he wrote:
Throngs counted by hundreds of  thousands 
belong far less to the ranks of  wealth owning 
picture galleries than to poverty owning none but 
this; and that the lowly in station are the chief  
18     Julia Fine
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy
visitants, were there no other evidence, seems to 
be shewn in the small purchase of  the official 
shilling catalogues. Out of  every seventy-six 
comers only one buys a shilling catalogue. Such a 
scanty sale seems to prove that by far the largest 
proportion of  visitors are those to whom the 
outlay of  twelve-pence is the denial of  a dinner, 
and that a cheaper catalogue is wanted.38
Cole had a clear interest in widening cultural access to a greater 
section of  society. He started the company Felix Summerly’s Art 
Manufactures, which produced household goods such as tea 
sets and mugs, designed by artists with whom he shared design 
principles, including Richard Redgrave, so that they adhered to 
strict standards of  taste.39
Henry Cole Tea Service, designed by Sir Henry Cole for Felix Summerly’s Art 
Manufactures; made by Minton & Co., Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire, 1846, 
earthenware, Victoria & Albert Museum, London, United Kingdom.
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 Upon his appointment to the School of  Design, Cole 
immediately embarked on its reorganization. He believed the 
School should become its own department under the purview 
of  the Board of  Trade, to be called the Department of  Practical 
Art. Cole became the superintendent of  general management 
and Redgrave was named art advisor. Parliament granted a 
budget of  £10,050, and its first report, published in 1853, laid 
out the Department’s goals. The first two promoted general and 
advanced instruction in art for all classes of  society, in order to 
advance correct taste for the producers and consumers of  goods.40 
To that end, the Department began to teach elementary art in its 
branch schools across the country, and it also instructed teachers 
so that they could impart their skills to students. According to the 
historian Janet Minihan, with this system, “Art had at last lost its 
official status as a polite, aristocratic skill and received significant 
acknowledgement of  its importance in general education.”41 The 
third goal, and the one most important to the development of  
the South Kensington, sought “the Application of  the Principles 
of  Technical Art to the improvement of  manufactures, together 
with the establishment of  Museums, by which all classes might 
be induced to investigate those common principles of  taste, 
which may be traced in the works of  excellence of  all ages.”42 
The School headquarters moved from Somerset House to 
Marlborough House in Pall Mall, which was used as a minor 
royal residence and had more room for the display of  collections. 
Prince Albert granted permission to use this space, as long as the 
Department aligned itself  with his goals for the future of  the 
1851 Exhibition. He envisaged a set of  permanent institutions 
that would apply the principles of  art and science to industry; 
this was to be an educational mission for the working classes. 
The Royal Commission was extended after the conclusion of  the 
exhibition in order to administer the surplus profits, which were 
used to secure a plot of  land just south of  Hyde Park, finally 
completed in 1858. It was christened as South Kensington, 
and numerous museums for the arts and sciences would be set 
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there. The museum at Marlborough House would relocate there 
in 1857 and be renamed the South Kensington Museum. The 
prince had a keen interest in science as well, and through his 
influence the Department of  Practical Art would be enlarged to 
become the Department of  Science and Art, with Lyon Playfair 
serving with Henry Cole as joint secretary and specifically in 
charge of  scientific education.43 Later, the Department would be 
moved from the Board of  Trade to the Committee of  Council 
on Education.44
 The nucleus of  the museum of  art manufactures was 
located at Marlborough House. At the end of  the exhibition in 
October 1851, Parliament granted £5,000 to the Department to 
purchase objects that had been on display that would function 
as models of  good design to serve as the basis of  a national 
collection. Cole and Redgrave served on a committee to make 
these selections, and their choices encompassed works from 
many different countries. These were moved to Marlborough, 
along with the original collection formed at Somerset House. 
Thus, the early museum was composed largely of  contemporary 
wares, intended to instruct in the principles of  taste for industrial 
objects. This soon changed, as evidenced by the shift from the 
name “Museum of  Manufactures” to “Museum of  Ornamental 
Art.”45 Indeed, the Third Report of  the Department of  Science 
and Art stated that the objects that had been acquired in the wake 
of  the exhibition were diverse in nature, but were all modern, 
and thus, “For this reason later additions to the collection, 
which have been very numerous, have mainly consisted of  
works from bygone periods.” It went on to assert that while the 
Museum had an avowedly educational mission, it was meant not 
just for students but also for the general public and even the 
collector, “whose pursuits it is, for many obvious reasons, clearly 
a national duty to countenance and encourage.” The goal was 
“the illustration, by actual monuments, of  all art which finds its 
material expression in objects of  utility, or in works avowedly 
decorative.”46 These statements illuminate the purpose of  
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the ensuing acquisitions, which evince the subtle shift from a 
purely practical mission to better the abilities of  artisans for the 
improvement of  manufactures to one that aimed to raise the 
standards of  all members of  society. 
 Cole firmly believed in the efficacy of  elevating the 
taste of  consumers rather than focusing on the producers. The 
museum, by promoting his view of  superior design quality, had 
the best chance of  achieving this goal, as it was the only feasible 
means of  educating the adult.47 This was seen as critical among 
art professionals in the mid-nineteenth century, when rising 
wealth among the middling classes meant that they were now 
empowered to purchase. However, their standards of  taste had 
not been refined and elevated from a long history of  familial 
collecting.48 Indeed, Anna Jameson had discussed the issue a few 
years earlier in her 1849 Art Journal essay, “Some thoughts on art, 
addressed to the Uninitiated.” She noted that, “‘the million’ have 
become patrons of  art” and “thus it is a matter of  very serious 
import that the young should be trained to discernment and 
refinement in the appreciation of  such objects as are addressed 
to the mind through the eye, that the public taste should, through 
the rising generation, be more generally educated.”49 The 
purpose of  Cole’s new museum was intimately connected with 
the broadening access of  different sectors of  society to aesthetic 
culture. Thus, in order to speak to all classes of  consumers, the 
rooms at Marlborough were designed to evoke the decorated 
rooms of  an elite collector, but there were also classrooms and 
lecture halls to promote the educational mission.50 
 A combination of  purchases and loans enriched the 
Museum’s collections. In 1853, Cole and Redgrave approved the 
purchase of  a collection of  pottery made by James Bandinel of  
the Foreign Office. The next year, the Gherardini Collection was 
up for sale. Gherardini was an Italian who had inherited a group 
of  wax and terracotta models by Italian Renaissance masters. 
These were first exhibited in the Museum for one month in order 
to ascertain the opinion of  the public as to whether or not they 
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should be purchased, and this collection passed the test.51 This 
was typical of  departmental policy, as the board minutes of  the 
Department of  Science and Art reveal that items were typically 
displayed for a considerable period of  time, from a couple 
months to two years, before being purchased by Parliament.52 
In 1855, the late antiquarian Whig MP Ralph Bernal’s collection, 
which contained art objects from the Byzantine era through the 
eighteenth century, was a potential acquisition for the museum. 
These items included porcelain, metalwork, jewelry, and furniture, 
among other categories. While Cole and the Department had 
hoped to purchase this in full, the Government believed the 
price to be too high and ordered it to go up for auction. The 
Museum was not allowed to spend more than £12,000, and it 
obtained 730 pieces.53 Interestingly, Bernal had remarked during 
parliamentary debates on the Museums Act 1845, which gave 
local town councils the ability to establish museums, that the 
William Linnaeus Casey, The First Room at Marlborough House, 1856, watercolor, 
London, United Kingdom.
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country needed “a Museum of  Art and Antiquities…which 
would be worthy of  the English nation.”54 His collection helped 
to form the basis of  such a museum. 
 One of  the most important purchases in the Museum’s 
early acquisition history was Jules Soulages’s collection. Soulages 
was a lawyer from Toulouse, France, who had acquired objects 
in Italy including enamels, medals, glass, bronzes, decorative 
furniture, and majolica.55 His collection practices specified that 
“his object was the illustration of  Art, and not the indulgence 
of  a taste for the merely curious,” and his acquisitions did not 
typically receive the “designation of  ‘high art.’”56 Cole wished to 
bring the entire collection to the Museum, and a subscribers’ 
fund of  “disinterested and public spirited men”57 was set 
up in order to purchase it before Government approval. The 
subscribers included some members of  the aristocracy, including 
Earl Granville, Lord Ashburton, the Duke of  Hamilton, and the 
Marquess of  Hertford. However, it was mainly composed of  
wealthy men of  business, men connected to the Department of  
Science and Art, and artists.58 Nevertheless, when it came time for 
Prime Minister Lord Palmerston to examine the objects exhibited 
at Marlborough House, he disliked their medieval style and did 
not understand how they would improve British manufactures. 
His disapproval proved decisive, and thus the collection could not 
be retained. Even at a time when aristocratic power was receding, 
the idiosyncratic aesthetic sense of  a politician could still retain 
significance in determining cultural policy. The collection was 
sold to the executive committee of  the Manchester Art Treasures 
Exhibition, and later the Department bought it back in portions.59 
In fact, those in favor of  the collection believed it would not only 
improve manufacture design, commerce, and the public taste, 
but would also help form “a large and complete historical and 
artistic museum.”60 The curator J.C. Robinson, who would have 
a profound effect on the Museum’s collection, advocated this 
latter acquisition policy. 
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 The collections and individual specimens purchased 
for or donated to the Museum were not typically held by the 
aristocracy. However, aristocrats granted liberal access to their 
property by loaning objects for temporary exhibition. The earliest 
example of  this came with an exhibition of  Historic Cabinet 
Work at Gore House, also owned by the Department. Lenders to 
this exhibit included numerous aristocrats, including the Duke of  
Hamilton, the Duke of  Buccleuch, the Duke of  Devonshire, the 
Duke of  Northumberland, the Earl Spencer, the Earl Granville, 
and Lord Willoughby d’Eresby, among others.61 In fact, the 
Museum, in both its earliest form and such later iterations as 
the South Kensington and Victoria & Albert Museum, was the 
first permanent institution to produce numerous temporary 
exhibitions. By contrast, the British Museum and the National 
Gallery relied solely on their permanent collections comprised 
of  donations and purchases.62 In 1880, Robinson wrote that the 
system allowed “the enormous accumulation of  works of  art of  
all kinds, in the possession of  the Crown, or corporations, and 
societies, the ancestral gatherings of  the nobles and gentry of  
the land, and the rich collections of  amateurs and connoisseurs, 
[to be] made available for the delight and instruction of  
everybody.”63 Indeed, this policy had a beneficial effect for both 
the Museum and the benefactors. A more widely held perception 
of  the artistic value of  the historic decorative arts, which were 
not as well known or authoritatively discussed in literature as 
fine arts, was encouraged by the elite status of  those who lent 
them. Moreover, the social pedigree of  the owners aroused 
further public interest in the items. The loaner’s name was 
always prominently displayed on labels and in catalogues.64 The 
announcement of  the cabinetry exhibition lauded those who 
had “liberally offered” their objects for display and study.65 That 
the names of  these contributors were so well publicized and 
celebrated suggests that their generosity was intended, at least in 
part, to reap a reputational benefit. 
 The tenor of  the parliamentary debates over the 
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retention of  the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park is illustrative of  
the tenuous position of  the aristocracy at this time. After the 
Great Exhibition had concluded, some executives and MPs 
wished to maintain the physical location of  the building in order 
to provide a recreational space for the working classes. During 
debates in April 1852, the MP James Heywood, a Liberal with 
radical tendencies who supported increased access to public 
museums,66 claimed that whereas the middle class was in favor 
of  keeping it, the aristocracy opposed the plans, and this class 
division could “agitate this country.”67 While this statement 
was not entirely accurate, as friends of  the movement for the 
preservation of  the Crystal Palace included notables such as 
the Duke of  Devonshire (Joseph Paxton’s patron), the Duke of  
Argyll, and Lord Harrowby,68 Heywood’s subsequent remarks 
are significant. He recounted a story in which he met a French 
nobleman at Haddon Hall, the seat of  the Duke of  Rutland. 
The Frenchman explained that “a reason why the English 
aristocracy retained their privileges and position, and the French 
lost theirs, [is] that the English aristocracy knew when to make 
just concessions.” Heywood then concluded that this was a 
moment for the aristocracy to “make a small concession to the 
opinions and wishes of  the middle classes.”69 Later in the debate, 
the Radical MP Thomas Wakley noted that the aristocracy “had 
risen wonderfully in the estimation of  the people since they 
had mingled with them at the Crystal Palace,” but they would 
“lose more in public estimation if  they now demolished that 
building.”70  
 Ultimately, these impassioned pleas did not save the 
Crystal Palace; it vacated Hyde Park and was re-erected at 
Sydenham by a private company as a visitor attraction.71 However, 
these statements help to clarify the nature and purpose of  the 
aristocracy’s involvement with a museum that was far removed 
from any notions of  elite trusteeship and taste in the fine art of  
painting. Indeed, it has been described as a “middle-class space, 
where middle-class norms of  behaviour were protected and, if  
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possible, enforced; middle-class values shaped and strengthened; 
and middle-class hierarchies displayed.”72 Aristocrats were 
absent from the management and creation of  the institution. 
The Art Journal commented approvingly in August 1861 that 
the South Kensington Museum did not suffer from “an effete 
system of  trusteeship” with “gentlemen little conversant with 
the matters they are called upon to decide,” which had afflicted 
the National Gallery. Rather, the South Kensington was “new, 
active, intelligent, and useful.”73 As with the National Gallery, 
members of  the aristocracy did not make permanent bequests 
of  their property. However, they did not shun the Museum, and 
they complied when their holdings were solicited and desired, 
perhaps out of  an aspiration to gain in the “public estimation,” 
in the words of  Wakley, at a time when the middle class was 
asserting its power in all areas of  society. The Art Journal remarked 
on the temporary loan policy again in November, noting that the 
periodical had often focused on the incredible amount of  art still 
held privately in Britain, including paintings and decorative art, 
but now “collectors have been frequently induced to allow their 
treasures to pass temporarily from their cabinets to the public 
gaze.” Thus, the Journal stated approvingly, knowledge of  the 
historic ornamental objects was extended beyond “a few wealthy 
individuals.”74
 Eighteenth-century, Grand Tour-era preferences may 
have been irrelevant to the approach of  the new museum, but 
Cole made sure that his firmest standard of  what constituted 
good taste was followed. He and his fellow design reformers were 
attempting to become new societal tastemakers; he chose objects 
that he believed exemplified these principles and didactically 
explained his doctrine in affordable catalogues.75 In the early 
days of  the Museum at Marlborough House, Cole devised a 
room called “Examples of  False Principles in Decoration,” 
which later came to be known as the “Chamber of  Horrors,” 
where he showcased what he viewed as bad taste.76 This attempt 
to impose notions of  taste was not uniformly accepted, as 
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Cole and Redgrave faced criticism from numerous sources, 
including a notable Manchester economist named F.J. Prouting, 
writing under the pseudonym Argus. He published a series of  
pamphlets called A Mild Remonstrance against the Taste-Censorship at 
Marlborough House, in which he demonstrated his contempt for 
what he believed to be the foreign preferences of  the museum’s 
managers.77 He wrote sarcastically: “Englishmen know nothing 
of  taste…Benighted Britons…know nothing of  Beauty, nothing 
of  Refinement, nothing of  Fine Art, nothing of  Taste!”78 He 
charged that these notions governed Cole’s administration of  
the Museum. In fact, the idea of  a correct standard of  taste was 
itself  a foreign, Continental creation.79 Prouting asserted that “if  
these qualities are real and definable, and if  they have anything to 
do with morals and right-mindedness, we think England has as 
good a claim to the possession of  Taste and to the appreciation 
of  the Beautiful.”80 These complaints are striking in their 
resemblance to the attacks leveled against aristocrats during the 
eighteenth century, an era in which they retained cultural control. 
They too were chastised for their foreign proclivities, preferring 
European masters to native British artists. Cole’s attempt to 
impose aesthetic criteria subjected him to the same criticisms 
that the aristocracy had faced decades earlier when they dictated 
the standards of  taste. 
 Cole was not alone in shaping acquisition policy at the 
Museum. John Charles Robinson was appointed curator in 1853, 
and he energetically drove the collection toward an art historical 
approach. His concern was not simply to elevate the standards 
of  taste in contemporary society; he was primarily focused on 
the representation of  a full history of  decorative art.81 Indeed, he 
had a wide-ranging interest in art that had not been popularized 
in Britain yet, such as the Portuguese and Spanish schools, 
including the work of  El Greco.82 He went to Paris as a young 
man to study art, and his experiences there were to have an effect 
on his later collection practices. Various antiquarian collections 
existed in Paris in the nineteenth century following the French 
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Revolution, during which many of  the objects and artifacts of  
the Middle Ages were in danger of  destruction due to their 
association with the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Almost 
immediately, however, scholars and collectors attempted to 
rescue these items. These grew into great collections, including 
the influential Musée de Cluny, which opened in 1832 and was 
transformed into a public museum in 1844. The French viewed 
this museum of  decorative art not as a means to improve 
manufacture design, but rather as a way of  showcasing history 
through objects.83 This idea of  a museum featuring a historical 
series of  art objects would come to suffuse Robinson’s activities 
as curator. He focused heavily on medieval and Renaissance art, 
engineering the acquisition of  an important group of  Italian 
Renaissance sculptures, despite the contemporary view that 
this had little to do with improvement of  industry or taste and 
thus did not fit the Museum’s purported mission.84 Robinson 
was a serious scholar, writing well-respected catalogues on the 
works in the Museum, including the Soulages Collection and 
the Italian sculptures. He served as a mediator of  Cole’s didactic 
utilitarian taste reform, and there are obvious parallels with the 
new director of  the National Gallery, Charles Locke Eastlake, 
who similarly tempered the aristocratic trustees’ elite preferences 
by embarking on a campaign to collect early Italian masters.85 
Experts in the emerging discipline of  art history endeavored to 
tell a fuller story of  the fine arts and material culture, rather than 
catering either to eighteenth-century connoisseur taste or the 
principles of  correct design for economic benefit. Knowledge 
of  art spread to all classes of  society in this period, but it was 
also transforming into a serious field of  study, which would have 
a profound effect on museums and exhibitions. 
 Victorian museums thus accommodated themselves to 
distinct visions and impulses. Regardless of  the collection policy 
pursued, however, there remained a general sense that exposure 
to the art objects would be morally and educationally beneficial. 
When the Museum of  Ornamental Art at Marlborough House 
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moved to its new location and became the South Kensington 
Museum, the institution took on even more revolutionary 
characteristics. The original museum aimed to be available to the 
broader public, open from Monday to Friday with Saturday as a 
free day.86 However, the South Kensington went even further, 
as Cole intended this museum primarily to benefit the working 
class. In his 1857 Introductory Lectures on the Science and Art 
Department and the South Kensington Museum, he remarked: 
“It is much less for the rich that the State should provide public 
galleries of  paintings and objects of  art and science, than for 
those classes who would be absolutely destitute of  the enjoyment 
of  them, unless they were provided by the State.”87 To that end, 
the museum was open six days a week throughout the year, with 
no vacation, and on three nights a week it would be open until 
ten o’clock in the evening. This policy was expressly for workers 
who would not be able to visit during the day,88 and it was 
achievable through gas lighting the galleries. Chambers’s Journal of  
Popular Literature, Science and Arts celebrated this as a “successful 
novelty…for artisan visitors who cannot come during the day.”89 
It was for this reason that middle-class collector John Sheepshanks 
decided to donate his collection of  British paintings to the South 
Kensington rather than the National Gallery, as Robert Vernon, 
the other eminent collector of  British artwork, had done. 
Whereas Vernon had longed for elite approval, Sheepshanks was 
secure in his middle-class identity and preferred the beneficial 
policies toward the lower orders at the South Kensington. He 
agreed with the liberal access policies, even desirous that his 
pictures be open to the public on Sunday.90 Critics charged that 
the location of  the museum in West London rendered it too 
far from the working-class public it supposedly served to be of  
any value, and indeed the neighborhood of  South Kensington 
did have aristocratic associations.91 Cole consistently defended 
the museum’s accessibility, reporting during proceedings of  the 
1860 Select Committee on the South Kensington Museum that 
his institution averaged thirty thousand more visitors per year 
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than the British Museum.92 He was aware of  the potential issues, 
however, and therefore he collaborated in the construction of  
boulevards and roads to improve access. The museum was also 
situated on omnibus routes, and Cole helped ensure that it would 
be a stop on the new Underground system.93
 As the Museum was so clearly oriented toward the 
accommodation of  the working class, and entirely managed by 
middle-class professionals, it would be easy to conclude that elite 
aristocrats were largely absent from this new mission. However, 
The Literary Gazette reported upon its opening that “The Museum 
appears to have excited much interest among the higher orders. It 
was attended by crowds of  well-dressed people.”94 Further, when 
the Queen attended a private viewing of  the museum before it 
opened to the public, the Morning Star noted that she was met 
there by notables such as the Marquess of  Lansdowne, Lord 
Stanley of  Alderley, and the Duke of  Buccleuch.95 These figures 
were sufficiently important to merit continued reporting on their 
public activities, and their art possessions were highly prized for 
their potential as valuable additions to loan exhibitions. Members 
of  the aristocracy did not create this institution, or propagate the 
rhetoric that surrounded it, but they were generous toward it. 
These balancing forces, along with the emergence of  scholarly art 
history, would express themselves in one of  the most important 
cultural events in mid-Victorian Britain: the 1857 Manchester 
Art Treasures Exhibition. 
Art treAsures And Art WeAlth: 
equIpoIse In the culturAl reAlM
 As a result of  the movement of  art from country homes 
to the capital that began in the eighteenth century, art in Britain 
was increasingly centered in London. As part of  the ongoing 
effort to make art and art instruction more available to the wider 
populace, the Museum of  Ornamental Art instituted a provincial 
loan system in which certain objects deemed unnecessary to the 
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central museum would be circulated to the provinces, a practice 
that would be continued by the South Kensington Museum. 
In this way, “the contents of  the Museum will, in time, have 
been literally brought home to each locality, and [an] incentive 
to the formation of  permanent local museums of  art will thus 
be given.”96 The desire to increase access to art for the entire 
country, especially in industrial towns and cities, precipitated 
the Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition. Manchester was the 
epitome of  an urban, manufacturing city in the mid-nineteenth 
century, controlled by the new wealthy middle class.  It was 
not a coincidence that the most comprehensive blockbuster 
art exhibition in Britain took place there.97 The Art-Treasures 
Examiner, a special publication issued by a city newspaper, The 
Manchester Examiner and Times, described the origins and impetus 
behind this venture:
It was in the early part of  the year 1856 that several 
of  the influential merchants and manufacturers 
of  Manchester, strongly impressed with the 
happy results of  the Paris Exhibition of  the 
previous summer, as well as those of  the Dublin 
Exhibition of  1853—forcibly struck, above all, 
with the important claims and uses of  the fine 
arts, and calling to mind the remark made by Dr 
Waagen in his valuable work, that the art-treasures 
in the United Kingdom were of  a character, in 
amount and interest, to surpass those contained 
in the collections upon the continent, bethought 
them of  the grand idea of  bringing the élite of  
these works into view under one roof, for the 
edification of  their fellow-men.98
Waagen’s Treasures of  Art in Great Britain, which brought to 
light the numerous private art collections of  quality in Britain, 
provided the idea to bring these works together in one space for 
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the benefit of  the public. 
 This concept eventually made its way to Thomas 
Fairbairn, who had been a commissioner of  the Great Exhibition 
and became the principal driver of  the Art Treasures Exhibition. 
He was the chairman of  the executive committee, composed of  
notable Manchester citizens, which raised a guarantee fund of  
over £70,000 in order to begin planning. He then reached out 
to Prince Albert to receive royal patronage from him and the 
Queen, which was, not surprisingly, quickly granted, as Albert 
took a keen interest in the project. The Earl of  Ellesmere was 
appointed president of  the General Council, which lent an air 
of  prestige and authority to the exhibition. Ellesmere, son of  
the Marquess of  Stafford, was a trustee of  the National Gallery 
and a member of  a family with a long history of  involvement 
in the arts. Several other noblemen were approached to provide 
their support, including Lord Derby and Lord Overstone.99 
Manchester businessmen were responsible for the creation and 
management of  the project, while the royalty and aristocracy 
served as prestigious figureheads. This was a project that 
encompassed both sectors of  society, although the driving force 
came from the newly wealthy.
 In order to successfully mount this exhibition, it 
was critical that those who held art treasures in their private 
possessions would be willing to lend them. The Report of  the 
Executive Committee asserted its confidence that gifts would be 
forthcoming, stating:
It will be necessary to invite extensive co-
operation from all patrons and lovers of  Art, and 
the Committee have reason to believe, from the 
very favourable reception which the project has 
already experienced…from all classes among the 
Public…that they will not meet with any serious 
difficulty in securing contributions.100
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Indeed, the response to loan requests was overwhelmingly 
positive.101 The solicitations often noted the support that the 
monarchy had given to the project;102 Prince Albert wrote to the 
Earl of  Ellesmere expressing his opinion that collectors would 
be willing to part with their paintings and objects if  they knew 
that not doing so would “mar the realisation of  a great National 
object.”103 This was a project with patriotic implications, and the 
elite were expected to play their part due to the value attributed 
to their holdings. The contributors’ generosity was lauded in the 
press, with the Art-Treasures Examiner pointing to some of  the 
most prolific donors, including the Duke of  Hamilton, the Duke 
of  Newcastle, the Duke of  Manchester, Earl de Grey, Lord 
Overstone, Lord Ashburton, the Earl of  Portsmouth, the Duke 
of  Richmond, and the Duke of  Marlborough.104 The publication 
sniffed at the “ingratitude” of  the Duke of  Devonshire, who 
had contributed nothing even though he held a significant 
collection at Chatsworth and Devonshire House.105 However, 
the duke had declined to participate due to ill health, not out 
of  any disdain for the project,106 and he in fact paid a visit to 
the exhibition, which the Art-Treasures Examiner noted.107 Many 
other elite figures attended, but it was by no means a preserve 
of  the aristocracy and the wealthy. Indeed, the organizers hoped 
for the attendance of  the working class, and the entrance fees 
on Saturday afternoons were reduced in order to induce them 
to come.108 In fact, the exhibition garnered over one million 
visitors, greatly helped by the ever-increasing railway system that 
made cheap travel much more feasible.109
 The Art Treasures Exhibition showcased the harmony 
between the belief  that comprehensiveness was publicly 
beneficial along with an increasingly sophisticated understanding 
of  art history. It occurred at the moment when art history was 
emerging as a codified field of  study, and the paintings and 
objects exhibited, as well as the way in which they were displayed, 
reflected this scholarly, universal impulse. The exhibition included 
“not only Oil Paintings, Water-colour Drawings, Engravings, and 
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Photographs” but also sculpture in all media, decorative furniture, 
musical instruments, glass, tapestry, antiquities, and costume, 
reflecting the collections of  the South Kensington.110 Both old 
master paintings and contemporary British art were included.111 
Notably, Italian paintings from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and 
early fifteenth centuries were displayed,112 reflecting Eastlake’s 
new acquisition policy. The paintings were hung chronologically 
and by school.113 The art critic George Scharf  was responsible 
for the selection and discussion of  the old masters, and his goal 
was to showcase a complete sample of  the history of  art from 
the Byzantine to the Baroque.114 This exhibition demonstrated 
the same scholarly interest evidenced by the new professional 
class of  curators such as Eastlake and Robinson.
 The Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition confirmed 
that the possessions acquired over generations of  aristocratic 
collecting, along with holdings of  the newly wealthy purchasers 
of  the nineteenth century, were emphatically part of  the national 
cultural heritage, even if  they were still held privately. The Art 
Journal remarked approvingly that “the aristocracy—of  rank and 
riches—[were] not only willing, but desirous, that the people 
should, as widely as possible, participate in the enjoyments 
they themselves derive from their treasures.”115 As long as they 
afforded liberal access to their works, there was a sense that the 
objects belonged to the British public as a whole. This growing 
consensus was further confirmed by a temporary exhibition 
curated by Robinson at the South Kensington in 1862, officially 
titled the “Special Exhibition of  Works of  Art of  the Medieval, 
Renaissance, and More Recent Periods, on loan at the South 
Kensington Museum,” but colloquially known as “The Art 
Wealth of  England.”116 This was intended to demonstrate 
representative specimens of  decorative art throughout the ages, 
and requests were sent out for donations from the monarchy, 
universities, corporations, and private aristocratic and wealthy 
collectors. Gifts were liberally given by all of  the groups, and 
it was difficult to accommodate everything that arrived at the 
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Museum.117 Notables such as the Marquess of  Abercorn, the 
Duke of  Devonshire, Earl Granville, the Duke of  Richmond, 
and Lord Willoughby d’Eresby all contributed, and they were 
joined by other non-aristocratic collectors.118 This exhibit 
was the brainchild of  a new organization of  which Robinson 
was a member, the Fine Arts Club, which included scholars, 
connoisseurs, and collectors who shared and discussed their 
knowledge and possessions. In the late 1860s, this club was re-
christened as the Burlington Fine Arts Club, an organization 
that brought prominent members of  the old aristocratic guard, 
such as Lord Lansdowne, into association with professional 
The Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition - The Great Hall, 
from The Illustrated London News 
(London, United Kingdom, May 30, 1857).
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curators like Robinson. The historian Gordon Fyfe describes the 
foundation of  this club as a moment of   “cultural rapprochement 
between the old and new orders.”119 Indeed, the “Art Wealth” 
exhibit represented an attendant turning point in the history 
of  the South Kensington Museum, as it had little to do with 
the utilitarian purpose of  elevating contemporary taste and was 
instead a celebration of  the history of  collecting in Britain, often 
under the purview of  the aristocracy.120
 The historian W.L. Burn famously described mid-
Victorian Britain as an age of  equipoise, signifying a period of  
political and social harmony, one in which class conflict waned, 
hierarchies were made slightly more flexible, and balance was 
maintained.121 Historians have debated this interpretation, but the 
evolution of  the South Kensington Museum and the Manchester 
Art Treasures Exhibition in the 1850s and 1860s proves that 
equipoise had arrived in the cultural realm. A vast new populace 
was allowed ever-increasing access to works of  art that had 
previously been the preserve of  the elite. Eighteenth-century 
connoisseur taste no longer dominated, and there was a new 
expert class of  curators that emphasized a more comprehensive 
art historical approach, while bureaucrats like Cole asserted 
the achievement of  the education, refinement, and broadened 
cultural horizons of  the working class as the primary goal of  
museums. The aristocracy had relinquished cultural control, but 
the oversight of  a realm of  society that had once been dominated 
by a particular class could not be so simply transferred. Indeed, 
even though trustees at the National Gallery lost much of  their 
power, they were not abolished altogether. Aristocratic donations 
were solicited and appreciated for temporary exhibition, and 
their treasures were claimed as the nation’s cultural heritage, 
without demanding that they be bequeathed permanently to the 
public. The aristocracy continued to lend an air of  prestige, even 
if  they no longer managed and created cultural institutions. Just 
as J.J. Angerstein, a banker, followed connoisseur preferences, 
and Robert Vernon, a middle-class collector, yearned for 
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acceptance from the old guard, many middle-class grandees still 
aped aristocratic techniques and ideas throughout the period. 
The reach of  the art world had been expanded to all classes of  
society, and it was professionally controlled, but the influence 
of  generations of  aristocratic cultural authority was still felt to a 
significant extent.
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An Affair on Every Continent: 
French Reaction to the Foreign Press 
during the Dreyfus Affair
David Murrell
 On October 15, 1894, artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus 
was summoned to the French Ministry of  War in Paris. At the 
time, the Jewish soldier, born in the northeastern French region 
of  Alsace, thought nothing of  the matter, believing he was merely 
due for his annual inspection. The only peculiarity was that he 
was specifically ordered to wear civilian clothing, but this seemed 
unimportant. Upon arriving at the ministry building, Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles du Paty de Clam met Dreyfus and asked the artil-
lery captain to compose a letter on his behalf, citing a sore finger. 
Dreyfus obliged, still unaware that anything was amiss. It was only 
after he had finished the letter, when du Paty de Clam rose and an-
nounced emphatically, “In the name of  the law, I arrest you; you 
are accused of  the crime of  high treason,”1 that Dreyfus realized 
this was no ordinary inspection.
 Such were the humble beginnings of  what came to be 
known as the Dreyfus affair, an international scandal that wracked 
France, as well as the rest of  the world, from 1894 until 1906. 
Specifically, Dreyfus had been accused of  passing on French army 
secrets to the German military attaché in Paris, Maximilien von 
Schwartzkoppen. As evidence, senior officials on the French Gen-
eral Staff  cited a document which would come to be known as the 
bordereau, an unsigned sheet of  paper containing sensitive French 
military information that had been picked up by a French spy in 
Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket at the German embassy. When du 
Paty de Clam summoned Dreyfus on that mid-October morning, 
his finger was not really injured. It was a trap, meant to prove that 
Dreyfus’s hand had written the incriminating document. The evi-
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dence was good enough for du Paty de Clam, for he immediately 
ordered Dreyfus’s incarceration. Dreyfus was then convicted by 
a closed-door military tribunal in December 1894 and sent to 
Devil’s Island, a penal colony off  the coast of  French Guiana, 
South America, notorious for its brutal conditions. With Dreyfus 
shipped halfway across the world and locked in a stone cabin 
measuring four square meters,2 the story of  a traitorous Jewish 
officer ought to have ended once and for all.
 Without the mass press that was burgeoning throughout 
Europe and, indeed, much of  the world, this might very well 
have been the case. The turn of  the twentieth century, however, 
brought with it a newly powerful actor: the modern newspaper. 
Illustration of  Alfred Dreyfus’s degradation ceremony 
at the École Militaire
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In France, the foundations for a literate, engaged citizenry were 
laid decades earlier with the adoption of  the 1833 Loi Guizot, 
which established primary schools throughout the country and 
created a new base of  readers in addition to the urban dwellers 
and educated classes.3 Not only were these new segments of  so-
ciety now capable of  reading, but they also had access to a novel 
brand of  popular press which, according to historian Christophe 
Charle, “abandoned the political function that dominated the 
press, instead choosing to distract and move the new readers, 
leading to the development of  so-called tabloids.”4 With its di-
verse cast of  characters, the Dreyfus affair served as fantastic 
tabloid fodder throughout Europe. Whether one was a “Dreyfu-
sard” supporting the artillery captain, or an “anti-Dreyfusard” in 
favor of  the guilty verdict, there was no shortage of  heroes and 
villains to support. 
 The case itself  had an inherently dramatic quality to it, 
for it soon became evident that a number of  the documents used 
to convict Dreyfus in his first court-martial were forgeries cre-
ated by members of  the French military. Colonel Georges Pic-
quart, one of  Dreyfus’s earliest defenders in the military, also 
realized that the leaks to Schwartzkoppen had continued even 
after Dreyfus’s arrest, which led him to discover the real traitor, 
a soldier by the name of  Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. While the 
French military had no desire to reopen the Dreyfus case, even 
wrongly clearing Esterhazy of  any wrongdoing in a court-mar-
tial, the press was now reporting on the various developments in 
the nascent affair with great zeal. This was in large part thanks 
to an article from a French newspaper, Georges Clemenceau’s 
L’Aurore, which helped spark serious international interest in the 
Dreyfus affair. That article was “J’accuse…!,” celebrated French 
novelist Émile Zola’s seminal open letter to French President Fé-
lix Fauré, published January 13, 1898. In “J’accuse,” Zola alleged 
that a massive conspiracy was being propagated by the French 
government and military to cover up Dreyfus’s innocence. In 
the aftermath of  the article’s publication, it became clear that the 
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French government would not succeed in burying the Dreyfus 
case, for Zola had managed to transform it into a bona fide inter-
national scandal. Indeed, from 1898 onward, Zola’s open letter 
polarized individual citizens within France, while also galvaniz-
ing support for Dreyfus throughout the world in the pages of  
the foreign press.
 There would be many developments and revelations 
between January 1898 and August 1899, the month Dreyfus 
was recalled from Devil’s Island for a second military tribunal 
in Rennes, France. But in some ways, Zola’s “J’accuse,” impos-
ing such pressure upon the French government, fast-tracked 
the Dreyfus case straight to Rennes. Indeed, by this point, the 
Dreyfus affair had gripped France, as well as the rest of  Eu-
rope. In one Belgian town, the entire community put on a parade 
in advance of  the Rennes court-martial, complete with citizens 
dressed up as French officers and lawyers.5 It is conceivable that 
these Belgian townsfolk were not well-versed in the political and 
legal intricacies of  the Dreyfus affair. But to them, these details 
did not matter. They were drawn to the characters and the the-
atrics of  it all, as if  the affair itself  were a real-life play. This was 
the legacy of  the popular press, which highlighted narrative and 
drama over the more burdensome legal and political details.
 If  the French government was concerned about the po-
litical and social ramifications of  an incendiary article like Zola’s, 
then it was equally troubled by the new international tenor of  
the affair. Admittedly, these fears proved to be quite rational. 
On the day of  Dreyfus’s reconviction at Rennes, demonstrations 
broke out in favor of  the ex-captain around the world. From 
Egypt to Australia, and virtually everywhere in between, the 
message was the same: people were indignant that Dreyfus had 
been reconvicted, particularly given the revelations that many of  
the documents used to convict him had been fraudulent.6 The 
French consul in Melbourne, Australia, reported that the situa-
tion “could not be worse.”7 In Belgium, the press was described 
as having a “rare violence.”8 Tens of  thousands demonstrated 
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in favor of  Dreyfus at Hyde Park in London, England.9 And in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, a group of  socialists signed a petition 
condemning the verdict, with the hope that their message could 
be transmitted to Dreyfus’s lawyer, Fernand Labori.10
 In 1899, nearly five years after Dreyfus’s original convic-
tion, the case inspired more controversy than ever before. It was 
ultimately the risk of  a continued media fiasco that led French 
President Émile Loubet to offer Dreyfus a pardon, which the 
artillery captain accepted on September 19, 1899. This, how-
ever, did not bring about a calm denouement to the affair. In-
deed, the Dreyfus affair was like a Hydra: when one controversy 
Émile Zola’s “J’accuse…!”
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was settled, two more appeared in its place. Eventually, in 1904, 
Dreyfus’s lawyer submitted a request on behalf  of  his client for 
a new appeal. After a slow march through the French courts, 
the Supreme Court of  Appeal announced on July 12, 1906, that 
Alfred Dreyfus was innocent. The French Senate passed a bill to 
promote Dreyfus to the rank of  major within the army. The fol-
lowing decade, Dreyfus would serve alongside his countrymen as 
an artillery officer in the First World War. 
 The foreign press played an instrumental role during the 
affair, familiarizing individuals across borders and continents 
with the plight of  Dreyfus. These people then mobilized around 
the world, pressuring the French government to amend the ver-
dict. Newspapers worldwide, some utilizing news agencies such 
as Reuters and others hiring their own foreign correspondents, 
reported detailed updates on the affair on a daily basis. The ex-
tent of  the spread of  information was impressive, even by to-
day’s standards. In 1898, for instance, the London Times repub-
lished a letter, originally sent to a newspaper in Vienna, Austria, 
which had been written by an American woman living in a small 
Finnish town.11 The woman, describing the conditions in her vil-
lage, reported, “People here are so frightfully interested in [the 
affair]. Even the peasants in quite out of  the way places spoke 
about it to my husband on his last journey. The general opinion 
in this country is that Dreyfus is innocent.”12
 This sort of  article, which did not condemn the French 
state or military, was relatively benign as far as the French gov-
ernment was concerned. But there were still many other stories 
written by the foreign press that directly attacked the French 
government’s treatment of  Dreyfus and, at least implicitly and 
occasionally explicitly, encouraged its readers to protest against 
France. Such demonstrations and discourse inevitably hurt 
France’s reputation as a bastion of  justice and equality, a position 
it had enjoyed since the French Revolution in 1789. This change 
in perception was a central concern of  the French Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, which kept detailed reports from its consuls and 
50     David Murrell
An Affair on Every Continent
ambassadors abroad pertaining to the activities of  the foreign 
press.
 Of  much greater concern to the ministry, however, was 
the publication of  numerous articles, particularly in neighbor-
ing Britain, which subsequently trickled into France and served 
to reignite the debate surrounding Dreyfus. This phenomenon 
was especially prevalent during the years between Dreyfus’s first 
conviction in 1894 and the publication of  “J’accuse” in 1898, 
a period when the affair was by no means entrenched as an in-
ternational scandal. Most famously, in 1896, Mathieu Dreyfus, 
the brother of  Alfred, convinced the British Daily Chronicle to 
publish a false story proclaiming that his brother had escaped 
from Devil’s Island.13 Mathieu hoped this would keep his broth-
er’s name in the press and provide a reminder that the Dreyfus 
affair had not yet concluded. Ultimately, Mathieu’s gamble paid 
dividends as a number of  British papers picked up the story, 
prompting the French press to follow suit and thus keeping the 
Dreyfus scandal in the public consciousness in France.
 Given this volatile atmosphere, it should come as no sur-
prise that the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs sought to keep 
close tabs on the foreign media in order to control any discourse 
pertaining to Dreyfus. This desire to control information abroad 
led the French government to pursue attempts at censorship 
more broadly than it ever did with its own domestic press. Al-
though the French certainly spied on their own newspapers and 
reporters, the government never moved to prevent the publica-
tion of  a domestic news story. This was due to the Press Law of  
1881, which effectively guaranteed newspapers the freedom to 
print whatever they pleased. The French treatment of  the for-
eign press, on the other hand, was a different story, as the Minis-
try of  Foreign Affairs repeatedly attempted to intervene through 
diplomatic channels in order to limit the publication of  damning 
materials against the French state. Unfortunately for the French 
government, many of  the foreign countries that covered the af-
fair most aggressively (particularly Belgium, Britain, Germany, 
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and Switzerland) either had their own liberalized press laws or 
had no incentive to restrict the publication of  articles that were 
hostile to France. For these reasons, the French focused their 
censorship efforts, particularly within Europe, on theater pro-
ductions, which were not yet granted similar freedoms from gov-
ernment censors. Even on the few occasions when France did 
move to influence the press outside of  Europe, the country’s 
efforts were generally unsuccessful.
***
 Relative to the rest of  the world, the European press re-
ceived the vast majority of  attention from the Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs. This was expected, for Europeans were much closer to 
France geographically and thus more familiar with the country’s 
history and culture. Naturally, this geographic proximity enabled 
the European press to locate more sources and invest more in 
breaking stories over the course of  the entire affair, as opposed 
to covering only crucial events such as the Rennes court-martial. 
The shared cultural and historical understanding among Eu-
ropeans was a primary reason the French government was so 
concerned with European press coverage. Indeed, much of  the 
affair was couched in terms that were intra-European in nature, 
making it relevant to the entire continent. When the coverage 
was critical of  France, as it almost always was, this constituted a 
political threat. For instance, after the British Daily Mail coined 
the term in September 1899, much of  the European press began 
referring to the Dreyfus affair as France’s “moral Sedan,” con-
necting the scandal to France’s humiliating military defeat at the 
Battle of  Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War of  1870-71. More-
over, the European press had an incentive to market the affair in 
a way that appealed to Europeans on a broader level. In doing 
so, the press created a continent-wide scandal, involving various 
players from France, Germany, and Italy alike. It became impos-
sible for Europeans not to link the infiltration of  Maximilien von 
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Schwartzkoppen, the German spy to whom Dreyfus allegedly 
sold military secrets, to the French military and its involvement 
in the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, the Dreyfusard European 
press could not help but frame the ex-captain’s convictions as a 
repudiation of  the gains of  the French Revolution. In this re-
gard, Europe was better equipped to cover the affair with vitriol 
and acumen than any other part of  the world.
 The Ministry of  Foreign Affairs devoted immense re-
sources to tracking the activities of  this international press. The 
department’s minister, Gabriel Hanotaux, received daily updates 
from his consular and ambassadorial staff  on the day’s foreign 
news. These dispatches took many different forms: press clip-
pings of  specific articles, hand-written translations, and detailed 
syntheses describing the coverage of  numerous papers. In the 
early days of  the affair, it was not a foregone conclusion that the 
foreign press would become obsessed with covering the case of  
Alfred Dreyfus. For instance, on November 6, 1897, the French 
ambassador to Germany wrote to Hanotaux, “the Affair in ques-
tion offers no direct interest for the German government.”14 The 
sentiment was echoed by the German press, and one German 
newspaper, La Gazette de la Croix, mentioned, “This whole ques-
tion is for France an internal affair, of  which we in Germany do 
not need to exaggerate the significance.”15
 This detachment disappeared in a matter of  weeks, fol-
lowing allegations in the French press that the German kaiser 
himself  dealt with Dreyfus and coordinated his espionage. Such 
an assertion transformed the Dreyfus affair in the eyes of  the 
German populace from an entirely French scandal into a calum-
ny that attacked the honor and reputation of  Germany. In other 
words, the affair became something of  a geopolitical conflict. As 
the French ambassador to Germany later described, “As a result 
of  all this, the German newspapers have modified their original 
attitude and no longer publish exclusively news articles about the 
affair.”16 Indeed, La Gazette de la Croix, which had downplayed 
the affair’s significance weeks earlier, now termed it France’s 
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“military Panama,” referring to the bribery scandal over the Pan-
ama Canal that walloped the French government in 1892. If  this 
anti-French sentiment was only burgeoning in Germany by the 
end of  November, it no doubt crystallized the following month. 
On December 12, 1897, Henri de Rochefort published an even 
more accusatory article in his popular newspaper L’Intransigeant, 
further implicating German Kaiser Wilhelm II.17
 This budding conflict with Germany was certainly trou-
bling for the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. The French 
ambassador to Germany continued to provide numerous up-
dates on the “biased and Francophobic” writings in German 
newspapers, such as those by the Paris correspondent of  the Ber-
liner Tageblatt.18 Germany was expected to cover the basic facts of  
the affair, but this transition to aggressive anti-French opinion 
pieces did not bode well for Franco-German relations. Indeed, 
only two decades earlier, France had lost the mineral-rich terri-
tory of  Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. The relationship between 
the two European powers, therefore, was already tense. And for 
a country that wished to appear strong in the aftermath of  such 
a devastating military defeat, the Dreyfus affair seemed to do 
just the opposite for France, reflecting the image of  a nation in 
decline for all to see. In the context of  Franco-German relations, 
these small changes in public perception had tangible diplomatic 
consequences.
 Although no British diplomats were implicated in the 
Dreyfus affair, much of  the British press coverage has been un-
derstood by historians in similar geopolitical terms. As historian 
Ricky Lee Sherrod argues, British interest in the affair stemmed 
in part from fear over the prospect of  a diminishing role of  lib-
eralism—particularly as it pertained to enlightened notions of  
justice, democracy, and laissez-faire economics—in the com-
ing twentieth century. The recently unified German Kaiserreich 
seemed to demonstrate that a state could achieve its desired 
ends through means that were decidedly illiberal, and the Drey-
fus affair signaled that perhaps France was journeying down a 
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similar path. Thus, as Sherrod writes, British reportage of  the 
affair reflected “a subliminal sense of  national insecurity,” which 
highlighted “an intense concern about the future of  liberalism 
and the declining popularity of  liberal values in both Britain and 
Europe.”19 As one magazine in Edinburgh noted, “If  what is 
now springing up rankly in France is germinating throughout the 
world, then the beginning of  a new century may be a rude one, a 
terrible shaking, the end of  which no human foresight can pre-
dict.”20 But if  the British media were concerned about the future 
of  European liberalism, then the Dreyfus affair offered a rare 
opportunity for Britain to assume the mantle as the “true world 
leader and principal promoter of  civilization and progressive 
ways. The Affair demonstrated the fragility of  French claims in 
these respects.”21 This widespread sense of  disappointment with 
the apparent French descent into injustice and illiberalism was 
not only felt across the English Channel. In 1898, the French 
consul in Antwerp, Belgium, recorded a conversation in which 
a local dignitary in the Masonic Lodge said, “If  a war broke out 
between France and Germany, all of  the people would be happy 
to hear of  the defeat of  the [French] ‘Grand Nation,’ which has 
abdicated the ideas of  justice and humanity of  which she has 
been the guardian since 1789.”22
 Historian Ronald K. Huch identifies a British press that 
was quite brazen in its geopolitical motivations for covering the 
Dreyfus affair. Huch notes that there were protests throughout 
Britain after Dreyfus’s second conviction at Rennes, but the mo-
ment Dreyfus was pardoned, the country seemed to lose any 
sense of  outrage regarding the affair. Thus, while a small number 
of  British citizens continued their noble fight and claimed that 
a pardon was still unjust, most of  the population felt as though 
their task had been completed. Huch argues that this reaction 
was no surprise, writing, “In England, the reaction to the Rennes 
trial had always been more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus.”23 In 
other words, the British had used the affair as a means of  criticiz-
ing the French, stoking the centuries-old rivalry between the two 
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countries. The moment France realized the folly of  its ways and 
pardoned Dreyfus, however, the British no longer had anything 
to gain from attacking the French. Put simply, the fate of  Drey-
fus himself  was irrelevant.
 The aforementioned “J’accuse” was unquestionably the 
spark that ignited much of  the rhetoric surrounding the Dreyfus 
affair around the globe. This rhetoric had tangible consequences 
for French citizens living abroad. Indeed, in one February 1898 
report sent to the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, the Rotter-
dam consul in the Netherlands warned that “business with our 
country is suffering from the current crisis. A certain number of  
travelling French commerce agents have been recently recalled 
by their firms because they have not been able to conduct any 
business.”24 Reports such as this one solidified the belief  within 
the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs that the spread of  anti-
French commentary across Europe had to be halted.
 In Amsterdam, the French consul general reported that 
many of  Zola’s pamphlets had been translated into Dutch and 
were now appearing in the windows of  libraries across the city.25 
Equally concerning to the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs was the fact 
that two pro-Dreyfus French newspapers, Le Siècle and L’Aurore, 
were beginning to emerge on the shelves of  small boutiques in 
the Netherlands. The Amsterdam consul concluded that, since 
these newspapers were not being sold in the official kiosks that 
had a monopoly on the sale of  foreign newspapers, they must 
have been coming directly from Paris as a propaganda tool to 
sow anti-French discord.26 Hanotaux found this development so 
troubling that he forwarded the consul general’s message to his 
superior, Prime Minister Jules Méline, and to his colleague in 
the French cabinet, Minister of  War Jean-Baptiste Billot. The 
subtext in Hanotaux’s action is clear: the French government 
may not have been able to censor Le Siècle or L’Aurore within its 
own borders, but it certainly could attempt to prevent the illegal 
smuggling of  these Dreyfusard papers throughout Europe.
 In attempting to control the foreign press’s access to 
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French newspapers, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs reached out 
to diplomats in neighboring countries. Only three days after Ha-
notaux received the news from his consul in Amsterdam, the 
Ministry of  the Interior sent him a separate message, asking Ha-
notaux to telegraph his German counterpart to see if  L’Aurore 
was sold there too.27 The French suspected that the newspaper 
had made its way to Germany either through Belgium or the 
Netherlands. Still, there is no evidence that the French govern-
ment solicited the Germans to ban the sale of  L’Aurore. Rather, 
it is likely that the French were attempting to uncover the extent 
of  the smuggling of  the newspapers, which they could then ad-
dress internally by preventing them from ever leaving France il-
legally in the first place.
Members of  the foreign press at the 1899 Rennes court-martial. 
From Cinq semaines à Rennes, deux cents photographies de Gerschel 
(Paris, France: F. Juven, 1900).
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***
 Although the French government had to exercise some 
degree of  caution in controlling the press abroad, it felt much 
more freedom in pursuing censorship of  the arts, particularly the 
theater. Even France itself, which had almost fully liberalized its 
press laws in 1881, did not end censorship of  the theater until 
1906. This was in part because in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
theater was considered even more influential than the press, as 
it was one of  the only ways through which the illiterate masses 
could be exposed to political caricature and criticism of  the rul-
ing elites.28 However, as the century progressed and the masses 
became more literate, the printed word surpassed plays as a more 
powerful medium for influencing public opinion. Nevertheless, 
the French government remained invested in censorship of  the-
atrical productions sympathetic to Dreyfus. In particular, the 
production of  a play entitled “Dreyfus, or the Martyr of  Devil’s 
Island,” which quickly spread across Europe, preoccupied the 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in France. In a letter dated January 
17, 1898, French diplomats in Belgium first notified Minister Ha-
notaux about the play’s existence. Hanotaux and the French con-
sul of  Antwerp then worked together to find a way to outlaw the 
performance altogether.29 Despite their efforts, the play’s popu-
larity persisted and performances were carried out on a regular 
basis in countries such as Italy and the Netherlands. Although 
the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of  
the Italian government, was able to suppress a production of  the 
play being staged in San Remo, Italy, Dreyfus’s mass appeal ren-
dered the play too difficult to suppress entirely. Indeed, not long 
after receiving the positive news regarding San Remo, Hanotaux 
confided to his consul in Amsterdam, “Are these performances 
still going on? I can only regret that they haven’t been forbidden 
like they were in The Hague.”30
 French efforts to suppress theater productions brought 
mixed results. On the one hand, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
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did enforce the interdiction of  some performances, particularly 
in countries that maintained strong and beneficial diplomatic re-
lations with France. Unlike major European powers such as Brit-
ain or Germany, smaller European states understood that there 
was little to gain from consistently tarnishing France’s world 
standing. As a result, these smaller countries were more sympa-
thetic to France’s plight. As one Italian newspaper proclaimed, 
“We love France and we wish her only the best: we hope she 
stays in Europe as a leader of  civilization rather than of  barba-
rism.”31 These smaller European states were perhaps also wary 
that a similar scandal could befall them one day in this new mass 
media environment—they understood that by helping France 
now during this time of  need, they could rely upon the country 
to return the favor at a later date.
 Even for those European governments that did sympa-
thize with France, enacting censorship necessitated a calculation 
between the benefit of  helping France versus the social cost of  
enacting overly harsh suppression. In Amsterdam, for example, 
the French were unable to convince Dutch diplomats to ban the 
production of  “Devil’s Island.” On January 26, 1898, the Am-
sterdam consul general broke the news to Hanotaux, writing, “A 
prohibition would only create in the press an ardent polemic; the 
legality and the opportunity would be contested…It would be a 
redoubling of  commotion, extra publicity from which only those 
amateurs seeking scandal would benefit.”32 This must have come 
as a disappointment to Minster Hanotaux, but the failure illus-
trates the complicated position occupied by the French Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs when it came to the coverage of  the Dreyfus 
affair abroad. Although the press was much more of  a threat to 
public opinion given its ability to reach and affect more people, it 
was nearly impossible to censor the scandal through diplomatic 
channels due to the widespread freedom of  the press laws in Eu-
rope. All that was left to censor, then, were the cheap and often 
poorly attended “Boulevard theater” productions, such as “The 
Captain Dreyfus,” which was staged in Hamburg, Germany, in 
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February 1898. According to one Frenchman who attended the 
play on behalf  of  the French consul, the spectacle was terrible. 
“Poorly directed and without any artistic value,” he wrote, “there 
were at least as many whistles as there was applause.”33
An advertisement for an American play based on the 1899 work Devil’s Island: 
A Novel founded upon the famous Dreyfus case. Though there is no evidence the 
French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs ever sought to censor this particular 
production, plays such as this one were often the targets of  censorship efforts 
led by the ministry.
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 The French efforts to censor negative press in the arts 
constitute an early form of  so-called “cultural diplomacy.”34 This 
was, of  course, unlike the cultural diplomacy of  the Cold War, 
where cultural products were sent from the United States to 
the Soviet Union, and vice versa, in an effort to establish some 
degree of  understanding between the two enemy powers. In-
stead, in the French context, cultural diplomacy was a strategy 
implemented as a means of  shaping the cultural realm of  for-
eign countries in a way that was beneficial to French interests. 
Such efforts at cultural diplomacy were not deployed solely by 
the French. After the Rennes retrial and the decision to convict 
Dreyfus, masses across Europe petitioned their respective gov-
ernments to use cultural events to punish France. This took the 
form of  calls to boycott the 1900 World’s Fair, which was to 
be held in Paris. These demands began as early as 1898, albeit 
more quietly. One German newspaper first made the suggestion 
after Zola was convicted for libel following the publication of  
“J’accuse.”35 The French took these concerns seriously, for the 
World’s Fair was anticipated to be not only an economic boon 
for France, but also an opportunity to celebrate the country’s his-
tory and glory as one of  the great states of  Europe. Any boycott 
would have been a serious blow both to finance and national 
pride. In September 1899, the French consul at Hamburg alerted 
the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs about a German news article that 
suggested a boycott and also noted that “many very important 
American businesses have made the decision to send nothing to 
the Exposition if  the situation does not improve, and the busi-
ness world in England is set to follow this example as well.”36 As 
Michael Burns notes in his historical study of  the 1900 World’s 
Fair and the Dreyfus pardon, the risk of  losing the international 
festival played a significant role in pressuring the French govern-
ment to pardon Dreyfus following the Rennes verdict. As Burns 
asserts, 
[Prime Minister Pierre] Waldeck-Rousseau’s gov-
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ernment quickly realized that a pardon would 
serve many purposes: it would eliminate the very 
real possibility of  the prisoner’s death while in 
custody…The pardon would also serve to liber-
ate Dreyfus without exonerating him (and there-
by pacify many factions in France); and it would 
salvage the 1900 Exposition by calming interna-
tional protest.37
 Although the threats to boycott never derived from in-
dividual governments, the international community nevertheless 
exercised its own sort of  pressure on France, much like France 
did in its suppression of  foreign theater productions through 
cultural diplomacy.
***
 Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French made little if  any 
effort to engage with or amend the portrayal of  Alfred Drey-
fus in the United States. Perhaps in that country, where freedom 
of  speech was so deeply ingrained in the fabric of  society, the 
French recognized that any requests for censorship would either 
not be accepted or not be upheld. That is not to say, however, 
that the French ignored American coverage of  the Dreyfus af-
fair altogether. And there was indeed tremendous coverage of  
the scandal in the United States, which continued to crest lead-
ing up to and during the 1899 Rennes trial. As Egal Feldman, 
a scholar of  Jewish American history, records in his book The 
Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, for a country “aspir-
ing to play a meaningful, if  not heroic, role in the world, it was 
only natural that the attention of  Americans would be attracted 
to major political and social crises abroad.”38 Much of  the af-
fair was transmitted to the United States through British media 
outlets—only a few newspapers based out of  major cities in the 
United States could afford their own foreign correspondents to 
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travel to France and report on the unfolding events there—and 
consequently, a significant portion of  American coverage began 
to reflect certain British idiosyncrasies and perspectives. Most 
notably, this manifested into what Feldman terms an “Anglo-
American bond” in judicial procedures.39 A New York Times ar-
ticle from 1898 illustrates this tendency:
In France…there are no rules of  evidence…
Witnesses have appeared before the judges and 
have spoken their minds freely. They have not 
presented evidence. They have given their own 
opinions. They have expressed the opinions of  
others. They have repeated conversations that 
they have heard at second or third hand. All this 
is called testimony in Europe.40
 
Much of  this coverage can be interpreted as American self-con-
gratulation. The not-so-subtle subtext in articles such as these 
was that Dreyfus’s conviction never could have occurred in a 
more civilized or democratic nation such as the United States, 
where judicial procedures and norms were much more rational. 
In this regard, American press coverage hardly differed from the 
self-aggrandizement that historian Ricky Lee Sherrod detected 
in his study of  the British press.
 On the other hand, the French judiciary undeniably tol-
erated a great deal of  testimony that would have been impermis-
sible in the United States. During the Rennes court-martial, for 
instance, former French Minister of  War Auguste Mercier testi-
fied that German and British bankers had donated over thirty-
five million francs to mysterious forces—frequently referred to 
in the anti-Semitic, anti-Dreyfusard press as the so-called “Jew-
ish Syndicate”—who were working to exonerate Dreyfus.41 The 
French newspapers were left to rebut this claim, with one article 
in Le Figaro commenting, “Nothing is more unjust, nothing more 
slanderous, monstrous, however, than that accusation of  Gen-
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eral Mercier…It is an attempt to dishonor all those who fight for 
the triumph of  the truth.”42 Thus, in France, newspapers played 
the role of  quasi-arbiter, condemning false testimony when the 
judicial structure failed to do so. Still, to an American public un-
familiar with the intricacies of  French legal customs, testimony 
like Mercier’s was laughable and undermined justice.
 The French were well aware of  the growing power of  
the United States, and this sometimes manifested itself  as unrea-
sonable paranoia about the influence of  the American press. The 
most pronounced instance of  such fears transpired in December 
1897, when Minister Hanotaux sent a letter to the New York 
consul marked “very confidential,” inquiring into an alleged plot 
orchestrated by the New York newspaper the World to free Drey-
fus from Devil’s Island:
An individual who calls himself  Antoine de Bas-
tillac, and who has collaborated at the World in 
New York, recently passed through Paris, stating 
that he had participated in a plot that was orga-
nized a few months ago in the United States by 
the Israelite director of  the newspaper to remove 
Dreyfus; he assures that the project will soon be 
restarted and that an expedition will be organized 
in Louisiana to this end, under the pretext of  a 
shipment of  arms to Cuba. Do your best to pro-
vide me information on Bastillac and on what he 
alleges. If  need be, consult with your colleague in 
New Orleans.43
That the French believed such a complex scheme to be plausible 
speaks volumes about their perception of  the American press. 
Indeed, the French were so concerned about the possibility of  
such a plot that they even contacted Spain to request that the 
Spanish provide any intelligence they might have procured per-
taining to the alleged conspiracy. Such a plan never materialized 
64     David Murrell
An Affair on Every Continent
and was, of  course, no more than an elaborate fiction. Yet the 
seriousness with which the French government processed and 
reacted to this warning reveals a deep-seated fear of  the power 
of  the American press.
 If  French government officials feared American newspa-
per influence, they also often expressed disdain for the negative 
coverage that so frequently emanated from the United States. 
The reports sent from the Chicago consul to the French Minis-
try of  Foreign Affairs during the Rennes trial of  1899 were par-
ticularly indicative of  this French sentiment, which contained a 
powerful mix of  wounded pride and betrayal. In these letters, the 
Chicago consul compiled an impressive list of  grievances against 
the United States. From criticism of  the newspaper coverage 
itself, to jealousy over the country’s privileged position in the 
world, to dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of  American society 
as a whole, these missives expressed in impassioned language the 
frustration felt by a proud Frenchman and diplomat serving his 
country in hostile isolation.
 In one of  the consul’s earliest letters to the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, dated August 24, 1899, the diplomat noted with 
contempt that every single newspaper in Chicago was support-
ing Dreyfus. This was compounded by the fact that, curiously, 
many pro-Dreyfus Frenchmen had been contributing articles to 
the American press, which had infused the local coverage with 
a heretofore unseen tenacity and proximity to the story. As the 
consul in Chicago observed, “Numerous French writers such 
as Bernard Lazare, Joseph Reinach, Marcel Prévost, and Clem-
enceau contribute regularly to this extraordinary service of  the 
American press, which we can say has been unanimously favor-
able to the condemned of  1894.”44 He later continued, “All good 
Frenchmen abroad cannot rid themselves of  an incommensurate 
sadness in the presence of  exaggerated interference of  the for-
eign press in a family affair.”45 Implied in these musings of  the 
consul was the belief  that the foreign press took an interest in the 
Dreyfus affair not for noble reasons of  justice, but instead due to 
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a voyeuristic fascination with watching and analyzing what he be-
lieved to be a private “family affair.” Thus, it must have been dis-
heartening for the diplomat to hear from an American journalist 
that “It is good style now to run down France; it makes money; 
it shows to France that there is something else than herself  and 
behind her in the world.”46
 Arguably the most fascinating aspects of  these letters 
from the consul in Chicago were his own interpretations of  
American society near the turn of  the twentieth century and the 
visible contradictions he discerned between the holier-than-thou 
tone expressed in American newspapers versus the actual news 
unfolding within the borders of  the United States. Of  particular 
interest was an anecdote reported by the consul in 1899, when a 
Jewish cadet was forced to leave the United States Military Acad-
emy in West Point, New York, following repeated anti-Semitic 
treatment from his classmates. On this issue, the consul in Chica-
go noted that the American press remained silent. “It is, anyhow, 
the third incident of  this sort that has occurred in recent years…
We are getting used to being treated in the manner in which 
we treat China…At home, we cover up all things,” he mused, 
mimicking the American thought process, “but when we need 
to provide something exciting to our readers, we demand light, 
always more light on the affairs of  France.”47 If  American anti-
Semitism and hypocrisy were not already disgraceful enough, 
the consul also hurled accusations at the Americans for being 
fortunate geographically, yet ungrateful to the French, who had 
helped secure American independence over a century earlier:
If  they had, to the west, a powerful Mexico pos-
sessing a fleet twice their size, and wealth, and an 
incommensurable means of  attacking them, the 
press of  this country would better understand 
the indignity of  its current behavior against our 
nation, which has poured its blood and given its 
gold, even when it was weak and fighting almost 
66     David Murrell
An Affair on Every Continent
without hope for its independence from which it 
has grown ever since.48
 The link between the foreign press and diplomacy was 
clear to the Chicago consul. In his view, the press was a tool with 
which geopolitical games could be conducted. This was by no 
means incorrect, for as has been noted earlier, the British press 
printed false stories about Dreyfus’s escape from Devil’s Island 
with the hopes that this would reignite the affair. Indeed, the 
British motivation for doing so was, as Ronald Huch contended, 
to help encourage anti-French sentiment and in turn promote 
the superiority of  the British.49 The French diplomat in Chicago 
perceived many similarities in American press coverage, specu-
lating that the country’s pro-Dreyfus sentiments stemmed from, 
above all, a desire for Anglo-American friendship: “I am con-
vinced that the American press would not be so violent against 
us, if  behind its movements existed the desire…to benefit their 
new British friends.”50 This is precisely what Egal Feldman spec-
ulates, referring to the Anglo-American friendship as “a redis-
covery of  a common Anglo-Saxon heritage, a ‘unique partner-
ship’; proposals were even made for an alliance or reunion of  the 
English-speaking people.”51 But the consul in Chicago was not 
only concerned with the burgeoning Anglo-American friend-
ship. In a letter sent on September 10, 1899, the French diplomat 
also reported that Kaiser Wilhelm II recently sent a German flag 
to Chicago and remarked to an American that “a war between 
Germany and the United States would be impossible.”52 For the 
French, witnessing this condemnation from both Britain and 
Germany must have been a gravely concerning diplomatic devel-
opment. Perhaps most frustrating of  all was the fact that France 
was powerless to control the American press. With regards to 
the United States, therefore, France found itself  in a subservient 
position, only able to express its displeasure in private dispatches 
sent back to the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in Paris.
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***
 Beyond Europe and the United States, France attempted 
to control the foreign discourse surrounding the Dreyfus affair 
with greater latitude, particularly in South America and India. No 
longer burdened by strictly enforced liberal freedoms granted to 
the press, the French could refocus their attention to influenc-
ing the printed word, which they never dared to do in Europe 
or the United States. Indeed, on September 19, 1897, Minister 
Hanotaux sent a telegram to the French consul in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil. “I understand that certain Brazilian newspapers are cov-
ering the Dreyfus Affair in order to spread negative press about 
the government of  the Republic,” the minister said, “I ask you 
to keep watch over this campaign, and if  necessary, refute the 
noise put into circulation.”53 The order coming from the French 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs here was somewhat ambiguous—
perhaps Hanotaux was using a euphemism to advocate for di-
rect attempts at censorship of  the Brazilian newspapers. Even 
if  Hanotaux only meant for his consul in Rio to make a public 
denunciation of  the Brazilian press, this still demonstrated a de-
gree of  direct intervention into another country’s foreign affairs 
that France did not even attempt to employ in Europe.
 France still met some opposition in its quest to control 
the foreign press outside of  Europe. Perhaps the most glaring 
failure came in British-controlled India, following a particularly 
incendiary sermon given by the bishop of  Calcutta in Septem-
ber 1899. The speech, which was printed in its entirety in the 
local newspaper The Englishman, attacked the moral fiber of  the 
French state for allowing the Dreyfus affair to transpire in the 
first place, despite the recent pardon of  the artillery captain. The 
bishop began by lamenting the entire ordeal: “What has become 
then of  those high principles of  liberty, equality, and brother-
hood of  which France has been held to be the self-constituted 
exponent? What final interest can a nation possess save in truth 
and justice and equity?”54 Next, he issued an attack on France, 
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denouncing the French people with a flourish:
There are conditions of  a comity among nations 
as among individuals. We do not endow a man 
with our confidence if  he has proved guilty of  
some flagrant crime; at least until he has repent-
ed of  it. Nor can we stand upon friendly terms 
with a nation of  men which has violated the el-
ementary laws of  human truth and justice.55
Despite this disappointment in the French regime though, the 
bishop’s sermon concluded on an optimistic note:
Let us pray then that France, that great and gal-
lant nation, may know ere it be too late “the 
things which belong unto her peace.” Let us pray 
that she may cast off  the bondage of  that military 
spirit which idolizes and sanctifies mere force. 
Let us pray that she may turn her back upon the 
unhappy policy which has too often in public 
life ignored or dishonoured the sacred name of  
God. Let us pray that in her national history she 
may recognize and realise yet again the eternal 
principles of  truth and justice and equity.56
 Unsurprisingly, the French found this sermon to be 
harsh and unacceptable, going so far as to lodge an official com-
plaint with the British colonial government.57 Citing a number of  
different passages from the sermon, including one in which the 
bishop advocated a boycott of  the 1900 World’s Fair, the French 
consul general in Calcutta claimed that the sermon was “injuri-
ous” and “an act of  hostility against France.” Three weeks later, 
the French government received a response from the colonial 
government, which refused to apologize for the bishop’s behav-
ior:
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The government of  India can accept no respon-
sibility for statements on matters of  current in-
terest that may be uttered from the pulpit either 
by the metropolitan or by any Bishop or minis-
ter of  religion in India. Such a responsibility is 
not, so far as the government of  India are aware, 
assumed by the civil power in any country; and 
it would appear to be fatal to that freedom of  
thought and speech with which the pulpit among 
all civilized peoples is, by virtues of  its moral and 
spiritual authority, endowed.58
 This controversy helps reveal a crucial element of  the 
French response to the foreign press: the French government 
was concerned not only with newspaper coverage pertaining to 
the Dreyfus affair, but also with the spread of  information per-
taining to Dreyfus more generally, whether it be a sermon or a 
theater production. Nor did these goals seem to have any sort 
of  geographic limits—indeed even India, which was neither a 
French colony nor close to the European continent, was not ex-
empt from receiving the attention of  the French Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs.
***
 That the French government invested so many resources 
in the monitoring of  the foreign press served as a tacit acknowl-
edgement that the foreign press was among the primary engines 
driving the scandal of  the Dreyfus affair. The Ministry of  For-
eign Affairs had a rather simple strategy when it came to control-
ling coverage of  the affair: limit any discourse, positive or nega-
tive, pertaining to Alfred Dreyfus. The hope was that by limiting 
any kind of  knowledge, foreign populations would eventually 
lose interest in the drama of  the affair. Given the links between 
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foreign and French publications, this strategy might have served 
as a means of  minimizing French interest in the affair as well.
 As a result, within Europe the French government 
looked to control those elements of  the press that it could ma-
nipulate with ease. This frequently meant wielding France’s close 
diplomatic ties to its neighbors to engage in a sort of  “cultural 
diplomacy,” by which France could convince other countries to 
suppress certain theater productions about Dreyfus. In this cul-
tural realm, however, France experienced limited victories. The 
theater had been the primary means of  disseminating informa-
tion to the masses in the mid-nineteenth century, but by the turn 
of  the twentieth century, the masses of  Europe began to receive 
much of  their information from the press. And when France 
turned its sights to this newly influential European press, other 
states’ liberal press laws severely limited the country’s ability to 
restrict the growing discourse of  the Dreyfus affair.
 Meanwhile, in the United States, the French experienced 
no successes of  any sort. The American press viewed the Drey-
fus affair as a means of  solidifying its friendship with Britain 
and felt especially secure in knowing that the French could not 
censor them in any way. The only arena in which the French gov-
ernment could attempt to control both the press and the cultural 
sphere, therefore, was outside of  the United States and Europe. 
Even in these cases, however, the French experienced opposi-
tion. In a humiliating display of  its own weakness, the Minis-
try of  Foreign Affairs could not even manage to quell the anti-
French rhetoric of  an anonymous preacher in the British impe-
rial colony of  India. This incident served to demonstrate both 
the incredible spread of  information about Dreyfus’s plight, as 
well as the inability of  France to control foreign engagement 
with the scandal.
 Confronted by a new era in which the press acted as the 
engine of  knowledge and scandal in the world, the French were 
presented with a Sisyphean endeavor when it came to limiting 
the scope of  the Dreyfus affair. These forces would only con-
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tinue to swell in the coming twentieth century, as newspapers 
continued to exert a massive influence on society. Indeed, in the 
years leading up to the First World War, the German government 
also began to closely monitor the press as a means of  gauging 
public opinion. It too viewed the press as a device with which it 
could track and potentially influence the public.59 The Germans 
would soon find, as the French had before, that their patriotic 
press was ultimately impossible to control. The British would 
also come to learn this lesson, for in 1909, the famous “We 
want eight and won’t wait!” slogan propagated by the patriotic 
press and naval armament interest groups compelled the Liberal 
government to double its annual dreadnought production from 
four to eight ships.60 These were the same underlying forces that 
gripped France during the affair. The Dreyfus affair was thus a 
preview of  the powerful mass media and domestic pressures that 
would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
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Gin, Gentlemen, and 
Generational Conflict
Chloé Nurik
And there are certain definite duties of  the student 
at Harvard…He must be a gentleman. A gentleman respects 
tradition. And the traditions at Harvard are quiet traditions. 
Nothing so bespeaks a vulgar and impoverished intellect as 
noise in word or action.
—The Harvard Crimson, 19261
College Windows, a FLIRTATION,
Moonshine, gin, HALLUCINATION;
This is part of  EDUCATION
Living in our GENERATION.
—The Punchbowl, 19252
 During the 1920s, youth symbolized modernity, progress, 
and development as a young generation of  Americans espoused 
new values and served as a lightning rod for social change. Col-
lege men epitomized these transformations as they confronted 
the values of  their educational institutions and asserted unique 
aspects of  their identities, which they believed separated them 
from the previous generation.3 Through on-campus protests, 
open defiance of  Prohibition, and a cavalier attitude toward aca-
demics, collegiates defined a new type of  masculinity that chal-
lenged authority and prioritized peer approval. In addition to 
these changes, historians cite the increased prominence of  col-
lege sports (particularly football) and fraternities as evidence of  
a dramatic transition from an internal, character-based model of  
masculinity to an external, personality-based model.4 However, 
a close examination of  college records and student publications 
reveals that many young men attending Harvard, Yale, and the 
University of  Pennsylvania in this decade sought to retain key 
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aspects of  character-based masculinity (such as honor, integrity, 
and self-sacrifice) while incorporating features of  the more mod-
ernized version (such as social popularity, physical appearance, 
and self-indulgence). Their lived experiences call into question 
the existing historiography by suggesting that notions of  mascu-
linity did not shift in an abrupt or absolute manner in the 1920s.5 
Campus activities that promoted male bonding and school spirit 
became more significant in this era but were also present in pre-
vious decades, revealing continuity in forms of  masculine affili-
ation and rituals across generations. Furthermore, many young 
men at elite universities struggled to incorporate disparate and 
opposing notions of  masculinity into their identities. They ad-
opted a complex, multifaceted construct of  manhood that si-
multaneously anchored them to the past and allowed them to 
embrace the new values of  a modernized society.
peer culture And IntergenerAtIonAl conflIct
 In the 1920s, due to increased enrollment in college6 
and the establishment of  a “network of  peer relations,” youth 
suddenly burst onto the social scene and became influential in 
American society.7 The devastation of  World War I significant-
ly affected the mentality of  young people, creating a profound 
sense of  disillusionment coupled with an urgency to live life to 
its fullest.8 Consequently, members of  the younger generation 
sought to differentiate themselves from the older generation, 
blaming their elders for leading the nation into war. In his 1920 
article, “These Wild Young People,” John F. Carter Jr. makes the 
resentment of  youth explicit: 
I would like to observe that the older generation 
had certainly pretty well ruined this world before 
passing it on to us…We have been forced to live 
in an atmosphere of  “to-morrow we die,” and 
so, naturally, we drank and were merry…We may 
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be fire, but it was they who made us play with 
gunpowder.9
In this indictment, Carter distances youth from the older genera-
tion, a dynamic that fueled the importance of  peer affiliations. 
 The primary sphere of  influence for youth shifted from 
authorities to peers, a transition that was especially dramatic for 
college men who operated within a subculture separate from the 
outside world.10 From the time freshmen arrived on campus, 
they confronted a new social order and sought the acceptance 
of  their peers. In 1925, Yale’s Eli Book provided the following 
advice to freshmen: “here in college we find ourselves in a world 
teeming with men of  about our own age whom we meet at ev-
ery turn, going to the same places, doing pretty much the same 
things, living all about us in the Oval. From among these we are 
going inevitably to choose our associates and our friends.”11 As 
reflected in this statement, students valued college as an avenue 
through which they could form social connections, strategically 
positioning themselves for later success.12 The locus of  influence 
naturally shifts from parental authority to peer approval when 
youth leave for college. However, this transition may have been 
more dramatic during this era, as young men felt compelled to 
differentiate themselves from the older generation and empow-
ered themselves through the expansion and idealization of  youth 
culture.13
 In their eagerness to identify with peers, college men em-
phasized modern values, adopting habits of  dress and behavior 
that helped them fit in.14 They conformed to a set of  standards 
that defined a new type of  masculinity, setting them apart from 
their fathers.15 A 1923 ad featured in The Harvard Crimson cap-
tures this tendency.16 As a young, clean-shaven man compares 
himself  to a picture of  his heavily mustached father, he draws 
attention to the contrast in their appearances: “And Dad was my 
age when he sat for that!”17 On a superficial level, this ad con-
veys the message that a more youthful look can be achieved by 
78     Chloé Nurik
Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict
purchasing the featured shaving cream. However, on a symbolic 
level, the dual image in the ad exaggerates the clash between gen-
erations of  men who subscribed to different values. Young men 
grounded themselves in a changing world by highlighting these 
contrasts. By rejecting certain characteristics they saw in their 
fathers, collegiates defined their identities in opposition to these 
images and aligned themselves with their peer culture.18
This ad plays off  a stark contrast between a young man 
and his father.
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 Anchored by their social communities, emboldened col-
lege men challenged institutional authority and envisioned them-
selves as the vanguard of  cultural change. Their sense of  self-
importance is evident in a speech by Hannibal Hamlin on Yale’s 
Class Day in 1927: “CLASSMATES—You are the apostles of  
change…You are 1927, typifying nothing and representing ev-
erything…The Class of  1927 is pointed to as the end of  an old 
era, as the beginning of  a new era, and as the transition between 
the two.”19 Hamlin’s impassioned speech suggests that collegiates 
recognized this era as a liminal period between old and new val-
ues. They viewed themselves as both unique and the product of  
generations who came before them. Elite universities fostered a 
sense of  connection to the past by reminding students of  their 
place in a long lineage of  cultivated leaders. Schools expected 
students to appreciate their pedigree and to make the institution 
a cornerstone of  their identity. Yale collegiate E. J. Begien made 
this agenda evident in his address to the freshman class of  1926: 
“You are coming to New Haven to be for four years a part of  
that process whereby Yale men are made…[and] each man…
will add to the store for the generations to come.”20 These so-
cially conservative institutions promoted Victorian values, and 
collegiates carried the mantle of  their school’s legacy upon their 
shoulders. While college men in the 1920s still clung to an in-
stitutional identity that offered them social prestige (expressing 
pride about being a “Yale Man” or a “Harvard Man”),21 they also 
railed against the old order and tested the bounds of  established 
authority.
Boys BehAvIng BAdly
 College men of  this era had a reputation for self-in-
dulgence, personal vanity, and lack of  restraint.22 In mass me-
dia representations, collegiates were depicted as rambunctious, 
rebellious, and immoral.23 While this portrayal was stereotyped 
and flat, a review of  student records reveals that it held more 
80     Chloé Nurik
Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict
than a grain of  truth. Archival sources indicate that college men 
bonded with each other by transgressing laws, bending rules, 
and behaving mischievously. These peccadilloes were a central 
way in which young collegiates enacted their masculinity, illus-
trating the connection between behavior and gender construc-
tion.24 Feminist theorist Judith Butler explains that individuals 
rehearse, perform, and repeat gendered actions in order to fulfill 
social scripts.25 Men of  the 1920s “performed”26 their manhood 
through rebellious actions during Prohibition, a so-called “Dry 
Decade.”27 Historian Paula Fass identifies alcohol consumption 
in this era as a ritualized masculine behavior: “unlike the other 
moral issues of  the twenties, drinking was a male-centered prob-
lem…Drinking had always been a male prerogative.”28 Colle-
giates consumed alcohol at parties and at football games, openly 
demonstrating their disregard for the law.29 They used alcohol as 
a signifier of  manly defiance and carefree living. Historian Nich-
olas Syrett explains that since drinking in the 1920s represented 
“a defiance not only of  the college administration but also of  
federal law,” drinking became a key way to demonstrate mascu-
line bravado within one’s peer group.30 For example, the 1927 
Yale Class book included humorous comments from students 
that linked college life with alcohol consumption. When asked, 
“What do you think is Yale’s greatest need?” a student respond-
ed, “Repeal of  18th Amendment.”31 When asked, “What is your 
chief  regret in regard to your college career?” one student said 
“Prohibition,” while another quipped, “Not drinking more.”32 
Rather than feeling the need to hide the fact that they engaged 
in this illegal activity, collegiates at Yale (and other Ivy League 
schools) openly flaunted their drinking habits. By failing to en-
force the law, school administrators provided an opportunity for 
collegiates to bond through rebellious acts.
 Many college men broke with the gentleman-like con-
duct stressed by their upbringing and were prone to mischie-
vous behavior. They played practical jokes, engaged in demon-
strations, and took collective action over minor grievances. For 
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instance, students at Harvard, who were tired of  being served 
the same food, protested through an “egg rebellion.”33 Yale ath-
letes, celebrating a football victory over Harvard, carried away 
the goalposts as “Souvenirs.”34 In the classroom, students often 
created chaos, showing little interest in academics and minimal 
respect for their professors. In fact, students sometimes threw 
objects (such as raw eggs) at their professors during lectures.35
 During this era, school-wide rituals became immensely 
popular, particularly those that pivoted on class rivalry. At the 
University of  Pennsylvania, these events occurred with such reg-
ularity that they became a routine part of  college life: “Through-
out the school year, the freshmen would struggle to meet the 
challenges set by the sophomores as a rite of  passage into the 
privileged world of  the University.”36 One annual ritual in the 
1920s was an event in which sophomore and junior architecture 
students at Penn fought over the right to wear smocks (to signify 
the dominance of  their class), resulting in mudslinging and tear-
ing clothes off  one another.37
This 1929 photo at the University of  Pennsylvania shows the Smock Fight.38 
According to scholar Amey Hutchins, students “hurled eggs and mud.”39
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 Several of  the rituals at Penn became so popular that 
they drew spectators from the city of  Philadelphia to the cam-
pus. However, the level of  rowdiness was sometimes difficult 
to contain, and there were a few occasions when such events 
brought negative attention to the school. Such was the case with 
the annual “Pants Fight,” an end of  the year event that started 
in 1922 in which freshmen and sophomores engaged in a brawl, 
culminating in the losers being stripped of  their pants.41 In May 
1923, when a group of  enthusiastic freshmen publically adver-
tised this fight by appearing on a trolley car wearing only their 
undergarments, “they drew gasps of  horror from maids and ma-
trons by trying to board a Woodland Avenue trolley car in which 
girls and women were passengers,” and they were promptly ar-
rested for their indiscretion.42 School administrators valued inter-
class rivalries, which expanded in the 1920s, as a way of  promot-
ing class unity and school spirit. In fact, the annual “Flour Fight” 
and “Poster Fight,” which were physically dangerous (sometimes 
resulting in concussions and broken bones), were routinely at-
Students at the University of  Pennsylvania engaged in the 
annual Pants Fight to show their class pride.40
Penn History Review     83 
Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict
tended by faculty spectators who cheered and hissed at partici-
pants during the event.43 It seems that university administrators 
and collegiates alike viewed these organized fights as a natural 
part of  manhood and as a way for new students to prove their 
worth as college men.44
 The majority of  these rituals were intended to provide 
an outlet for expressing the playful vitality of  youth and to foster 
male bonding. However, some incidents erupted into widespread 
rioting that created chaos and spilled over into the local com-
munity.45 Rioting at Harvard, Yale, and Penn had a contagion 
effect, starting on one campus and then spreading to the others 
in succession.46 In 1925, The Harvard Crimson published an edito-
rial that applauded a recent incident of  rioting at Yale: “Judging 
by newspaper accounts of  it, the annual freshman riot at Yale 
was a great success.”47 These comments endorsing the rebellious 
behavior of  Yale students may have encouraged collegiates at 
Harvard to act in a similar manner. Archival records indicate that 
rioting at Penn increased in frequency over the course of  the 
decade with one riot in 1920, two riots in 1928, and four riots 
in 1929.48 Some students regarded these incidents as a source of  
amusement and an outlet for their pent-up energy.49 This tenden-
cy is exemplified in the aftermath of  a riot in 1929, as students 
justified their behavior by stating: “We didn’t have any fun for a 
long time.”50 Thus, their pursuit of  pleasure sanctioned the de-
struction of  property and sometimes even led them to block au-
thorities from controlling the situation.51 Students at Penn were 
suspected of  burning down a fraternity house and then jeering at 
firemen when they arrived on the scene.52
 A well-publicized riot between Harvard students and 
the local police force in 1927 illustrates how peer bonding in 
collegiate communities empowered men to act in a disruptive 
way. While attending a show at University Theatre, students 
(who may have been intoxicated)53 threw “eggs and vegetables 
at the actors” and produced a “shower of  coins” on the stage.54 
As students left the show, a “great deal of  horseplay from the 
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crowd” resulted, and when police rushed to the scene, they hit a 
student over the head with a stick.55 During the subsequent legal 
proceedings, collegiates took a bold stance: they defended one 
another in court by shifting the blame to local police officers 
rather than taking responsibility for their own actions.56 Students 
testified that the police officers were deliberately violent towards 
them and were overheard bragging to one another: “we licked 
[the collegiates] good and proper.”57 An editorial from The Har-
vard Crimson entitled “Riot or Assault?”58 reinforced the percep-
tion that the students were victimized by declaring: “there was 
no riot until wagon loads of  police charged the crowd…The 
police, in other words, created a riot before quelling it.”59 Testi-
mony offered by both sides suggests that generational and class 
differences played a part in fueling the conflict between these 
men.
 In some instances in which young men acted out, author-
ities allowed them great latitude and were reluctant to impose 
sanctions even when their infractions were dramatic. Following 
the Freshman Riot of  June 4, 1923, Yale parents and administra-
tors exhibited ambivalence about enforcing institutional compli-
ance, suggesting that masculine standards of  behavior were in 
flux.60 During this event, freshmen threw bottles out of  their 
dorm windows, dumped buckets of  water outside, shot fire-
crackers at lamps, threw burning paper, and even destroyed city 
property, forcing the fire department to come.61 Administrators 
estimated that 341 of  the 789 members of  the class (a stagger-
ing 43%) participated in the riot.62 School officials initially felt 
pressed to respond in a harsh manner, as these students not only 
vandalized public property but also stepped outside the bounds 
of  what was considered appropriate conduct of  a Yale Man.63 Af-
ter much deliberation, administrators decided to ban participants 
from sports for the first term of  the following year.64 While this 
was the most lenient option out of  several considered,65 it was 
enough to trigger a wave of  protest letters from parents who, in 
almost every instance, insisted that their son was being punished 
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too harshly, was an honorable boy, and had barely contributed 
to the ruckus.66 Under pressure from angry alumni and parents, 
school authorities quickly overturned their ruling.67
 As revealed in their letters, Yale parents ascribed the ri-
otous behavior of  their sons to youthful impulses and did not 
consider their actions to reflect poorly on their character. This 
attitude suggests that they adopted changing views of  masculin-
ity, granting greater tolerance for behaviors that might have been 
considered unacceptable in their own generation.68 Through 
their interference, the older generation validated peer influence 
and endorsed the concept of  adolescence as a distinct stage of  
life that extended through the college years.69 This tendency is 
evident in the way that a Yale parent admonished the administra-
tion (rather than his own son) by appealing to a naturalized view 
of  gender: “Extra curriculum activity furnishes the main outlet 
for the surplus team of  youth, and by repressing it, you destroy 
your safety valve and thereby increase your hazard…boys will 
be boys.”70 When the young men involved in this riot commit-
ted acts of  defiance, their parents excused their poor behavior 
and irresponsibility rather than upholding the institution’s moral 
code. This attitude not only signaled a shift in the expectations 
of  male behaviors, but also reflected a sense of  elite privilege. 
These incidents illustrate how manifestations of  college mascu-
linity reflected a complex mosaic of  on-campus culture, class 
values, and broader social changes. 
secret socIetIes And frAternAl MAsculInIty
 College men prioritized forms of  exclusive male bond-
ing at this time due to a confluence of  factors. At the turn of  the 
century, an influx of  immigrants to the United States from east-
ern European countries led to increased cultural heterogeneity.71 
Penn’s Quaker heritage and its greater degree of  diversity made 
the process of  absorbing these students less disruptive (and less 
threatening) than at Harvard and Yale, institutions that prided 
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themselves on their traditional Anglo-Saxon roots.72 As their so-
cial environment was altered by newcomers from more diverse 
and less desirable backgrounds, it became more important for 
students to carve out special spaces for themselves on campus.73
 Yale University, with “its distinctive—and professedly 
meritocratic—social system,” bestowed prestige upon a select 
group of  students who were “tapped” for membership into se-
cret societies during the spring semester of  their junior year.74 
Societies such as Skull and Bones, Scroll and Key, Wolf ’s Head, 
and Elihu represented a longstanding tradition at Yale, but mem-
bership took on special meaning in the 1920s as a way of  rein-
forcing class distinctions within the student body.75 Since selec-
tion for senior societies was based heavily on a student’s contri-
bution to the Yale community through leadership positions, the 
competition to rise to the top of  the school’s social hierarchy 
was fierce.76 However, this system became self-perpetuating as 
certain groups of  students were denied leadership opportunities 
(and sometimes even membership) in extracurricular clubs. Stu-
dents who had come to Yale directly from public schools (rather 
than preparatory schools) and those who were Jewish were at a 
disadvantage, as the former were rarely “tapped” for member-
ship and the latter were altogether excluded.77 Social class was 
clearly required for initiation. Yale’s secret societies thus ensured 
a separate social space—one of  enviable distinction—for young 
men of  means who reflected its Anglo-Saxon ideal.
 Select clubs were also a part of  the undergraduate culture 
at Harvard University and the University of  Pennsylvania, albeit 
to a lesser degree. Through the years, generations of  Harvard 
men vied for spots in Final Clubs such as Porcellian, AD, Fly, 
Spee, and Delphia, which mirrored Yale’s senior societies in func-
tion and status.78 These Final Clubs had a long-standing tradition 
of  selecting well-groomed men from the most prominent social 
circles, favoring students who were legacies or came from elite 
boarding schools.79 Many of  those selected, such as Theodore 
Roosevelt, went on to become national leaders, highlighting the 
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importance of  this avenue for establishing connections.80 Penn 
also established senior societies, including the Mortarboard, Fri-
ars, and Sphinx in the early twentieth century.81 Although these 
clubs were not cloaked in the same mystery as those at Yale and 
Harvard, they were also based on leadership and sociality. Thus, 
there was an imperative at all three universities for students to 
develop their social capital so that they might be recognized as 
the quintessential collegiate by their peers.82
 While fraternities were less selective than these senior so-
cieties, they were also an important part of  campus culture, pro-
viding a way to assert aspirational masculinity. Although frater-
nities had existed for a long time at these elite universities, they 
increased in status and prominence during this time.83 In fact, the 
1920s witnessed a large growth in fraternity membership, indi-
cating the rising popularity of  this form of  male homosociality.84 
Nicholas Syrett notes both the continuity and progression of  
this tradition:
The seeds of  1920s fraternal masculinity had 
been planted long before the dawn of  the twen-
tieth century: the reverence of  athletics and of  
other extracurricular involvement, the exclusiv-
ity...None of  this was particularly new. Novel, 
however, was the degree to which all of  these el-
ements were emphasized among fraternity men... 
Fraternity men’s actions were by definition the 
most cutting edge, the most worthy of  emula-
tion—in short, the most collegiate. To be popular 
on campus, one played by fraternity rules almost 
without exception or one did not play at all.85
 Fraternities had special appeal because they not only 
perpetuated social distinctions within the student body, but also 
provided a clear model of  masculinity, regulating standards of  
behavior at a point when ambiguity, uncertainty, and role confu-
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sion characterized college life.86 They offered young, impression-
able men the chance to bond with others who held similar val-
ues and behaved in comparable ways.87 During rush, fraternities 
enabled student-judges to exclude classmates who did not meet 
their subjective notions of  social worth. An article from the Yale 
Daily News described the process of  selecting fraternity brothers, 
declaring: “The essential requirements are…conventionality and 
conformance to a certain social standard.”88 Here, it is important 
to note that students constructed these standards so that the fra-
ternities mirrored their own values. Thus, through this process, 
fraternities reinforced a limited notion of  masculinity that was 
passed down from one generation of  brothers to the next, en-
suring continuity and conformity within the system.
 From the start, fraternities aimed to promote a specific 
form of  masculinity. In fact, the process of  rushing was likened 
to dating, in which a potential brother experienced “calling and 
hold-offs.”89 As students attended smokers90 at the most pres-
tigious fraternities, “judges” would question them about their 
family background, financial status, dating life, and activities.91 
Fraternities looked for students who, in addition to having the 
right pedigree, demonstrated a fun-loving nature and a certain 
mischievousness endemic to masculinity at this time. In a 1923 
letter to the editor of  the Yale Daily News, a recruit recalled how 
he was spurned during this process. When the student explained 
at a fraternity house that he did not drink alcohol, his interviewer 
promptly “emptied his mouthful of  cigarette smoke into [his] 
face and passed onto the next candidate.”92 Thus, in this situa-
tion, peers selected the type of  men with whom they wanted to 
associate, favoring those who displayed a similar rowdiness and 
disregard for institutional authority.
 Fraternities had a significant impact not only in deter-
mining which traits were socially desirable, but also in raising the 
social capital of  those men selected to join, setting in motion a 
self-perpetuating system of  elitism. An editorial from The Penn-
sylvanian noted, “seldom is it that a worth-while man does not 
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receive a bid from at least one house.”93 This statement reflects 
the belief  that if  a collegiate was not pursued by at least one fra-
ternity, he was not considered to be socially desirable. Such a re-
jection was perceived by other college men as a sign of  personal 
deficiency rather than a reflection of  a flawed selection process 
that favored cronyism.
 Since men on campus were judged on their fraternity af-
filiation, freshmen felt pressured to get in with the good crowd 
from the start of  their tenure in college. A 1923 editorial from 
The Pennsylvanian acknowledged that successful rushing mattered 
to freshmen “because it will have a great bearing on the three 
and one-half  years that remain of   [their] college career.”94 The 
social clout of  fraternities (an intangible quality) was concretized 
through the fraternity pin, which became a coveted possession. 
As a status symbol, it elevated the prestige of  its owner through 
his conspicuous display of  the pin. In fact, the fraternity pin 
carried so much social currency that it was featured prominently 
Advertisers used the image of  the fraternity man to emphasize the importance 
of  consumerism and appearance.95
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in collegiate films of  this era such as The Fair Co-Ed. Some men 
regarded their fraternity membership as a key marker of  their 
masculine identity, granting them social prominence on campus. 
In The Plastic Age, Hugh Carver notes that his pin was “a sign that 
he was a person to be respected and obeyed; it was pleasant to be 
spoken to by the professors as one who had reached something 
approaching manhood.”96 Since fraternity culture promoted ma-
terial consumption, appearance, and social conformity, advertis-
ers played off  these ideas to convince college men to buy their 
products.97 These ads revealed the ways in which fraternities 
endorsed and encouraged modernized elements of  masculinity 
that were socially oriented and appearance-based.98
 However, fraternities were not solely linked to social sta-
tus and superficiality; they also reinforced values of  fidelity, civic 
duty, and scholarship. Some fraternities considered the moral 
standing of  men before admitting them. Harvard’s chapter of  
Kappa Sigma summarized its selection process as follows: “We 
do not, therefore, pick men simply because they are athletes or lit-
erary wonders, but we try to get men of  character.”99 Fraternities 
also encouraged community engagement through chapter-based 
programs and activities. For instance, Kappa Sigma at Harvard 
revealed plans to maintain scholastic achievement through peer 
advising. Their “Big Brother” or “Daddy” system was “intended 
to bring the newly initiated and younger men into closer contact 
with the chapter work, and, through the watchfulness of  one of  
the older brothers, keep the younger fellow up in his studies if  
need be.”100 This program indicates that while promoting male 
bonding, fraternities also upheld the values of  loyalty and ser-
vice. One article from The Pennsylvanian explained that fraternities 
helped students “become better men; better qualified to assume 
positions of  leadership; better qualified to help others.”101 Thus, 
fraternities sought to prepare men to take their place as leaders 
in business, industry, and professional fields.
Penn History Review     91 
Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict
college sports: IntegrAted Models of MAsculInIty
 Similar to fraternities, college sports reflected a nuanced 
construction of  masculinity that combined social appearance 
with internal convictions. Displays of  male physicality were 
celebrated during the 1920s, giving rise to the “Golden Age of  
Sports.”102 Scholar Michael Oriard postulates that interest in foot-
ball grew in an uncertain time of  masculinity: “Concern about…
football was inevitably highest when American life seemed soft-
est, in the 1920s.”103 Through football in particular, masculinity 
was publicly contested and proven.104 In the aftermath of  World 
War I, college educators received a national directive to focus on 
sports. The records of  President Lowell of  Harvard testify to the 
growing interest in college athletics. Among his archived docu-
ments is a 1920 message from P.P. Claxton of  the United States 
Commission of  Education stressing the importance of  physical 
endeavors for young males: “The highest ambition of  every boy 
should be to become a man as nearly as possible perfect in body, 
mind and soul; fit and ready for all the responsibilities of  man-
hood…Every boy should want to excel in boyish sport, and win 
and hold the respect of  his fellows.”105 President Lowell retained 
this communication, which aligned with his commitment to ex-
pand athletic programs. College football had wide-ranging ap-
peal, connecting to notions of  nationalism, masculine strength, 
and fidelity, qualities that were especially prized at this time. One 
1928 issue of  the Saturday Evening Post placed the iconic image of  
a pilgrim side by side with a football hero, suggesting that these 
male figures were both emblematic of  America’s culture, past 
and present.106
 While football had already been an important part of  col-
lege life, it became commercialized in an unprecedented manner 
during this era as college enrollment increased and universities 
invested in expanding their athletic programs.107 The Yale Bowl, 
a massive stadium that could seat 80,000 individuals (the largest 
stadium since the Roman Coliseum), was constructed in prepa-
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ration for future Yale-Harvard games.108 By the 1920s, athletics 
often dwarfed academics, an increasingly common phenomenon 
satirized in The Freshman, a film in which Tate University was 
described as “a large football stadium with a college attached.”109 
The immense popularity of  college football was further evi-
denced by its rapidly growing fan base. Oriard explains that “[a]
ttendance at college football games increased 119 percent in the 
1920s, exceeding 10 million by the end of  the decade, slightly 
more than for major league baseball.”110 As further evidence of  
this craze, news pertaining to football was plastered across the 
front pages of  The Harvard Crimson and The Pennsylvanian on a 
daily basis and given significantly more coverage than other sto-
ries.111 As the weekends approached, these periodicals included 
glossy inserts that featured pictures of  the school’s football team, 
biographies of  individual players, and statistics about the home 
team and its rivals. Additionally, college newspapers regularly re-
minded students about upcoming games against important rivals 
and included ads that encouraged them to purchase cars, rac-
coon coats, and other big-ticket items in connection with attend-
ing these events.112
 Football became so visible that it naturally led to a glo-
rification of  the men who played it, increasing their popularity 
and prominence on campus.113 Since an athlete’s success “sold” 
his school to the broader public, students respected the sports 
heroes who brought honor to their institutions.114 An editorial 
from the Yale Daily News described school spirit as “the flames 
which burn at the altar of  the God of  football,”115 and an edito-
rial in The Harvard Crimson remarked that athletes “cease to be 
mortal.”116 This deification elevated football to a sacred sport 
whose heroes were idolized by their peers. Percy Marks captured 
this tendency in his novel The Plastic Age. As a professor upbraids 
his students for their shallow values, he exclaims: “Who are 
your college gods?…They are the athletes…And they are wor-
shipped, bowed down to, cheered, and adored.”117 The profes-
sor’s dismissal of  “false gods” reflects the tension between the 
Penn History Review     93 
Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict
older and younger generations, as youth often prioritized athlet-
ics over academics and challenged the importance of  traditional 
values.118
 However, while college sports featured externally-based 
aspects of  masculinity (such as social status, physical vanity, and 
the pursuit of  personal glory), they were also essential to campus 
life as they promoted aspects of  character development in young 
men (such as loyalty, hard work, and honorable conduct).119 In 
fact, the football hero epitomized the ideal man because he 
straddled two worlds, the old and the new. He seamlessly mani-
fested aspects of  both the traditional model of  masculinity and 
the more modernized version, earning both the praise of  his 
elders and the esteem of  his peers. The struggle to integrate 
these opposing forces is illustrated in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s short 
story “The Bowl.” In this tale, protagonist Dolly Harlan plays 
football for the good of  his team as well as to attain popular-
ity and prestige. When his girlfriend Vienna tries to get him to 
quit football, she exposes his need for male attention, which was 
satisfied through the sport: “You’re weak and you want to be 
admired. This year you haven’t had a lot of  little boys following 
you around…You want to get out in front of  them all and make 
a show of  yourself  and hear the applause.”120 However, Dolly 
rejects this view and frames his participation as a noble act: “If  
I’m any use to them—yes [I’ll play].”121 Fitzgerald’s story indi-
cates that football not only served as a way of  gaining popularity, 
but was also linked to traditional values, including self-sacrifice, 
loyalty, and filial obligation.
 Elite universities endorsed athletic competition as a ve-
hicle for promoting character development,122 often prioritizing 
this extracurricular activity above academics.123 Mather A. Ab-
bott, a crew coach at Yale, explained that a thorough and sus-
tained involvement in athletics would help to develop “character 
and manhood” in college men.124 Coaches like Abbott were en-
trusted with reinforcing moral values in the students they trained 
by modeling ideal behaviors themselves: “The coach is more than 
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a teacher; he is a character-builder; he molds personalities.”125 By 
tying physical pursuits to personal virtues, college sports grew 
in importance and became self-justifying. Administrators held 
athletes to high moral standards and expected them to demon-
strate honesty, great effort, and fair play when competing for 
their school. The “Athletic Code of  Ethics,” which appeared in a 
1922 issue of  The Pennsylvanian, explained that the student-athlete 
must: “strive to carry more than [his] own burden, to do a little 
more than [his] share…To be unselfish in endeavor, caring more 
for the satisfaction which comes from doing a thing well than for 
praise.”126 The imperative to maintain a “sportsmanlike ideal of  
honor” indicates that college sports promoted aspects of  gentle-
manly conduct among athletes, including honorable conduct and 
fair play.127 By competing in this manner, sports produced “the 
greatest pride deep down in the individual that he is a Yale man 
or a Harvard man.”128 Thus, college athletics provided students 
with a way to construct a nuanced concept of  masculinity that 
integrated new and old values into their social repertoire. 
conclusIon
 The 1920s was a decade of  youth, as the younger gen-
eration suddenly became visible and influential. Embracing new 
values, college students symbolized the broader national trajec-
tory toward modernity and became objects of  social criticism. 
As they emphasized the ways in which they were different from 
the previous generation, collegiates increasingly turned to peers 
to assert themselves and to shape their identities. In doing so, 
they challenged institutional authority, often created chaos on 
campuses, and prioritized the pursuit of  social relations over aca-
demic studies. While these behaviors indicate new features of  
masculinity, there is also evidence of  continuity in the extracur-
ricular activities that collegiates pursued. Although senior soci-
eties, fraternities, and athletics had existed in previous genera-
tions, they became especially prominent during this era, fulfilling 
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an even more essential social function. These opportunities for 
male bonding reinforced conformity within select groups and 
maintained a culture of  elitism. As students stretched to meet 
the competing demands of  parents, school administrators, and 
peers, they navigated disparate social systems and expectations, 
weaving together multiple forms of  masculinity rather than ad-
hering strictly to one template. For these college men, the shift 
to a modernized version of  masculinity was not monolithic or 
abrupt but instead was fluid and integrative.129
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The Big Stick Split in Two: 
Roosevelt vs. Hay on 
the Anglo-American Relationship
William Shirey
 In 1895, the United States and Great Britain found 
themselves in a state of  crisis over a British intervention in 
Venezuela that had been sparked by a disagreement over the 
Venezuela-British Guiana border. Most American political elites 
sought to solve the issue by arbitration; many academic elites 
wished for their government to be as conciliatory as possible. 
During the crisis, a half-cowboy-half-politician named Theodore 
Roosevelt, then a candidate for the New York City mayoralty, 
wrote a letter to his alma mater’s newspaper stating his thoughts 
on the international debate in no uncertain terms: there was no 
time now, Roosevelt declared, for “stock-jobbing timidity” or “the 
Baboo kind of  statesmanship,” nor was there any time for those 
who were “still intellectually in a state of  colonial dependence 
on England.” The United States, according to Roosevelt, should 
insist upon the Monroe Doctrine in its fullest application, and, 
for good measure, “build a really first-class Navy.”1 Yet according 
to most historians, within two decades, Theodore Roosevelt 
had played a significant if  not determinative role in laying the 
foundation for the Anglo-American “special relationship” that 
carried the two nations through the world wars. 
 Frederick W. Marks III, in his 1979 book Velvet on Iron: The 
Diplomacy of  Theodore Roosevelt, posits that “[Roosevelt] liquidated 
virtually every object of  discord between the two countries and 
would probably have sought a more formal tie had he not feared 
the veto power of  German and Irish-American voters.” Marks 
argues that Roosevelt’s seemingly cool attitude toward Britain 
was concealing his true desire, Anglo-American partnership, for 
the sake of  political prudence in a largely Anglophobic country.2
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 The main scholar of  Theodore Roosevelt’s relationship 
with Great Britain, William N. Tilchin, argues that Roosevelt 
combined his own bombastic nationalism with a pro-British 
attitude, a sentiment he held because of  the cultural affinities 
between American and British societies as well as his cherished 
relationships with British statesmen such as Cecil Spring-Rice, 
the best man at his second wedding. Tilchin writes that, from 
his grand geostrategic considerations down to his handling of  
minor details, Roosevelt played a pivotal role in nurturing Anglo-
American relations.3
 Howard K. Beale, the deliverer of  a prolific set of  
lectures on Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy at Johns 
Hopkins University and the author of  perhaps the most-cited 
work on the subject, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of  America to 
World Power, argues that Roosevelt and his ardent companion 
Henry Cabot Lodge were indeed cold (if  not somewhat hostile) 
toward the British in the early 1890s, but grew friendlier as 
their careers progressed. This friendliness grew, his narrative 
goes, after the Spanish-American War, when Britain refrained 
from censuring America like the other European powers.4 After 
describing Roosevelt’s fury toward Britain’s aforementioned 
incursion upon the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela, Beale posits 
that by 1898 Roosevelt had “developed a full-blown foreign 
policy based on the belief  that the British and Americans shared 
common interests.”5 Beale propounds a view of  Roosevelt’s 
actions toward Great Britain that he dubbed “the cementing of  
an Anglo-American entente”; in other words, Roosevelt helped 
consummate an informal but mutually understood relationship 
of  diplomatic solidarity with Britain. His analysis is colored by the 
fact that Roosevelt “played England’s game” in the conferences 
and diplomatic skirmishes that led to the First World War.6
 Scarce dissent is to be found on Theodore Roosevelt’s 
general affinity for England and his playing a major role in 
the building of  the Anglo-American entente. Indeed, England 
and America began to deliberately form a friendly diplomatic 
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relationship beginning, at the latest estimate, in 1900, when Lord 
Lansdowne became the British secretary of  state for foreign 
affairs.7 Furthermore, it is plain that Roosevelt had a respect for 
the affinities between American and British culture and that he 
had dear British friends in important diplomatic roles.
 But the trend from wariness to entente in British-
American relations was more a British phenomenon than an 
American one; the respect that Roosevelt found for British 
culture was not meaningfully different from the respect that he 
found for other nations as disparate as Russia, Germany, and 
Japan. Similarly, though Roosevelt’s greatest foreign friends were 
indeed British, he surrounded himself  with an international 
coterie of  Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Japanese, and 
Russians with whom he shared an immense mutual fondness.8 
Yet one must go back to 1957 in order to find a historian who 
credits the strengthening of  the bonds between England and 
America not to Theodore Roosevelt himself, but to people like 
John Hay, Lord Pauncefote, Henry White, or the general foreign 
policy establishments of  England and America, or even to the 
mutual enmity toward Germany from both countries.9
 The historical facts, upon closer examination, cast the 
general conclusion of  historians like Marks, Tilchin, Beale, and 
others in a suspicious light. Historical episodes involving both 
the United States and Britain reveal that Roosevelt was, even after 
1898, often blatantly anti-British, while in fact other Republican 
actors worked to pacify Washington’s dealings with London. 
The general historical consensus thus fails to recognize that a 
diplomatic and political corps whose ideologies and affinities 
differed from Roosevelt’s levied a crucial influence on the actual 
comportment of  his administration. In addition to obscuring 
the importance of  other Republican policymakers, the historical 
consensus regarding Roosevelt’s foreign policy interprets his 
actions anachronistically through the screen of  the world wars, 
attempting either to ascribe to him a foresight that he did 
not possess, or to fit him into a facile teleology of  America’s 
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seemingly inexorable entente with Britain while ignoring the 
contingencies of  that relationship. No history has adequately 
explained Roosevelt’s role in Anglo-American relations without 
falling into these traps of  faulty historical reasoning.10
hIstorIcAl BAckground: 
BrItAIn, europe, And the unIted stAtes
 Britain, from at least the termination of  her disastrous 
effort in the Second Boer War, had been in need of  a new 
geopolitical approach. Before the imperial boom of  the 1870s 
and 1880s, only Britain had anything more than a toehold in the 
wider world. Once the other European powers—save Austria-
Hungary—crashed into Africa and Asia, Britain’s comparative 
naval and financial advantage began to wither. In the late 1890s, 
the British fought their disastrously long war in southern 
Africa against the Boers for three years, seriously draining their 
resources and their morale; at the same time, Britain and France 
nearly collided on their imperial frontiers. Under Kaiser Wilhelm 
II and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany began the 
construction of  a “risk fleet” to compete with the Royal Navy 
in the late 1890s, a clear threat against Britain’s traditional 
dominance on the sea.
 The British realized that the “splendid isolation”—in 
actuality, unilateralism—that they had practiced for decades was 
no longer viable in an increasingly multipolar world order. Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury, the last great lion of  British conservative 
statecraft and a staunch supporter of  unilateralism, left office in 
1902. Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne 
had been working since 1900 on broadening Britain’s friendships 
and minimizing the number of  her enemies, a task that became 
easier when Salisbury could impede him no longer. Although 
Lansdowne’s attempted overtures to Berlin were fruitless, the 
British successfully formed a naval compact with Japan in 1902, 
an “entente cordiale” with France in 1904, and a triple entente 
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with France and Russia in 1907. 
 Before all of  this, however, Britain had made diplomatic 
overtures to the United States, even though many northern 
American statesmen—Senator Lodge foremost among them—
publicly conveyed their detestation of  both Britain’s antagonism 
toward American control of  Hawaii and her stringent upholding 
of  Canadian fishing rights. Nevertheless, the path to an unofficial 
Anglo-American entente was paved by Britain’s hostility 
toward Spain in 1898; the relationship was slowly brought 
to its consummation as Britain brought garrisons back from 
Canada. The British at this time were also beginning to negotiate 
over recognizing at least partial American rights to the future 
Isthmian canal—and was, therefore, tacitly toying with allowing 
full American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
 The diplomatic behavior of  the United States was going 
through a set of  changes at the turn of  the century as well, perhaps 
even more profound changes than Lansdowne was to make in 
Britain. In 1898, the United States crashed onto the world scene 
in the Spanish-American War, taking the Philippines and other 
colonies. Roosevelt and his fellow “imperialist” Republicans 
such as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and—though he only 
influenced policy indirectly—the historian Alfred Thayer Mahan 
had been working their way up the ranks of  the Washington elite 
during the preceding decade, and by the late 1890s they were 
influencing naval affairs, the State Department, and the Senate. 
These men developed what Henry Cabot Lodge called the “Large 
Policy,” meaning worldwide American assertion. The Large 
Policy finally found its way into the Oval Office when Theodore 
Roosevelt assumed the presidency after the assassination of  
William McKinley in 1901.
 The expansions, different as they were, of  both Britain 
and the United States throughout the globe were in part 
subtended by cultural assumptions of  civilizational superiority. 
These assumptions were the product of  both Enlightenment 
thought and retroactive justifications of  colonial control and 
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displacement.11 In the U.S., the Republican Party and progressive 
elites peddled imperial expansion in the lead-up to the Spanish-
American War as synonymous with national honor; dominance 
in the Western Hemisphere became, therefore, an imperative for 
the sake of  civilization and Christendom.12 Furthermore, not 
only did the British end up ceding hemispheric dominance to the 
United States for pragmatic reasons during this period, but they 
also held the selfsame cultural assumptions that made it appear 
valid. That published works of  fiction, philosophy, and social 
and political thought began to flow in sharply increased volume 
between the U.S. and her motherland during the dawning hours 
of  joint Anglophone global dominance was no coincidence.13
 England was reaching out for friends and allies at the 
same time that the United States began to seriously exert its 
power throughout the world; the friendship was, in a sense, 
natural. (German Weltpolitik had seemed always to stand athwart 
America’s aims at expansion; by virtue of  the Anglo-German naval 
race and general rivalry, then, British and American diplomatic 
goals of  the late nineteenth century found a somewhat organic 
alignment.) The historiographical consensus is that Roosevelt 
played a positive role in bringing about this alignment, which 
facilitated Anglo-American cooperation during both world 
wars. Among major historians on the subject, Howard Beale has 
the most generous view on when Roosevelt began to seriously 
cooperate with the British. By 1898, Beale argues, Roosevelt was 
basing his foreign policy on the palpable necessity of  the Anglo-
American understanding.14
 Yet Roosevelt, rather than favoring Britain categorically 
over Germany or other European powers, was far more erratic 
than historians have acknowledged. He was friendly toward the 
diplomats of  Downing Street when Britain stood to advance 
American interests, but he could be shockingly pugnacious 
whenever Britain posed even a minimal threat to America’s 
geopolitical goals. Besides the latent trend that made an Anglo-
American understanding propitious at the turn of  the century, 
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it was Roosevelt’s diplomatic corps, including his Anglophilic 
Secretary of  State John Hay, that truly made an effort to build 
the Anglo-American relationship that came to define later 
decades. The clearest case of  the tension between the rabid 
“pro-American” style of  Roosevelt and the Anglophilia of  
Hay and the State Department—and the importance of  the 
structural trend of  Anglo-American friendship—can be seen in 
the Alaskan boundary dispute of  the early 1900s.
hAy And choAte In cAnAdA
 By the end of  the nineteenth century, the spheres of  
both British Canada and the United States were growing; by the 
1890s, they were bumping into each other. Roosevelt’s “pro-
Americanism” reached a fever pitch in the face of  this ever-so-
mild and indirect abrasion between America and the Imperial 
Parliament at Westminster, which controlled Canadian foreign 
affairs at the time. In 1895, two years after a dispute between 
the British and the Americans over fisheries in the Bering Sea 
had been resolved by arbitration, then-New York City Police 
Commissioner Roosevelt wrote to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge 
to say that “Great Britain’s conduct about the seals is infamous… 
[we should] seize all Canadian sailors as pirates.”15 Roosevelt also 
expressed his wish to invade Canada as punishment for Britain’s 
half-violation of  the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. In late 1895, 
he wrote: “Let the fight come if  it must; I don’t care whether our 
sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”16 
(The Americans would most emphatically not have taken Canada; 
at the time of  Roosevelt’s letter, Great Britain had fifty available 
battleships in the northern Pacific to America’s three).17
 Canadian-American—and, by extension, British-
American—friction ebbed after 1895. The British Admiralty 
continued to worry about both American and German naval 
ambitions in the North Pacific, but the Anglo-Japanese 
agreement of  1902 eventually diminished the fears.18 Downing 
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Street recognized that, in the event of  a war with the United 
States in the coming decades, British ships would ineluctably be 
batted away from Canada’s Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence 
by the up-and-coming United States, which had established 
its Naval War College in 1884 and come under the leadership 
of  a fire-breathing naval advocate in Roosevelt. Aside from a 
small fleet of  submarines, the British abandoned their military 
presence in the Western Hemisphere, preferring to count on 
diplomatic courtship of  the Americans and the loyalty of  the 
Canadians.19 Still, the tension between America’s increasingly 
positive relations with Britain and America’s increasingly strained 
relationship with British Canada was the dialectic that defined 
the Anglo-American understanding in its infant stages.
 The year 1900 saw the beginning of  the Alaskan 
boundary question. According to the 1825 treaty that demarcated 
the boundary between Alaska and Canada, the line of  separation 
was to “follow the summit of  the mountains parallel to the 
coast” north of  the Portland Channel. Yet the language was far 
too vague to draw an actual line, and an exact boundary had not 
been established.20 It is in fact unclear whether or not a mountain 
summit line parallel to the coast even exists. The treaty also 
included the phrase “winding of  the coast” and referred to the 
“Portland channel” at points crucial for its own interpretation, 
neither of  which is an obvious feature based on geography alone, 
and neither of  which had been previously defined. The British/
Canadians and the Americans each claimed two different lines 
that ran approximately northwest-southeast along the coast. 
Crucially, each side claimed control of  a pass over the Lynn 
Canal, the key spot which controlled the headwaters and allowed 
for all riverboat transport in the area.21
 When gold was discovered in the Yukon in the 1890s, 
the Canadians pressed their claim for territories that were 
left ambiguous by the treaty. In January 1900, the American 
ambassador to London, Joseph Choate, made it clear that the 
United States would agree to an arbitrative tribunal on the matter. 
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Lansdowne, wishing to be as conciliatory as possible toward 
the Americans while still keeping the Canadians happy, saw 
the question as an unnecessary roadblock to an entente.22 With 
discussions between London and Washington about the nature 
of  the future Isthmian canal becoming more serious by the 
week, the Alaskan boundary dispute became a major bargaining 
chip for both sides. As it was the most emotionally charged issue 
dividing the British and the Americans and was tightly linked 
to the future of  transportation, trade, and naval power in the 
Western Hemisphere, the topic of  Alaska’s boundary was the sine 
qua non of  Anglo-American rapprochement.23
 Secretary of  State John Hay sent a drafted proposal 
for the tribunal to Julian Pauncefote, envoy extraordinary and 
The Lynn Canal and the Skagway River. 
A gold discovery in the area would bring the United States and the British 
Empire into a pivotal near-confrontation.
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minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The British were 
initially surprised and satisfied, but Pauncefote reported that the 
judges would have very little interpretive power outside of  the 
1825 treaty, which was firmly in the United States’ favor. Canada 
and Governor-General Minto were at first “delighted,” but on 
further consideration of  the precise terms, they considered the 
United States’ proposal “most insidious.”24
 Secretary Hay, as historians have noted and as was clear 
to his contemporaries, was willing and eager to bend U.S. policy 
in England’s direction. “In sum,” comments one Hay biographer, 
“under Hay’s direction, American neutrality was distinctly 
benevolent to England.”25 In the Alaskan situation, however, an 
American interest was directly involved. Once Roosevelt was in 
office, Hay could not nakedly alter U.S. policy to favor England, 
even though (as will be shown) he disagreed with President 
Roosevelt’s tacit idea that American claims in Alaska were more 
important than the prospective relationship between Washington 
and London.26 His willingness to arrange an arbitration only 
served to put him on thin ice as secretary of  state. As Roosevelt 
would recall after Hay’s death, he was simply “not to be trusted 
on issues concerning England”—and, as an important corollary, 
he was “foolishly distrustful of  the Germans.”27
 Fortunately for the Americans, a canal treaty with England 
was in its final stages and Lansdowne was determined not to 
jeopardize it. Lansdowne’s secretary wrote to his counterparts in 
the British Colonial Office that Lansdowne wished
that the communications to the Dominion 
Government should not in any way imply that His 
Majesty’s Government associate the settlement 
of  the Alaskan Boundary and other primarily 
Canadian questions with that of  the Interoceanic 
Canal question, or that the negotiations for the…
Treaties are interdependent.28
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Lansdowne and Hay, therefore, were committed to an amicable 
resolution of  the issue. It was Roosevelt who stood as an inhibitor 
of  the trend toward conciliation.
hAy vs. roosevelt In cAnAdA
 Canada already stood on shaky legal ground. That her 
mother country of  England was unwilling to throw weight 
behind the Alaskan issue only worsened her hopeless situation. 
The British, as Canadian Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier knew, 
would frown upon any further obstructive tactics he used.29 
Thus Laurier, in January 1902, decided to arbitrate.30 Hay and 
those at the British Foreign Office were delighted that this 
source of  friction between Washington and London would soon 
be removed.
 But the events of  the previous September—the 
assassination of  William McKinley and the inauguration of  
Theodore Roosevelt as president of  the United States—had 
introduced a great deal of  volatility into America’s cooperation 
on the Alaskan issue. Roosevelt immediately made clear his 
opposition to any such arbitration as had been tentatively 
approved by the Canadians, the British, and Hay. In March 1902, 
a crestfallen Pauncefote told Lansdowne that “the President 
considers the claim of  the United States is so manifestly clear 
and unanswerable that he is not disposed to run the risk of  
sacrificing American territory under a compromise that is the 
almost certain result of  an arbitration.”31 Roosevelt, according to 
Henry Cabot Lodge, had posited in the presence of  two senators 
that at the first sign of  trouble in the disputed territory he would 
send United States troops to occupy it. One of  the two senators 
intimated that this would be a popular decision among both 
members of  Congress and the people.32
 Secretary of  State Hay pushed the reluctant Joseph 
Choate to enter private discussions at the British Foreign 
Office despite Roosevelt’s heated opposition toward anything 
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resembling arbitration. Choate noted that the British and 
Canadians were indeed open to significant compromise. In 
August 1902, Lansdowne had suggested to Choate that the 
United States could even determine the format and style of  an 
arbitration if  it were to take place.33 The significance of  Hay’s 
apparent dismissal of  Roosevelt’s hawkishness on this issue is 
often overlooked in the later historiography.34
 In September 1902, Lansdowne sent Sir Michael Herbert, 
a friend of  Roosevelt’s, to Washington as ambassador to the 
United States. Roosevelt gave him a warm reception but made it 
clear that he wished to move immediately ahead with the Alaskan 
issue. The president suggested, during his first interview with 
the new ambassador, that he might accept an Anglo-American 
jurist tribunal that carried no formal weight. Instead, it would 
be made up of  jurists selected by the American and British 
governments. The Canadian government gave its tentative assent 
on November 18. Said the Governor-General of  Canada, “My 
ministers would be disposed to consider it favorably, provided 
that the reference to a Tribunal should include all aspects of  
the question.” Lansdowne told Hay that the British, too, 
would agree.35 Roosevelt’s grudging acceptance of  Hay’s initial 
arbitrative idea could be put into effect because Lansdowne was 
willing to cooperate and because Hay had used his influence to 
grease the skids for peaceful diplomacy.
 The Alaskan issue was primarily seen as one between 
Britain and America, not as one between British Canada and 
America or some combination of  the three. Hay, in predictable 
if  absurd Anglophilic fashion, wished to see only one American 
on the commission of  six jurists. Herbert wished to see three 
Americans and three Britons, leaving out any Canadians.36 This 
was no small source of  friction between Canada and her imperial 
motherland. Laurier, in January 1903, once again publicly 
criticized the Americans for their position and actions regarding 
the Alaska treaty. He would have rather had the issue submitted 
to The Hague than to what he increasingly saw as a clearly biased 
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Anglo-American old boys’ club.37
 Herbert and some British diplomats began to dream 
of  some sort of  Anglo-American supreme court, while other 
elder British statesmen were more cautious of  the Americans.38 
But Herbert, Hay, and Lansdowne were the central players in 
the Alaskan boundary issue, and their wish for Anglo-American 
friendship superseded Roosevelt’s demand of  the satisfaction of  
American interests on one hand and British colonial relations 
on the other. In Canada, Minto and Laurier recognized their 
helplessness and on January 21 assented to a tribunal of  six 
impartial jurists. Two days later, King Edward VII gave his 
blessing.39
 In the U.S., representatives from the northwestern states 
put up a fight. They believed that ceding to Canada what was 
not Canada’s would endanger their own states; they asserted that 
there were no legal grounds on which the Canadians could stand 
Secretary of  State John Hay, c. 1904. 
The unsung hero of  the Anglo-American relationship, but to Roosevelt, 
“not to be trusted on issues concerning England” and 
“foolishly distrustful of  the Germans.”
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and that even deigning to arbitrate was a farce on the part of  
the United States. Those Americans who favored the arbitration 
declared that no matter what the tribunal said, no territory would 
be lost to Canada. Despite the protestations of  the Northwest 
(whose states were the most anti-Canadian of  all) and the 
constant, truculent “pro-Americanism” of  the president, the 
treaty passed the Senate on February 11 and cleared the path for 
negotiations to take place.40
 The international table was set for the pacification of  the 
Alaskan issue. Hay, Herbert, and Lansdowne had ensured Anglo-
American friendship, and the Canadians’ complaints seemed to 
have been sacrificed for the sake of  placating the Americans. 
Even so, Theodore Roosevelt and his pro-Americanism found a 
way to make trouble. On February 18, 1903, Roosevelt appointed 
three of  the most grossly biased politicians in all America as his 
“impartial” jurists: Secretary of  War (and longtime Roosevelt 
man) Elihu Root; Senator George Turner of  the anti-Canadian 
state of  Washington; and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, progenitor 
of  the “Large Policy” and Roosevelt’s most steadfast political 
partner.41 When the inevitable outrage came, the pathetic 
American excuse was that three unbiased judges could not be 
found. This, of  course, did little to quell the anger.42 Herbert 
declared himself  severely disheartened and disillusioned with the 
Americans.43
 Lansdowne was disappointed but still hoped for 
accommodation over anger. Britain had just terminated its 
involvement in the Anglo-German blockade of  Venezuela on 
February 14, and the blockade had caused Roosevelt’s animal 
Americanism to come frightfully to the fore. The president—
perhaps by coincidence, but more likely not—had ordered the 
admiral of  the navy to practice naval maneuvers on what was 
then the largest scale in American history in the same theater as 
the Anglo-German blockade.44 Now was simply not the time for 
the British to anger the rough-riding Roosevelt. Herbert, too, 
fully comprehended the strength of  American feeling about what 
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was seen as Britain’s bad faith. He sent notes on February 23 to 
Ottawa and London urging amicability and a quick conclusion.45 
The will of  the Canadians would not be allowed to obstruct the 
rapprochement of  the English and the Americans.
 The Canadians, angered at once by the Americans for 
their preposterous choice of  “impartial” jurists and by the British 
for their appeasement of  Roosevelt’s bullish Americanism, 
“felt called upon not only to express their dissatisfaction at 
the recent exchange of  ratifications at Washington before their 
official consent had been given, but practically to indicate that 
their assent had been rendered unavoidable by His Majesty’s 
Government.”46 Lansdowne, struggling between the rock of  
Anglo-American amity and its import and the hard place of  
Britain’s colonial obligations, was forced to ask the Americans 
for two delays in the tribunal to allow the Canadians to gather the 
necessary documents. Hay was also trying to reconcile his own 
intense, fundamental affinity for the British with the fact that 
he was the secretary of  state of  the United States of  America. 
Hay expressed disappointment at what he saw as stalling tactics. 
Roosevelt asserted to Hay a duty: 
If  the English decline to come to an agreement 
this fall, under any pretense, I shall feel that it 
is simply due to bad faith—that they have no 
sincere desire to settle the matter equitably. I 
think they ought to be made to understand that 
there must be no delay; that we have come to 
a definite agreement with them and that the 
agreement must be kept on their side as well as 
on ours, and that we shall expect them to live up 
to it without fail…I shall probably, if  they fail to 
come to an agreement, recite our case in the message 
to Congress and ask for an appropriation so that we may 
run the line ourselves.47
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 Yet Hay was not the only member of  the American 
foreign policy establishment to receive word from Roosevelt in 
these terms. On June 29, Roosevelt wrote Lodge to say that, if  
the British continued to make things difficult, he would “declare 
the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress, 
and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it 
should be run.”48 To Hay on July 29, he stated that “if  we can’t 
come to an agreement now nothing will be left but to act in a way 
which will necessarily wound British pride.”49 To Root on August 
20, Roosevelt expressed his hope that the “the British will see 
reason. If  they do not, it will be unpleasant for us, but it will be 
far more unpleasant for Great Britain and Canada.”50 To Hay on 
September 21, Roosevelt stated that he was wondering
if  the Jacks realize that…it will be far more 
unpleasant to them, if  they force the alternative 
upon us; if  we simply announce that the country 
is ours and will remain so, and that so far as it has 
not been reduced to possession it will be reduced 
to possession, and that no further negotiations in 
the matter will be entertained.51
 Other letters of  Roosevelt’s indicate even more explicitly 
his proclivity to use state force to resolve the issue. To Henry 
White on September 26, Roosevelt wrote that
I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours, 
as being for the most part in our possession, 
and the remainder to be reduced to possession 
as soon as in our judgment it was advisable—
and to declare furthermore that no additional 
negotiations of  any kind would be entered into.52
To Elihu Root on August 8, the president wrote how he “shall 
at once establish posts on the islands and sufficiently far up the 
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main streams to reduce at all the essential points our claim to 
actual occupancy…This will not be pleasant to do and it will be 
still less pleasant for the English.”53 To Frederick Jackson Turner 
on August 8, he stated that in case of  “captious objections on the 
part of  the English, I am going to send a brigade of  American 
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of  the disputed 
territory and hold it by all the power and force of  the United 
States.”54
 Roosevelt was playing fast and loose, and the British saw 
that he would risk severely harming the budding relationship 
between England and America for the sake of  a small strip of  
land in a barely inhabitable area bearing trace amounts of  gold. 
Fortunately for the sake of  smooth Anglo-American relations 
at this critical stage, Hay and the British statesmen kept cool 
heads and paved the way for London and Washington to get 
Theodore Roosevelt in his presidential years. 
A pugnacious pro-American: “I am going to send a brigade of  American 
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of  the disputed territory and hold 
it by all the power and force of  the United States.”
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along. Joseph Chamberlain, then British secretary of  state for 
the colonies, had been spooked enough by Roosevelt. He too 
resolved to quickly settle the Alaskan issue no matter the cost to 
Canada and the empire.55
 The negotiations began in September. According to 
Lord Alverstone, the British representative at the tribunal, the 
Americans behaved badly, but he wished to put up a fight. On 
several issues concerning the dispute he remained unwaveringly 
set against all that the United States wished to do. An abrupt 
turnaround in early October was likely the result of  pressure from 
Lansdowne (who was in turn feeling pressure from Roosevelt) 
toward conciliation on the part of  the British.56 The Americans 
came out with a total victory; Roosevelt and the three jurists 
were met with wide acclaim for what was seen as an enormous 
diplomatic win. The Canadians were fittingly resentful and knew 
that all injuries to Canada were being sustained for the sake of  
British friendship with America.57
 But it was Hay, not Roosevelt, who worked for diplomacy 
surrounding the Canada issue. It is difficult to imagine a scenario 
where Anglo-American amity would have remained on a smoothly 
upward ascent without Secretary Hay tempering the Roosevelt 
administration’s response. Roosevelt’s truculence, in actual fact, 
threatened significant setbacks to Anglo-American amity on 
multiple occasions; it brought Lansdowne and his enormously 
conciliatory attitude to his wit’s end. Hay’s Anglophilia and 
Lansdowne’s determination to end Britain’s “splendid isolation” 
were the determining factors that allowed the Anglo-American 
understanding to progress despite the Alaskan boundary conflict. 
Roosevelt was, realistically, a liability throughout the resolution 
of  this dispute.
lIMItAtIons And IMplIcAtIons
 Roosevelt and Hay’s respective roles in the Alaskan crisis 
should bring the historical consensus regarding Roosevelt’s 
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relationship with Britain under much harsher scrutiny. Yet a far 
more thorough analysis of  the diplomatic episodes throughout 
Roosevelt’s career is needed to establish precisely when Roosevelt 
became more disposed to treating the Anglo-American entente as 
a serious diplomatic goal. These analyses must rely on explorations 
of  the attitudes of  Roosevelt’s fellow American diplomats and 
policymakers, as the Alaskan boundary case shows that perhaps 
they were the authors of  the Anglo-American rapprochement that 
undeniably took place between 1895 and 1917. (Tantalizing leads 
for such an analysis exist: Roosevelt left much of  his East Asian 
diplomacy to Secretary Hay until his death in 1905, and Hay, in 
a remarkable suspension of  logic fitting only the most ferocious 
of  Anglophiles, attempted to blame the Russo-Japanese conflict 
on Germany, then clearly Britain’s nemesis. Roosevelt, on the 
other hand, at one point attempted to blame Japanese aggression 
on Britain, also a plain twist of  the reality on the ground.) In any 
case, a fuller exposition of  Roosevelt’s potentially more neutral 
attitude toward Britain—as opposed to the palpable Anglophilia 
of  other Republicans of  his time, like that of  John Hay, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, and Henry White—must explain the fact that 
Roosevelt seemed to favor Britain in his later diplomacy.
 The Alaskan boundary dispute does not conclude 
the inquiry into Teddy Roosevelt’s views on Great Britain 
or the evolution of  those views, but it does destabilize the 
historiographical consensus that Roosevelt was, in his personal 
thought, a friend to Britain—or that he had become a friend 
to Britain by 1898. That others in the Republican Party of  
Roosevelt’s time—most importantly, Secretary of  State John 
Hay—were indeed Anglophilic has created the illusion that 
Roosevelt himself  was pro-Britain, whereas, in fact, until at least 
the early 1900s, Roosevelt was in fact something of  a practical (if  
absurdly feisty) “pro-American” situated in a largely pro-Britain 
party and administration. Secretary Hay, in the case of  the Alaskan 
boundary, was not tightly managed by Roosevelt with regard to 
diplomatic actions and, as illustrated above, would sometimes 
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go against the wishes of  his president. Despite Roosevelt later 
denying that Hay was a major player in the boundary dispute, it 
was indeed Hay who curbed Roosevelt’s dangerous influence on 
the situation, made the necessary diplomatic maneuvers, took 
advantage of  the British retreat from “splendid isolation,” and 
allowed the conflict to come to its peaceful resolution.
 The case study above has implications for the debate that 
runs through the literature on the appropriate characterization 
of  Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the grandest sense. Some 
scholars, most famously Henry Kissinger, have argued that 
Theodore Roosevelt can be most accurately be described as an 
American realpolitiker, always thinking systemically and globally 
while at the same time remaining conscious of  the balance of  
power.58 Historian Walter McDougall also projects some degree 
of  realism and balance-consciousness onto Roosevelt, although 
McDougall’s narrative is far more nuanced than Kissinger’s and is 
informed by the fact that the extant “Progressivism” at the turn 
of  the century was a fundamental aspect of  the Rooseveltian 
worldview.59 Howard Beale also portrays Roosevelt as seeing the 
world chiefly through the lens of  power.60 Others have disagreed 
sharply with the realist school of  analysis. Frank Ninkovich in 
his book American Imperialism argues that a structural, cultural, 
and intellectual moment was the plinth upon which American 
expansion in the Edwardian era stood, while William C. Widenor 
and John Milton Cooper Jr. have in tandem argued that Roosevelt 
and Lodge were in fact more idealistic than Woodrow Wilson 
and William Jennings Bryan, due to the “Large Policy” group’s 
Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian assumptions, their (arguably) 
more overt racial paternalism, and their near-worship of  the 
militaristic spirit.61
 The clearest example of  the anti-realist view of  
Roosevelt’s foreign policy is Frank Ninkovich’s article “Theodore 
Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” where Ninkovich asserts 
that Roosevelt’s diplomatic thought and behavior was driven 
primarily and fundamentally by an idealization of  “civilization” 
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informed by a “metahistorical outlook” of  a sort of  souped-
up Whig history.62 Citing Roosevelt’s praise of  imperialism, his 
efforts to form diplomatic ties with European nations, and his 
tendency to try to be on the “civilized” side of  conflicts abroad, 
Ninkovich portrays Roosevelt as a blind ideologue, one who saw 
himself  as having, above all else, a “duty upon the civilized races 
to transplant the seeds of  civilization where they had failed to 
germinate of  their own accord.”63
 Ninkovich’s article is unconvincing. A disproportionately 
large amount of  the primary source material used by Ninkovich to 
create his narrative is made up of  letters to high-ranking foreign 
officials, texts of  public speeches, or articles in widely circulated 
magazines—all discursive scenarios in which any president or 
diplomat might justify his actions in the most high-minded 
light. While Ninkovich’s argument in American Imperialism, which 
places Roosevelt’s actions in their proper intellectual and cultural 
context, is a welcome tonic to Kissinger’s retrojection of  later-
twentieth century American realism onto Roosevelt, his selective 
and tenuous material for “Civilization as Ideology” causes him 
to miss the mark. Ninkovich’s “civilizational” framework is 
excellent for Roosevelt’s approach to, for example, Latin America, 
but is unequipped to handle the looming and central diplomatic 
question of  Roosevelt’s presidency: how the United States 
should navigate the increasingly dire Anglo-German rivalry. It 
is no wonder that Ninkovich’s article only dares to approach the 
question of  Roosevelt’s ideas on U.S.-German relations after the 
point that the German war machine brutalized Belgium, five 
years after Roosevelt had left office.64
 The Alaskan boundary issue seems to show that 
Roosevelt’s self-proclaimed “pro-Americanism” manifested 
itself  as a short-term explosiveness, inimical both to calculated, 
systematic, balance-of-power realism and to high-minded 
normative ideas of  “civilization.” Roosevelt’s actions, when 
examined closely, cannot fit on any facile midpoint between the 
two. Furthermore, it seems that the steady hands in American 
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foreign policy were in Roosevelt’s administration. The emphasis 
ought to be taken away from Roosevelt the man, and a responsible 
evaluation of  U.S. diplomacy from 1901 to 1909 should not 
attribute successes blindly to the president but rather take into 
account the efforts of  Hay, White, Root, and others who worked 
to set policy and tame the wild man in the White House.
 The question of  Roosevelt’s role in the informal, loose 
drawing together of  the United States and Britain also engages a 
hotly debated topic in the theory of  international relations: the 
degree to which leadership matters in statecraft and diplomacy. 
Most in the field of  international relations implicitly or explicitly 
work with the idea that looking at structural, impersonal forces, 
along with culture, bureaucracy, and political systems, is the 
appropriate method by which to understand diplomacy and 
history. This is not an uncontested idea: Daniel Byman and 
Kenneth Pollack, for example, have asserted that even small 
idiosyncrasies of  leaders can have a profound impact on the 
course of  history—that the human element is a significant 
variable. They defend their thesis on a theoretical level, positing 
that state intentions—often tied up with specific leaders’ 
intentions—are germane to theories of  international relations; 
they ground their idea in case studies as well.65
 Within the debate of  leadership vs. structural causes in 
international relations theory, Robert Jervis engages with the 
tension between leaders and advisors. Jervis argues that political 
role can be a determinative force in the intentions of  different 
actors, though Jervis himself  is somewhat ambivalent about 
the extent to which structural forces dominate personal forces 
in statecraft.66 The president, Jervis’s argument goes, will face 
political pressures, while a secretary of  state like Hay will be freer 
of  electoral constraints. Jervis’s thesis is a powerful explanation 
of  the dynamics of  the Roosevelt administration during the 
Alaskan boundary crisis. Yet Roosevelt’s personality—along 
with the residue of  his previous tepidness regarding Britain—
most certainly was a factor in how he behaved, in addition to the 
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presidential pressure he faced. Similarly, Hay’s well-documented 
Anglophilia was a factor in his comportment along with his 
position at the State Department.
 Even if  structural factors were among the ultimate 
causes of  the Anglo-American rapprochement, to ignore the 
role of  leaders—especially particularly influential ones, like 
Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, or Lansdowne—is dangerous 
and reductive.67 Matters of  international relations and diplomatic 
history are too complex to focus only on any one element; 
biography and psychology must be explored as much as political 
systems and international structures. The historiography on 
Theodore Roosevelt’s own tastes and predilections regarding 
diplomacy has crucially ignored evidence of  his own ambivalent-
at-best attitude toward Great Britain, and Roosevelt’s very 
persona is far from unimportant in this analysis. The Anglo-
American entente steadied both nations before the coming 
collapse of  world order, and the causes of  that entente—not 
only those distal and impersonal, but also those proximate and 
personal—deserve painstaking attention.
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Re-Southernization of the White House
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IntroductIon
 At 12:30 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963, President 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. 
Two hours later, the Texan Lyndon Baines Johnson was sworn 
in as the thirty-sixth president of  the United States aboard Air 
Force One. Kennedy’s assassination stunned the world. As with 
momentous events such as Pearl Harbor before, and 9/11 after, 
the great majority of  Americans remember exactly where they 
were and what they were doing at the moment Kennedy was shot. 
Despite being floored by a profound sense of  loss, however, the 
American people also recognized the symbolic importance of  
President Johnson’s ascension to the highest office in the nation. 
As soon as Johnson entered the White House, commentators 
stressed that he was the first resident of  a southern state in a 
century to get there.1 Although President Woodrow Wilson 
was born in Virginia, another former Confederate state, he was 
considered to have voided his southern credentials by establishing 
residency in New Jersey. Many thought a true southerner would 
never reach the Oval Office, and southern elites were among the 
principal doubters. As historian William Leuchtenburg stated in 
his book, The White House Looks South, prior to the culmination 
of  Johnson’s political ascent, “[a]mong Southerners on Capitol 
Hill it was an article of  faith—bitter faith—that no Southerner 
would ever be President of  the United States.”2 As Johnson 
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assumed the presidency and prepared to run for election in his 
own right, this “southern-ness” quickly became a critical issue.
 This paper examines the story of  Johnson’s rise and 
his victory in the 1964 presidential election. It traces the arc of  
Johnson’s ambitious political career, paying specific attention to 
the 1964 election and the way in which the Texan won North 
Carolina. This paper argues that Johnson calculated and shaped 
a specific path to the White House by leaning heavily on figures 
such as Jonathan Worth Daniels, the North Carolinian editor 
of  the Raleigh News & Observer (N&O). Daniels and Johnson’s 
relationship was more than simply a strategic bond; it offers a 
case study of  southern identity and the evolution of  southern 
liberalism in the twentieth century. The give and take between 
Daniels and Johnson yields interesting takeaways with regard 
to the press, the populace, and the president. Their interactions 
reveal that Jonathan Daniels was a pivotally important figure in 
Lyndon Johnson’s presidential campaign. Johnson’s relationship 
with Daniels afforded the Texan a window into the minds of  
North Carolinians; it allowed him to truly grasp these citizens’ 
feelings, especially on divisive issues such as race. This nuanced 
understanding of  North Carolinian politics ultimately proved 
decisive in carrying the state.   
 Although Daniels was clearly among the elite of  
society—his family was one of  the wealthiest in the southeastern 
United States—his correspondences reflected interactions with 
all elements of  society. For every letter addressed to President 
Johnson or Governor Terry Sanford, there is one postmarked 
to a farmer in eastern North Carolina, or a thoughtful piece 
authored in response to an angry “letter to the editor.” These 
letters provide a fascinating window into North Carolinian 
politics, where race was a contentious, highly partisan topic in 
the 1960s due to polarizing events such as the Greensboro sit-ins 
and ongoing debates regarding segregation. 
 Throughout his tenure in national politics, Lyndon 
Johnson maintained a close relationship with Jonathan Daniels, 
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a bond held together by a mutual commitment to bring the 
South back to the forefront of  American politics. While 
several biographers—most notably Robert Caro, Robert Dallek 
and William Leuchtenberg—have written on the issue of  
Johnson’s southern identity, none have done so by examining 
his relationship with the press, or more specifically with Daniels. 
The correspondence between Lyndon B. Johnson and Jonathan 
Worth Daniels raises important questions about the nature of  
relations between press and president in the twentieth-century 
election cycle. It also exposes questions about the concept of  
“southern-ness” in early twentieth-century America and sheds 
light on the intense feelings of  alienation many southerners such 
as Daniels and Johnson felt. 
 Ultimately, this paper concludes that Lyndon Johnson 
and Jonathan Daniels formed a mutually beneficial relationship, 
which allowed the Texan to gain a more nuanced understanding 
of  North Carolinian feelings on issues such as sectionalism and 
race. Despite their vastly different professional and personal 
backgrounds, Daniels and Johnson bonded over their shared 
southern identity and desire to mend regional tensions. Moreover, 
the two men possessed the foresight and determination to realize 
that providing a solution to the South’s racial issue would be the 
best way forward. Johnson and Daniels’s symbiotic relationship 
was built upon a bedrock of  mutual southern understanding and 
borne out of  a shared desire to correct the historical record as it 
pertained to the South’s post-Civil War reputation. 
 
JonAthAn dAnIels fInds hIs voIce
 During World War I, Secretary of  the Navy Josephus 
Daniels posed for his picture at the entrance to the White House 
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his assistant secretary. Later, 
while  reflecting on the photograph, Daniels said to FDR, “We 
are both looking down on the White House, and you are saying 
to yourself, being a New Yorker—‘Some day I will be living in 
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that house’—while I, being from the South, know I must be 
satisfied with no such ambition.”3 Josephus would not live to be 
proven wrong. Nor would the senior Daniels live long enough to 
watch his son Jonathan become an integral part in the rise of  the 
southerner he could not foresee.
 Jonathan Worth Daniels was born on April 26, 1902, 
in Raleigh, North Carolina. Daniels enjoyed an unconventional 
childhood, yet he did so within the mainstream of  southern 
society. Though Daniels was encouraged to adopt traditional 
southern liberal attitudes towards race—his father taught him to 
condemn the Ku Klux Klan, but favor segregation—Jonathan’s 
unique childhood experiences led him to eventually reconsider 
such norms. The Danielses’ house sat directly across the street 
from Shaw University, a historically black college in Raleigh. 
According to his biographer, Charles Eagles, Daniels’s proximity 
to Shaw likely led him to believe that black and white differed 
less than most whites thought, since Daniels saw young black 
students working and studying at Shaw just as whites did at 
nearby schools like North Carolina State.4 Daniels also enjoyed 
the company of  a black housekeeper and playmate during 
his youth. These relationships in Raleigh proved vital to the 
formation of  Daniels’s inquisitive nature and atypically liberal 
attitude towards race. The experiences of  his childhood echoed 
in Jonathan Daniels’s mind for his entire life and undoubtedly 
shaped his attitude regarding civil rights.
 Daniels’s father, Josephus, was a prominent southern 
liberal who served as secretary of  the navy during World War I 
and as United States ambassador to Mexico. These jobs forced 
the Daniels family to move to the nation’s capital when Jonathan 
was ten, but they also afforded him an exciting change in lifestyle. 
Jonathan Daniels benefited from his parents’ intellectually 
stimulating lives. Their position in society provided Jonathan 
with an abundance of  good books to read, interesting people to 
meet, and serious conversation in which to engage.5 Josephus’s 
work also provided Jonathan with the opportunity to travel 
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and expand his worldview. Among his various jobs, Josephus’s 
true love was journalism. This passion led the elder Daniels to 
purchase a controlling interest in the Raleigh News & Observer, a 
once proud regional publication, at a foreclosure sale in 1893. At 
the conclusion of  his tenure on Capitol Hill, Josephus and his 
family returned to the Tar Heel State to run the N&O as a family 
enterprise. 
 Jonathan Daniels was similar to, and shaped by, Josephus. 
Both father and son graduated from the University of  North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Both father and son served time on 
Capitol Hill. And both of  them possessed a natural curiosity, 
which begat a love for journalism. The Raleigh News and Observer 
would become the channel for this passion and a vessel for father-
son bonding. Like his father, Jonathan Daniels worked closely 
with Franklin Roosevelt in Washington. Whereas Josephus 
served above FDR as secretary of  the navy during World War I, 
Jonathan served under Roosevelt as his press secretary prior to 
the president’s death in 1945. In late 1944, Josephus became sick 
like FDR himself.
 After remaining on board long enough for President 
Harry S. Truman to choose his replacement, Jonathan Daniels 
returned home to assume control of  the News & Observer. He 
presided over the paper during a period of  immense growth, 
as the News & Observer bought out the Raleigh Times, opened a 
new downtown office, and rapidly built upon its base readership 
throughout North Carolina. All the while, Daniels made sure 
the paper maintained its liberal bent. Personally responsible for 
the bulk of  the editorial board, Jonathan ensured that the News 
& Observer actively promoted stances in keeping with those of  
his father and the Democratic Party. It is critically important to 
qualify, however, that the News & Observer’s positions were typical 
of  North Carolinian Democrats and not the national party. Like 
Josephus Daniels, the paper often supported positions such 
as segregation in schools that were antithetical to the national 
Democratic Party. This began to change as Jonathan assumed 
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control. 
 As Jonathan took over the News & Observer, he sought 
to uphold his father’s vision of  the role the paper should play 
in North Carolinian life. As Cleves Daniels wrote in a letter to 
his family concerning the future of  the N&O in October 1964, 
“[Josephus] believed that it was important to both give people the 
news and to educate them at the same time.”6 The younger Daniels 
worked steadfastly to ensure that his family’s newspaper did just 
this. The News & Observer did not simply present stories for its 
readership to digest. “Old Reliable,” as it was known, brought its 
readers—who hailed primarily from the rural, otherwise isolated 
parts of  North Carolina—into the mainstream by shaping their 
understanding of  how to think about certain issues. A September 
1963 letter to the editor from a seemingly typical reader named 
C. Stanton Coates demonstrates the degree to which Daniels was 
successful. Coates detailed in gushing terms the way the N&O 
had served as a father figure and educator in his life. As a boy, 
Coates “always looked forward to the Sunday issue, which came 
to [him] in rural Johnston a day late via R.F.D.”7 The N&O 
was not simply a source of  entertainment for Coates as a child, 
however. Coates grew with the paper, and in turn “Old Reliable” 
educated him on the affairs of  the world and how to feel about 
such developments: “Growing into manhood I put away the 
comics for the more noble and glorious sections.”8 Despite 
expressing concerns over the veracity of  some stories in the 
N&O’s recent past, Coates’s account reveals the degree to which 
the News and Observer was more than just a paper. The Danielses’ 
family paper was not only a fixture in the community and an 
educating force—it constituted a powerful political weapon. 
 Jonathan Worth Daniels reached his prominent, publicly 
visible position largely due to the influence of  his father. Josephus 
Daniels paved the way for his son financially and professionally. 
Moreover, Josephus taught Jonathan to think critically, develop 
his passions, and view education as an essential, never-ending 
pursuit. While Daniels owed his father a great deal for helping 
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him grow, Jonathan had to split from Josephus in order to further 
his growth and cultivate his own voice. This meant adopting 
more progressive stances in his daily editorials. As Charles 
Eagles wrote, Josephus Daniels saw no need to discuss racial 
affairs; he simply accepted that segregation and subordination 
of  Negroes was the best solution for the matter.9 On this issue 
specifically, and many others, Jonathan Daniels refused to accept 
the status quo or simply take traditionally accepted beliefs at face 
value. Jonathan was somewhat apologetic for his racial editorials 
at first.10 He knew that he had his father’s confidence and trust, 
however, which overcame their differences in opinion.11 Not 
only did Josephus accept his son’s stances, he even encouraged 
them. In a personal correspondence between father and son, 
Josephus agreed to set aside his private ideological differences 
with Jonathan for the good of  the N&O. He told Jonathan, “In 
the meantime you must go ahead doing your duty as you see it.”12
lBJ fInds hIs pAssIon
 Despite the fact that they were born over 1,300 miles apart 
and into entirely different socioeconomic backgrounds, Lyndon 
Johnson and Jonathan Daniels enjoyed similar upbringings in 
several critical respects. Although he was not a national figure 
like Josephus Daniels, Lyndon’s father, Sam Ealy Johnson Jr., was 
a prominent regional figure who served in the Texas House of  
Representatives for a decade. Sam Johnson and his wife, Rebekah, 
encouraged their eldest son to read newspapers and interact 
with his fellow schoolchildren so as to nurture his curiosity 
and broaden his worldview. Johnson’s parents also emphasized 
achievement, ambition, and public service. According to his 
primary biographer, Robert Caro, Johnson’s parents instilled in 
him a civic ethic from a young age.13 Sam Johnson would also 
encourage his children to think critically; he would spur talk of  
“serious issues” and stage debates on a myriad of  topics at the 
dinner table on a regular basis. Like Daniels, Johnson was said to 
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have had a “highly inquisitive mind” from his earliest days. Well 
aware of  this fact, Sam Johnson consciously worked to nurture 
his son’s curiosity.
 Much like Jonathan Daniels, Lyndon Johnson was the 
beneficiary of  an unconventional racial education. Although he 
grew up in a nearly exclusively white section of  Blanco County, 
Texas, Johnson witnessed the worst excesses of  southern 
segregation and racial prejudice while teaching at the Welhausen 
School in Cotulla, Texas, as a young man.14 In 1927, Johnson 
moved to Cotulla, in the state’s southwestern corner, in order 
to earn enough money to complete his undergraduate degree. 
Upon reaching Cotulla, he found it to be a destitute town with an 
overwhelmingly Mexican population. This experience, however, 
did not reaffirm Johnson’s preexisting racial biases. Instead, 
Johnson’s time in Cotulla became a watershed event in the 
formation of  one of  his guiding political ideologies, as he came 
to view education as the key to realizing the American dream. 
Lyndon Johnson as a young boy in 1915.
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Johnson felt that his students were hampered not by inherent 
racial inadequacies, but by poor education and the unfortunate 
circumstances of  their birth.15 Thus, Johnson’s spell in Cotulla 
led him to second-guess his innate racial biases. 
 Whereas Josephus Daniels nurtured his son to love 
journalism, Sam Johnson raised Lyndon to take an interest in 
politics. Much as Jonathan revered Josephus, Lyndon adored his 
father from a young age; he could usually be found sticking to 
Sam like a shadow and imitating his mannerisms.16 As Lyndon 
Johnson grew, so too did his ambition. When Sam Johnson was 
elected to the legislature in Austin, it only seemed natural to bring 
Lyndon with him. Sam brought his son into Austin’s legislative 
chamber so frequently that many legislators believed Lyndon 
was one of  the page boys.17 While Johnson certainly learned a 
great deal with his father in the state capital, his experience in 
Austin paled in comparison to the wisdom Sam imparted to 
him on the campaign trail. Lyndon relished the opportunity to 
campaign with his father and interact with people across Blanco 
County. Prior to one particularly important campaign stretch, 
Sam told Lyndon, “If  you can’t come into a room and tell right 
away who is for you and who is against you, you have no business 
in politics.”18 This piece of  advice stuck with Johnson his entire 
life and permanently shaped his approach to politics. 
 Lyndon Johnson’s father was integral to his son’s political 
rise and to the development of  his political ethic. Sam Johnson 
paved the way for Lyndon’s professional future by introducing 
him to the world of  politics. He also encouraged his son to think 
critically, develop his passions, and treat education as essential. 
Like Daniels, Johnson inevitably had to split from his role model 
in order to realize his true potential. While Jonathan Daniels 
looked past his father’s ideals, Lyndon Johnson set his career 
sights significantly higher than his father had. Although Lyndon 
idolized his father in his youth, the two Johnsons strove to fulfill 
starkly different dreams. The elder Johnson never harbored 
ambitions of  making it to Washington. As fellow Congressman 
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Wright Patman once said of  Lyndon’s father, “Sam’s political 
ambitions were limited. He didn’t have any aspirations to run 
for Congress. He wanted only local prestige and power, and 
the Texas House was fine for him as his limit.”19 For Sam’s son, 
Blanco County—and even all of  Texas—would never be enough. 
Legend has it that on the day of  Lyndon’s birth, the Johnson 
family patriarch rode around town on horseback shouting that a 
United States senator—his grandson—had been born that day.20 
Lyndon did not shy away from such rhetoric; rather, it imbued 
in him a strong sense of  belief. Johnson truly believed he would 
one day become president. 
 The difference in political aspirations between father and 
son is encapsulated perfectly in the account of  a Johnson City, 
Texas, resident who told Robert Caro, “Sam liked to argue; Sam’s 
son liked to win arguments—had to win arguments. Sam wanted 
to discuss; Lyndon wanted to dominate.”21 Lyndon Johnson 
sought to dominate every discussion, win every argument, 
and triumph in each election. This ceaseless ambition would 
ultimately lead LBJ to Washington and later to the highest office 
in all the land. It was there on Capitol Hill that he would become 
acquainted with Jonathan Worth Daniels. 
cIrcuMstAnces of AcquAIntAnce
 Lyndon B. Johnson relied on a savvy use of  the press as 
a political weapon to take the pulse of  his constituency and to 
widen his sphere of  influence. Jonathan Daniels proved to be 
a particularly important figure in helping Johnson realize these 
aims. Although the precise first point of  contact between the 
two men is unclear, correspondence between them dates back 
to the mid-1940s. Johnson and Daniels continued a steady, if  
not robust, rapport over the years as Johnson accrued power on 
Capitol Hill. Naturally, as Johnson’s power and reach widened, so 
too did his level of  interaction with the press across the nation. 
From the early days of  his youth, Johnson recognized the power 
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of  the newspaper. Throughout his childhood, he could be found 
reading a copy of  whatever he could get his hands on. Johnson 
would read any paper cover to cover; it did not matter if  the 
publication was from a local outlet or a national titan. When he 
ventured into the world of  regional politics, he maintained this 
habit and began to interact strategically with the major players. 
He made a concerted effort to make friends with the most 
important people across his district. Johnson canvassed far and 
wide to court the right people in the right places all across Texas, 
leading many to believe that he had statewide ambitions from the 
day he arrived in the legislature.22
 Johnson made and used friends in the press to solidify 
his support within his district, specifically by allying himself  
closely with George Marsh and his influential Austin newspaper, 
the Austin News-Tribune and Herald.23 Lyndon Johnson could work 
his constituency directly when he was simply a congressman. 
As former Texas State Representative Welly Hopkins attested, 
“Lyndon knows every man woman and child in Blanco County.”24 
By all accounts, Johnson possessed an unusual gift for meeting 
and interacting with the public. As Johnson’s ambitions and reach 
shifted, however, so too did his contacts, as his ability to reach 
the people directly diminished. Upon moving to Capitol Hill, 
he kept on reading, yet Johnson began to favor more nationally 
influential publications such as the New York and Washington 
newspapers, as well as the Congressional Record.25 During his 
rise, Johnson never forgot his father’s advice. He possessed an 
incredible ability to find and identify the pulse of  his constituents, 
and the press played a pivotal role in his ability to do so. This 
luxury allowed Johnson, as his father instructed, to always know 
who was for him and who was against him as he walked into 
any given room. Johnson sought to retain this advantage as his 
influence expanded from the fourteenth district to the entire state 
of  Texas. In the nation’s capital, this task became exponentially 
more difficult as Johnson’s influence magnified. As his ambitions 
outgrew even the Lone Star State, regional mouthpieces such 
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as Jonathan Daniels became necessary contacts for Johnson’s 
Rolodex.  
dAnIels And Johnson’s syMBIotIc relAtIonshIp forMs
 Jonathan Daniels and Lyndon Johnson would eventually 
strike up a mutually beneficial relationship based on a shared 
southern understanding, which existed in the hopes of  delivering 
North Carolina to Johnson in the 1964 election. In exchange for 
his political support, Daniels received a host of  benefits. This 
relationship began to form in the period between Kennedy’s 
assassination and the 1964 presidential election, as Daniels and 
Johnson’s correspondence intensified. During this period, the 
two men discussed a wide-ranging set of  issues in a consistently 
cordial and friendly tone. They spoke about everything from 
issues of  minor importance to matters with serious national 
implications. Ultimately, however, their conversations centered on 
the two men’s visions of  a better America. Johnson and Daniels 
bonded over discussions of  civil rights and their progressive, 
evolving ideas regarding the matter. They also bonded over their 
shared southern identity.
 Lyndon Johnson and Jonathan Daniels asked and received 
a great deal from each other. From Daniels, Johnson asked for 
public support—in editorial form—on several key issues, which 
would shape popular opinion and ultimately help sway the 1964 
election in North Carolina. Johnson understood just how much 
Daniels’s word—and the paper’s word by extension—meant 
to the readers of  the News & Observer. Kennedy had added 
Johnson to the Democratic ticket in 1960 almost exclusively to 
win states in the solid south, such as North Carolina. Johnson’s 
increasingly progressive stance on racial equality, however—in 
tandem with Goldwater’s pandering to segregationists—meant 
these southern states would be in play in 1964. Keeping his 
father’s advice in mind, Johnson recognized that he would have 
to campaign aggressively and work collaboratively with major 
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figures of  the press like Daniels in order to retain traditionally 
Democratic strongholds such as eastern North Carolina, where 
the N&O circulated heavily. 
 Johnson and his advisers would repeat a simple process 
when reaching out to Jonathan Daniels. President Johnson would 
write Daniels, asking for an editorial on issue X, written with 
slant Y. Daniels would comply immediately. Shortly thereafter, 
he would receive a letter from Johnson thanking him graciously 
for his support. Daniels would then write back to the president, 
thanking him for his letter and pledging unlimited support in 
the future. Typically, such letters would close with a bonding 
remark relating to southern pride, or with Daniels mentioning 
how thankful he was for Johnson’s friendship. One example of  
many concludes with a note from Jonathan Daniels postmarked 
September 28, 1964. In this letter, Daniels wrote, “Dear Mr. 
President: I am grateful for your note about my editorial based 
on my understanding and appreciation of  your fighting qualities 
back in the days of  our first associations.”26 This remark was 
in response to Johnson’s earlier request for Daniels to write an 
editorial acknowledging the pair’s longstanding relationship. 
By “the days of  our first associations,” Daniels alludes to the 
early days of  the pair’s friendship, dating back to the mid-1940s, 
when Johnson was a little known member of  the House hailing 
from Texas’s tenth district. This editorial served as an “I knew 
him when” piece. It was likely effective in fostering a positive 
perception of  Johnson in the eyes of  working class eastern 
North Carolinians. 
 Such an editorial aimed to make the readers of  the 
N&O understand Johnson as a relatable character—a hard 
worker of  modest origins. In reality, Johnson likely understood 
these citizens, as he had developed sympathy for the poor and 
oppressed during his childhood and experiences in Cotulla.27 
The Texan never forgot the poverty and rural isolation of  
the Hill Country of  his youth. Although Johnson did ask for 
specific editorials to portray himself  and his candidacy in a 
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calculated manner, Daniels’s personal notes indicate that the 
North Carolinian wrote in good faith while doing so. The two 
operated with a mutual understanding that Daniels’s work was 
of  vital importance; though never explicitly stated, it is clear that 
Daniels and Johnson believed a series of  strategically planned, 
well-written editorials would help the Texan carry the eastern 
portion of  North Carolina and win the state.
 While Johnson asked a considerable amount of  his 
North Carolinian friend, Jonathan Daniels also requested his 
fair share of  favors in return. Daniels’s correspondence with 
Johnson reveals a bevy of  requests for the Texan. On January 18, 
1964, Daniels wrote President Johnson at Governor Sanford’s 
suggestion in order to notify the president of  the excitement in 
North Carolina relating to “the establishment of  the proposed 
Environmental Health Center of  the United States Public 
Health service.”28 Daniels hoped that the president could turn 
the proposed center into a reality. While Daniels’s request, like all 
from his camp, was submitted humbly, it also not so subtly listed 
reasons why it would be in Johnson’s best interests to comply. 
Knowing that the president was eyeing the 1964 election, Daniels 
pleaded a case for Johnson having the N&O on his side: “We 
have had three tough goes in Presidential elections in the years 
just behind us. I’m proud that we carried the State all three times, 
and thought it may sound like boasting, we carried it in the area 
dominated by the circulation of  the News and Observer.”29
 Moreover, in asking for the realization of  a North 
Carolinian dream, Daniels crafted an appeal that detailed the 
ways in which the N&O could prove pivotal in the realization 
of  some of  Johnson’s own political aspirations: “[The N&O’s 
area of  circulation] roughly is our ‘black belt’ where feeling has 
been highest on civil rights and could be intense again.”30 Here, 
Daniels craftily hinted at the merits of  forming a reciprocally 
beneficial relationship and appealed to Johnson on an issue in 
which he knew they both had a vested, common interest. Thus, 
Daniels subtly indicated to Johnson that he could not only help 
“We of the South”
Penn History Review     143 
him win North Carolina, but also shape the state after winning it.
 Jonathan Daniels submitted a variety of  other requests 
for Johnson’s consideration, such as one in March 1964 to issue 
a “stern rebuke to extremists on city streets as well as political 
platforms.”31 All evidence suggests that the president was 
receptive to such requests. The Environmental Health Center in 
the aforementioned correspondence was erected in Durham in 
1966, two years after Daniels helped provide Johnson with the 
east North Carolinian firewall the Texan needed to win the Tar 
Heel State.
 Daniels’s support proved immensely important for 
Johnson as he carried every North Carolinian county east of  
Randolph. Johnson ran up particularly large margins in winning 
rural eastern counties where the N&O reigned supreme, despite 
the expectation that such counties would be hotly contested. As 
Daniels noted in a post-election letter to Johnson, “We’re proud 
of  you! We’re proud of  North Carolina! And we are happy about 
the fact that Eastern North Carolina, where the News and Observer 
circulates went strong for Johnson despite dire predictions that 
that was the area where Goldwater would break through to victory 
in this state.”32 Daniels and Johnson’s correspondence continued 
well after the Texan had secured victory in 1964. Despite the 
importance and maintenance of  their relationship, however, 
Daniels’s post-election communications were outsourced to the 
president’s staff. Nonetheless, Daniels sent requests for Johnson 
to consider certain proposals and attend events in North 
Carolina, such as the Shaw University centennial celebration of  
1965, which he saw as relevant to the promotion of  the Great 
Society. 
 Daniels, moreover, remained happy to publish editorials 
essentially on demand when they would promote positions he 
already supported. He penned one typical editorial in October 
1965, advocating the adoption of  the highway beautification bill. 
He wrote to the president’s wife, Claudia “Lady Bird” Johnson, 
“Your Gal Friday Liz Carpenter called me yesterday morning 
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about an editorial on the highway beautification bill and I was 
happy to oblige.”33 On this occasion, and many others, Daniels 
immediately and obediently served Johnson and his administration 
when called upon. Later in the same letter, Daniels voiced his 
appreciation to the Johnson administration, writing that he had 
been “beating the drum” for the cause of  highway beautification 
for many years, adding that he did so “without much hope before 
you came along.”34 This remark reflects Daniels’s feelings for 
President Johnson. Despite Daniels’s obvious strategic interest in 
forming a relationship with the president, the North Carolinian 
also revered and believed in the man. 
 Although he was called upon to write on a wide variety 
of  subjects, Daniels’s correspondence with President Johnson’s 
office indicates that the North Carolinian was always ready 
to serve on command. On May 14, 1965, for example, one 
of  Johnson’s special assistants wrote to “express [President 
Johnson’s] sincere appreciation for [Daniels’s] editorial of  May 
5th concerning the nature of  America’s actions in the Dominican 
Republic.”35 This aide went on to detail why President Johnson 
felt Daniels’s literary contribution was so crucial: 
The situation in the Dominican Republic is most 
troubled and complex. The reasons for the United 
States’ actions could easily be misinterpreted to 
America and to the World. Because of  this, the 
President was so pleased to see the informative 
explanation which you gave to this manner.36
Johnson and his advisers recognized Daniels’s reach and role 
in shaping public opinion in North Carolina. The Johnson 
administration viewed Jonathan Daniels as a valuable asset 
in securing re-election and in promoting stances on a variety 
of  issues such as foreign policy, mental health, and specific 
proposals such as the highway beautification bill once re-election 
had been secured. Johnson viewed Daniels as having the power 
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to correct the historical record in North Carolina on complex 
issues such as U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in the 
1960s. Daniels held a reciprocal belief  in the ability of  a Johnson 
presidency to correct the historical record on a major issue near 
and dear to both men. 
WhAt lBJ’s presIdency MeAnt for the south
 Daniels’s relationship with the president suggests that 
they both felt a shared duty to restore the South’s reputation 
and return the region to national prominence. Although 
Daniels’s primary job was editor of  the Raleigh News & Observer, 
the North Carolinian concurrently worked in several auxiliary 
capacities. Daniels represented North Carolina as a delegate at a 
handful of  Democratic National Conventions. Additionally, he 
published a number of  books and poems. Interestingly, Daniels 
also accepted invitations to write forewords on a wide variety 
of  subjects, frequently using these forewords as a platform to 
correct the historical record as it related to southern attitudes 
towards race and the South more generally. In his 1957 foreword 
for Dr. Thomas J. Woofter’s Southern Race Progress: The Wavering 
Color Line, Daniels wrote: 
Sometimes in the South today [the segregation 
problem] is treated like something that fell off  
the moon or was dropped almost as fortuitously 
by a fumbling supreme court. And in the North 
the impression is sometimes given that the South 
itself  is one furious posse pursuing every colored 
man who asserts its rights.37
Daniels believed that racial issues such as segregation were too 
often portrayed in a fundamentally incorrect, incomplete, and 
harmful manner. He refuted the notion that racism and racial 
issues were problems that were simply dropped in the South’s 
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lap. As a southerner, Daniels was deeply aware of  the region’s 
long, complex racial history. He believed that discounting 
that history, and looking solely at recent developments, was 
reductionist. In his foreword for Dr. Woofter’s book, Daniels 
also addressed what he deemed to be an unhealthy relationship 
between the North and the South as it related to race. Daniels 
was very well-educated and progressive; he clearly acknowledged 
that the South had room to improve inter-racial tensions. Yet he 
also recognized and hoped to debunk two myths: Daniels hoped 
to prove that racial issues were not exclusive to the South and 
that the region was not composed solely of  racists.
President Johnson’s official White House portrait.
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 Another foreword for a revised edition of  George 
Nichols’s The Story of  the Great March illustrates the ways in 
which Daniels believed the Civil War was the genesis of  the two 
aforementioned myths and the reason for a southern sense of  
profound collective guilt. Daniels was highly critical of  Nichols, 
a former Union soldier and journalist who served under General 
William Tecumseh Sherman prior to publishing his account in 
1865. Daniels pointed to inconsistencies in Nichols’s work and the 
way they created a “devil’s brew.” Nichols wrote that seeing “the 
spectacle of  burning homes aroused in him only feelings about 
a south paying its long overdue debt to justice and humanity.”38 
Daniels believed that Nichols’s factually incorrect, biased, toxic 
narrative, and thousands like it, led Americans to view the South 
as fully culpable for the Civil War without acknowledging the sins 
of  the North. Daniels eloquently pointed to the hypocrisy of  this 
statement and highlighted the ways in which Sherman’s march 
“wasn’t simply a march of  disciplined military destruction.”39 
Nichols noted that “men and officers, too, took everything from 
silver cups to carriages, gold watches, chains and rings.”40 Daniels 
did not seek to excuse the wrongs of  the South; he simply aimed 
to prove that the South was not “occupied only by extremists on 
both sides,” in the hope of  debunking the idea that the South 
had a long overdue debt to pay.41 Moreover, Daniels hoped to 
highlight the fact that the South and North could work together, 
as the two were neither diametrically opposed nor free of  guilt. 
He believed that Lyndon Baines Johnson could be the man to 
foster this reunification of  a splintered nation and correct the 
South’s historical record. 
 Lyndon Johnson was acutely aware of  his southern 
identity and of  the potential he held to mend daunting regional 
tensions. As a president born in a former Confederate state, 
Johnson felt he carried a personal burden in representing the 
South and dispelling the myths surrounding the region. When 
he became president, Johnson determined, “I’ve got to show 
southerners are not dumb, I’m going to defend the south by 
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showing every time how much I know. I’m not going to use 
metaphors. I’m not going to be folksy.”42 He felt a personal duty 
to prove that southerners belonged in the executive branch. 
Johnson and Daniels both recognized that a successful LBJ 
presidency could help bring the South back into the Union and 
the mainstream of  American politics. From his first moments 
in office, Johnson offered the hope of  reconciliation and the 
prospect of  a future in which the South could be an integrated 
part of  the United States rather than a separate region that stood 
against the rest of  the nation.43
 Johnson was uniquely well equipped to appeal to the 
South. As a southerner himself, he understood both the history 
and feelings of  southern people.44 He truly understood what it 
meant to come from the South in twentieth-century America. 
Johnson empathized with the southern pride the Sons of  Dixie 
felt, and he understood the shame of  being discriminated against 
solely due to his place of  birth. The president understood these 
concepts because he had lived and breathed them. Lyndon 
Johnson and figures like Daniels were also prescient in recognizing 
that promoting civil rights would unblock the quickest route to 
reclaiming southern pride and correcting the South’s historical 
record. In the words of  political journalist Theodore White, LBJ 
spoke “in the presence of  other southerners as a southerner who 
had come to wisdom.”45 This wisdom led Johnson to provide his 
southern compatriots with an ultimatum disguised as a choice. 
On the campaign trail in 1964, he issued one of  the signature 
speeches of  his political career, declaring:
Today the south like the rest of  the nation is 
at a crossroads…between a glory of  what can 
be—and a glory that was. A choice has been 
forced upon us. It is the choice between a new 
progress—and a new nullification. Here in 
Charleston, once the hub of  the Old South, you 
have to make that choice.46
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dAnIels, Johnson, And JIM croW: 
rAce As the key to southern reIntegrAtIon
 Daniels and Johnson eventually came to see race not as 
an issue, but as the issue that prevented the South from reentering 
the American political mainstream. This was not always the 
case, however, despite the prognostication of  another Texan, 
sociologist V.O. Key. In the 1940s, Key identified the bulk of  
literature on southern politics as conforming to one of  two 
caricatures:
In both caricatures there is a grain of  truth; yet 
each is false. The south, to be sure, has its share 
of  scoundrels, but saints do not appeal markedly 
less numerous there than on the other side of  
Mason and Dixon’s line. Rather, politics of  the 
south is incredibly complex.47
Key asserted that a variety of  issues set the South “against the 
rest of  the country.”48 Despite all of  its issues he believed that 
one towered above all the rest: “The race issue broadly defined 
thus must be considered as the number one problem on the 
southern agenda. Lacking a solution for it, all else fails.”49 While 
it is difficult to pinpoint an exact date, it is clear that Daniels 
and Johnson came to the same conclusion as Key by 1964; they 
believed that abandoning Jim Crow once and for all was the only 
way the South could truly merge with the rest of  the nation. 
 Neither of  these men, however, came to such a 
conclusion in a linear manner. According to Charles Eagles, 
Daniels’s challenge to attitudes towards race emerged tentatively 
over the span of  several decades.50 Daily editorials forced Daniels 
to constantly grapple with his personal stances, as well as the 
moral and political ramifications of  such statements. Johnson 
also took many years to see the light and incorporate civil rights 
into his own political imperative. Reflecting on his career after 
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the passage of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964, LBJ observed, “I 
do not want to say that I have always seen this matter, in terms 
of  the special plight of  the black man, as clearly as I came to see 
it in the course of  my life and experience and responsibility.”51 
Daniels and Johnson also shaped each other’s understanding and 
views regarding racial equality during their two decades-long 
correspondence. Upon reaching this understanding, the two 
men were uniquely qualified to enact the changes they deemed 
necessary.
 Daniels used his pen to educate and shape the minds of  
his readership. Week after week, he sold the men, women, and 
children of  rural, eastern North Carolina on the idea of  a new, 
post-Jim Crow South, while Johnson attempted to make that new 
South a reality. Lyndon B. Johnson had the sensitivity, personal 
experience, political acumen, and southern credentials to connect 
with southerners and work the political establishment to inspire 
a shift in attitudes towards racial issues. He was able to connect 
with people in places such as rural, eastern North Carolina 
partially because of  contacts like Daniels, but also because he 
President Johnson signing the Civil Rights Act of  1964.
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knew how the denizens of  such areas felt. Johnson knew that 
citizens of  poor, rural southern states were not just poor. He 
understood that they felt poor. The president empathized with 
these men and women who felt “back in the woods” because as 
a southerner in Washington, he felt the same way.52
 Johnson was able to tap into an intangible feeling and 
rally enough support in key areas of  the South to carry the torch 
for an evolving southern liberalism in Washington. His alliance 
with Daniels was integral in rallying the base of  support that 
was necessary to carry North Carolina in 1964. Johnson had to 
internalize and set aside both his southern pride and his southern 
shame in order to lead. Rather than serving as purely a southern 
leader, Johnson served as a national leader. The president 
certainly felt the sting of  northern elitism and name calling; he 
battled crippling insecurity and constantly wondered if  he could 
ever fit in amongst the Washington elite, whom he referred to as 
“Harvards.” Yet Johnson overcame these feelings of  insecurity in 
an attempt to lead the South back into the political mainstream. 
 As much as he tried, however, Johnson could never 
entirely separate himself  from his southern pride. He toiled 
ceaselessly to ensure that future generations of  southerners would 
not have to feel the sting of  “discrimination for the geography 
of  their birth” or grow up in a dichotomy of  two regions in 
which it was simply unthinkable that a southerner could become 
president.53 Johnson’s southern identity served as the catalyst for 
his fight against racial injustice and his struggle to correct the 
South’s historical record as Daniels had hoped. He once said, 
“I know the burdens the south has borne… And I want to see 
those burdens lifted off  the south. I want the ordeals to end and 
the south to stand where it should stand as the full and honored 
part of  a proud and united land.”54 Even some of  Johnson’s 
fiercest opponents—many of  them southern—conceded that 
the Texan was integral in leading the region from the fringes of  
politics into the core of  the nation. One of  these opponents, 
Virginia Durr, stated, “Lyndon brought the south back into the 
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mainstream politics of  the United States. That is my belief, that 
he really struck the shackles. I mean, Lincoln struck the shackles 
off  the slaves, but Lyndon struck the shackles off  the south. 
He freed us from the burden of  segregation.”55 Johnson could 
never have done so without the help of  men like Jonathan Worth 
Daniels.
“We of the South”
Penn History Review     153 
notes
1 William Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2005), 323.
2 Robert A. Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1981), 535.
3 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, quoted in Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks 
South, 402.
4 Charles W. Eagles, Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations (Knoxville: The 
University of  Tennessee Press, 1982), 15.
5 Ibid, 11.
6 Cleves Daniels, Letter to Raleigh News & Observer Board Meeting, October 
19, 1964, Letter. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, The Southern Historical Collection.
7 C. Stanton Coates, Letter to the Editor, Jonathan W. Daniels, August 4, 1962, 
Letter. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The 
Southern Historical Collection.
8 Ibid.
9 Eagles, Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations, xiv.
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 3.
12 Josephus Daniels, quoted in Eagles, Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations, 6.
13 Sylvia Ellis, Freedom’s Pragmatist: Lyndon Johnson and Civil Rights (Gainesville: 
University Press of  Florida, 2013), 14.
14 Ibid, 17.
15 Ibid, 18.
16 Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 98.
17 Ibid, 114
18 Sam Ealy Johnson, quoted in Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to 
Power, 75.
19 Wright Patman, quoted in Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 
178.
20 Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 89
21 Anonymous Johnson City Resident, quoted in Caro, The Years of  Lyndon 
Johnson: The Path to Power, 78.
22 Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 534.
23 Ibid, 1.
24 Welly Hopkins, quoted in Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 
203.
25 Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of  American Ambition (New York: Free 
Press, 2006), 80.
  
“We of the South”
154     Simon Panitz
26 Jonathan Daniels, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, September 28, 
1964. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The 
Southern Historical Collection.
27 Ellis, Freedom’s Pragmatist, 14.
28 Jonathan Daniels, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, February 18, 1964, 
Letter. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The 
Southern Historical Collection.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Jonathan Daniels, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, January 14, 1964, 
Letter. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The 
Southern Historical Collection.
32 Jonathan Daniels, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, November 14, 
1964, Letter. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, The Southern Historical Collection. 
33 Jonathan Daniels, Letter to Lady Bird Johnson October 5, 1965, Letter. 
From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The 
Southern Historical Collection.
34 Ibid.
35 Jonathan Daniels, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, May 14, 1965, 
Letter. From Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The 
Southern Historical Collection.
36 Ibid.
37 Jonathan Daniels, Foreword to Southern Race Progress, 1957. From Wilson 
Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The Southern Historical 
Collection.
38 Jonathan Daniels, Foreword to The Story of  the Great March, 1958. From 
Wilson Library, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The Southern 
Historical Collection
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Lyndon Johnson, quoted in Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South, 
392.
43 Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South, 377.
44 Ibid, 276.
45 Theodore White, quoted in Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South, 322.
46 Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South, 319.
47 V.O. Key Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (Knoxville: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc, 1949), 1.
48 Ibid, 3.
“We of the South”
Penn History Review     155 
49 Ibid, 675.
50 Eagles, Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations, 16.
51 Lyndon Johnson, quoted in Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to 
Power, 127. 
52 Caro, The Years of  Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 118. 
53 Ibid, 340.
54 Lyndon Johnson, quoted in Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South, 
377.
55 Virginia Durr, quoted in Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South, 380. 
Images
Page 136: “A picture of  Lyndon Johnson in 1915 at his family home 
in the Texas hill country near Stonewall, Texas and Johnson City,” 
1915, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Lyndon_B._Johnson_-_15-13-2_-_ca._1915.jpg (accessed May 5, 2017). 
Page 146: “Official Presidential portrait of  Lyndon Baines Johnson,” 
Elizabeth Shoumatoff, 1968, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ljohnson.jpeg (accessed May 5, 2017). 
Page 150: “Lyndon Johnson signing Civil Rights Act,” Cecil Stoughton, July 
2, 1964, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Lyndon_Johnson_signing_Civil_Rights_Act,_July_2,_1964.jpg (accessed 
May 5, 2017). 
156     Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts 
Honors Thesis Abstracts
Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts
Rejecting the Blackmail of  the Enlightenment: Foucault’s 
Critical Ontology of  the Present 
Kyle Bigley
 This thesis analyzes the way in which the Enlightenment 
served as a catalyst in the work of  Michel Foucault, a twentieth-
century French intellectual who contributed to diverse 
disciplines, including political theory, philosophy, sociology, 
and literary theory. In examining Foucault’s treatment of  the 
Enlightenment, this work rejects the notion that Foucault was 
“anti-Enlightenment,” the accusation he faced throughout his 
career that he rejected science, reason, and universality. Instead, 
this thesis argues for an understanding of  Foucault’s work that 
posits a distinction between the Enlightenment as a historical 
period and the Enlightenment as a philosophical ethos, or 
critique. In making this distinction, this thesis can distinguish 
between Foucault’s criticism of  practices that emerged during 
the Enlightenment in the human sciences and his simultaneous 
commitment to a Kantian and Enlightenment form of  critique. 
The findings conclude that Foucault attempted to turn the form 
of  critique the Enlightenment engendered against what Foucault 
considered to be pernicious practices that originated during the 
eighteenth century.
Plebiscite and Partition: Propaganda, Mass Mobilization, 
and Diplomacy in Weimar Germany’s Struggle for Upper 
Silesia
Samuel Byers
 This thesis examines the propaganda, political mass 
mobilization, and diplomatic campaigns waged by the nascent 
government of  Weimar Germany to defend its sovereignty 
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over the disputed border province of  Upper Silesia in the years 
immediately following the Treaty of  Versailles. The Weimar 
government has conventionally been characterized as impotent 
during this period and subjugated by the harsh terms of  the 
Versailles Peace. However, the handling of  the Upper Silesian crisis 
demonstrates that this is at least in part a mischaracterization. The 
provisions of  the Treaty mandated that the region’s sovereignty 
would be determined by a popular referendum of  its ethnically-
mixed (and nationally-ambivalent) residents in accordance 
with the principle of  national self-determination. This thesis 
uses documentary evidence from the records of  the Weimar 
Chancellery and Interior Ministry, as well as newspapers and 
the personal papers of  local government officials, to argue that 
Berlin’s propaganda and political mobilization campaigns were 
successful in convincing Silesians to vote to remain in the Reich. 
Successive Weimar governments leveraged their own advantages 
and exploited the terms of  the Treaty to their advantage in order 
to defend Germany’s patrimony. The Weimar government then 
leveraged its victory in the March 1921 plebiscite as the key part 
of  its diplomatic strategy to retain control of  the province. This 
research joins a growing body of  work which characterizes early 
Weimar Germany as a dynamic and vibrant government capable 
of  taking initiative and effectively defending its own interests, 
even when placed at a significant disadvantage by the Treaty of  
Versailles or the governments of  the victorious Allies, giving 
us a more nuanced perspective on inter-war German political 
development.
Progressive Profit: Identity, Culture, and Branding at 
Polaroid in the 1970s
Conor Cook
 Although one rarely sees a Polaroid camera in use today, 
the Polaroid Corporation remains an iconic American brand. 
Little research, however, has analyzed the company’s cultural 
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history and legacy through the latter half  of  the twentieth 
century. Building upon existing scholarship, this work integrates 
sources such as advertisements, interviews, photographs, and 
annual reports to illuminate a larger narrative about Polaroid. 
Polaroid embodied technological innovation and novelty, and by 
the late-1960s and 1970s, the company promoted a constructed 
progressive public image that emphasized its social and cultural 
agenda. This work examines the Polaroid Corporation’s social 
and cultural progressivism and the extent of  its eventual 
impact using the contemporary framework of  corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Ultimately, the economic environment in 
which the Polaroid Corporation promoted its products stunted 
the impact of  the company’s social and cultural progressivism. 
The thesis highlights three essential components of  Polaroid’s 
cultural history: the place of  Polaroid in the social and racial 
zeitgeist of  late-1960s and 1970s America, artistic initiatives 
and sponsorship, and the Polaroid Corporation’s marketing and 
branding strategies. Though Polaroid’s contributions to minority 
self-expression and self-actualization were significant, they were 
ultimately limited because they did not address the material, 
organizational, or structural causes of  corporate marginalization.
A Long, Hot Summer: The 1964 Columbia Avenue Race 
Riot and the Jewish Community Relations Council of  
Greater Philadelphia
Hannah Fagin 
 In August of  1964 on Columbia Avenue in North Central 
Philadelphia, a minor police incident escalated into a weekend-
long race riot. This thesis explores how this specific event shaped 
Black-Jewish relations in Philadelphia through the perspective of  
the Jewish Community Relations Council of  Greater Philadelphia 
(JCRC), a local community-organizing agency. On Columbia 
Avenue, like many northern cities during the 1960s, Jews served 
as landlords and business owners in Black neighborhoods, yet 
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lived elsewhere in emerging middle class areas of  the city. The 
vandalism and looting perpetuated by rioters largely affected 
Jewish business owners, increasing hostilities and resentment 
on Columbia Avenue and complicating the JCRC’s mandate 
to promote Black-Jewish relations. While many contemporary 
observers viewed August 28, 1964, as the pinnacle of  the decline 
between Philadelphia’s Black and Jewish communities, this thesis 
argues that hostilities existed well before the violence ensued 
and that collaborations continued long after. Over the course of  
the decade, partly because of  the riot, the JCRC transitioned its 
work from promoting interpersonal relationships and sustaining 
dialogue between Jews and Blacks in the early 1960s to aiding 
Jews in moving out of  Black neighborhoods by the early 1970s. 
Through archival research, largely derived from the unprocessed 
JCRC Records Collection, this study explores a race riot that has 
been largely overlooked in previous historical literature due to its 
relatively mild outcome. This thesis claims that the mythologized 
Black-Jewish relationship in Philadelphia promoted by the JCRC, 
and elsewhere in the United States, was never a true or natural 
alliance, but one always defined by fractures and fissions long 
before and long after the race riot.
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy: Public Art Museums, 
Exhibitions, and Cultural Control in Britain, 1805-1862
Julia Fine
 This thesis examines the evolving nature of  cultural 
authority in early- to mid-nineteenth century Britain, focusing 
specifically on the aristocracy’s involvement in the creation of  
public art museums and exhibitions. The eighteenth century was a 
period of  aristocratic cultural dominance, during which a codified 
notion of  correct ‘Taste’ was created and expressed by the art 
treasures collected during Grand Tours and housed in elaborate 
country homes and London townhouses. The 1800s, however, 
witnessed a dramatic expansion of  the economic and political 
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presence of  the upper middle class, although the aristocracy still 
retained significant power. This period also saw the creation of  
public art museums, including the National Gallery and the South 
Kensington Museum (later called the Victoria & Albert), and my 
research explores the shift in the balance of  power between the 
aristocracy and the emergent middle class in this cultural realm. 
Who were the main drivers of  these newfound institutions, and 
who controlled their management? Which sectors of  society 
were desired and allowed to enter into these spaces of  culture? 
This examination of  the cultural issues related to the rise of  
public museums illuminates the social history of  class relations 
in a time of  political change. Through the use of  institutional 
Boards of  Trustees minutes, parliamentary reports and debates, 
newspaper articles, and treatises on art and collecting in Britain, 
this thesis traces the history of  art for public consumption in this 
era through the lens of  class. Ultimately, elite authority over the 
arts, once so firmly established, was diminished as Parliament, 
professionals, and men of  business and industry became the new 
managers and overseers of  museums and exhibitions. Aristocrats 
were reduced to figureheads, holding positions of  symbolic 
control. However, their influence as the original tastemakers 
was to be felt for generations, as their art treasures became 
firmly established throughout this period as the nation’s cultural 
heritage.
Trimming Liberty’s Tree: John Dickinson Before He Was 
“A Farmer”
Benjamin Fogel
 John Dickinson (1732-1808) did more to affect the 
founding of  this nation than nearly any man, yet his refusal 
to sign the Declaration of  Independence has confounded 
scholars for centuries. He earned the sobriquet “Penman 
of  the Revolution” for his Letters from a Farmer (1768) and 
The Liberty Song (1768). He was the de facto voice for the 
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colonies, drafting the Declaration of  Rights (1765), the Bill of  
Rights (1774), the List of  Grievances (1774), the Letter to the 
Inhabitants of  Quebec (1774), the Petitions to the King (1774, 
1775), the Declaration of  the Causes and Necessity of  Taking 
up Arms (1775), and the Articles of  Confederation (1776). 
He was an elected representative in the Delaware (1759-1761) 
and Pennsylvania (1762-1764) Assemblies, a delegate to the 
Stamp Act (1765), First Continental (1774), Second Continental 
(1775-1776), and Confederation (1779-1781) Congresses, and 
the President of  Delaware (1781-1783), Pennsylvania (1782-
1785), and the Annapolis Convention (1786). He personally 
took up arms during the Revolution and served as a colonel 
in Pennsylvania’s militia before joining Delaware’s. And yet, he 
abstained from the vote on Independence. Dickinson is largely 
forgotten and oft neglected for this decision. It has become his 
sole legacy and source of  confusion about his politics. Only 
two proper biographies have been published on Dickinson and 
neither offers an adequate explanation for his fateful decision. 
Contradictory claims have failed to explain the apparent paradox: 
How could Dickinson, that staunch advocate for the American 
cause, reject the Declaration yet still fight for liberty? Several 
recent discoveries at archives in London and Philadelphia offer 
a unique glimpse into Dickinson’s education and legal career and 
help construct a new understanding of  his theory of  government, 
conceptions of  rights, and jurisprudence. With these tools, this 
thesis reconsiders the nuances of  his politics and presents a new 
perspective on his ideological influences.
Out of  Control: The Ulster Special Constabulary, the 
Cushendall Incident, and Anglo-Irish Relations, 1920-1922
Anna Garson
 On June 23, 1922, in the village of  Cushendall in 
Northern Ireland, three Catholic civilians were brutally 
murdered by members of  the Protestant-majority Ulster Special 
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Constabulary, a newly formed quasi-military police force. The 
Specials claimed they had been attacked and fired in self-defense, 
a lie accepted by the government of  Northern Ireland. Subject 
to four investigations—including one ordered by Winston 
Churchill—hundreds of  letters of  correspondence, and two 
trials, the truth of  the incident was suppressed and all files 
relating to the matter were classified for 75 years. Analysis of  
the incident is almost entirely absent from secondary scholarship 
or is discussed anecdotally with little archival evidence. Why, 
then, is this particular moment of  violence, which appears 
to have been an immense problem for the Northern Ireland 
government, worthy of  study now? This thesis argues that the 
Cushendall incident exposes competing authorities and political 
ambiguities and inconsistencies within the very new Northern 
Ireland government, and it is also evidence of  the state’s 
deliberate encouragement of  the Ulster Special Constabulary to 
be the violent Protector of  Northern Irish Protestant, Unionist, 
and Loyalist supremacy at the expense of  the Catholic minority. 
The Specials were designed to organize Protestants and to 
disorganize Catholics: the Cushendall episode tested whether the 
new Unionist regime would be free to keep the Ulster Special 
Constabulary from British scrutiny and determined the tone with 
which the government of  Northern Ireland would approach the 
next fifty years of  sectarian conflict.
“Let George Do It”: Simkins v. Cone and the Making of  
Hospital Integration in Greensboro, North Carolina
Eli Goldman
 This thesis examines the role that local civil rights activist 
George Simkins Jr. played in the struggle to integrate Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Wesley Long Community 
Hospital in Greensboro, North Carolina, during the 1950s and 
1960s. Throughout the first half  of  the twentieth century, racial 
segregation defined southern healthcare, as hospitals regularly 
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denied patients treatment on racial grounds and relegated 
African Americans to inferior service in segregated facilities. 
Not until 1963, when Simkins organized a successful legal 
challenge to segregation at Greensboro’s two prominent, private 
hospitals in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, did the 
federal government address this critical inequality in healthcare. 
However, existing scholarship on the medical integration 
process lacks the same attention paid to other aspects of  the 
civil rights movement and often overlooks the complexities of  
grassroots efforts to integrate. This thesis addresses these critical 
shortcomings by analyzing the importance of  the local socio-
political climate in Greensboro, as well as the agency of  local 
leaders like Simkins in the progression of  the Simkins v. Cone 
case. In doing so, it relies on official court documents from the 
case, correspondences between civil rights leaders and hospital 
administrators, hospital administrative records, news coverage, 
and transcripts of  interviews with Simkins. Ultimately, this thesis 
demonstrates the great impact local circumstances and activity 
had in forcing the desegregation of  southern hospitals and 
draws connections between the Simkins case and the broader 
progression of  medical integration.
Between Judaism and Christianity: The Intellectual Journey 
of  Moses Margoliouth
Jill Golub
 This thesis analyzes the life and thoughts of  one convert: 
Reverend Dr. Moses Margoliouth (1815-1881). Margoliouth 
was a Polish-born Jew who grew up in a traditional Jewish 
household. Eager to escape his observant Jewish community 
and the wife he had just married, Margoliouth set out to see, 
and better understand, the larger world. While traveling, he 
ended up in Liverpool, England. There, he met members of  
the conversion society called the London Society for Promoting 
Christianity Amongst the Jews, read the New Testament, and 
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converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, for the remainder of  
his life, Margoliouth’s identity was caught between Judaism and 
Christianity. Although religiously he had become a full Christian 
after his conversion, his connection to his Jewish heritage and 
ethnicity was never foregone. As a result, both the Jewish and 
Anglican communities were never able to fully accept his change 
of  faith. Margoliouth’s split identity manifested itself  in his 
writings and relationships. The study of  Margoliouth not only 
contributes to the general historiography on the phenomenon 
of  conversion, but also focuses on a much smaller segment of  
the convert population—those who left Judaism because they 
believed in the Christian message. Margoliouth went on to 
become a devoted Christian missionary and his story allows a 
closer analysis into faith-based conversions and the climate in 
England in the nineteenth century for those who converted and 
attempted to get others to do the same.
Sermons of  Sacred Fire: Interwar Congressional Attenuation 
of  U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia
Joseph Kiernan
 This thesis explores the influence of  the New Deal 
political coalition upon the United States’ foreign policy positions 
in East Asia. The subtle sinews between the frenetic domestic 
politics of  the early 1930s and the decay of  American post-First 
World War internationalism reveal a striking abandonment of  
key precepts of  the 1920s U.S. foreign policy order. Through 
the triumph of  newly-empowered populists, progressives, 
and militarists with the Roosevelt coalition, dormant political 
agendas achieved consonance and strength in the congressional 
milieu. Illustrating the ramifications of  this political revolution 
and seeking to explore the domestic catalysts for the United 
States’ East Asian foreign policy shifts, this thesis examines two 
distinct narratives: the quest for pro-silver economic policies and 
the promotion of  naval rearmament, and their ramifications for 
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American diplomacy and global geopolitical change.
 Before the advent of  the Roosevelt era, the 1920s were 
marked by the emergence and maturation of  an international 
order, founded on the Washington treaties of  1922 and largely 
guided by the United States, which emphasized multilateral 
cooperation on naval disarmament and the defense of  Chinese 
sovereignty. Through Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover’s 
administrations, these efforts were centerpieces of  American 
foreign policy, a careful balance between the United States’ 
expanded presence in world affairs and the popular reluctance 
to pledge to the enforcement of  peace promotion through 
overseas military commitments. The U.S., therefore, would lead 
by example as an advocate for Chinese self-determination and 
expansive naval disarmament. 
 This foreign policy order, emphasizing American 
leadership, entered terminal decline due to the insurmountable 
pressures of  the New Deal political system and Roosevelt’s single-
issue allies. By forcing the United States to massively increase 
the price of  silver, pro-silver and pro-mining congressmen and 
senators knowingly sacrificed the Chinese economy, which was 
dependent upon a stable price. This dramatically, and perhaps 
fatally, weakened the Chinese Nationalist government while 
enhancing Japan’s interference in China. Navalist politicians, 
such as Carl Vinson, used the demand for military economic 
stimulus to finally overcome the pacifistic, disarmament status 
quo defended by the Hoover administration and its predecessors. 
The internationalists of  the 1920s could not endure the onslaught 
of  introverted progressivism, an irresistible political populism 
which contradicted the inertia of  preexisting policy and hobbled 
the United States’ alleged friend, China. The disregard and 
contempt for the system enshrined at Washington in 1922 reveals 
how the United States’ politicians of  the 1930s played a key role 
in destroying the post-WWI order and amplifying the conditions 
that would lead toward the Second World War.
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“Unhallowed Bonds”: Interracial Sex, Rape, and the Law 
in the Antebellum Carolinas 
Dorian Ledbetter
 This thesis explores the legal response to interracial 
sexual relationships in two southern states, North and South 
Carolina, during the antebellum era. Such an analysis reveals how 
interracial sex functioned in a slave society and further elucidates 
the complexities of  the racial hierarchy and the structure of  
southern power dynamics in the period leading up to the Civil 
War. Legal responses to interracial adultery are examined primarily 
through the use of  divorce petitions penned by betrayed spouses. 
The study also expands to include nonconsensual relationships, 
specifically analyzing trial transcripts from cases of  rape. This 
thesis also considers the dangers that the children of  interracial 
sexual relationships produced for North and South Carolina and 
their racial hierarchies. When attempting to racially classify an 
individual, the courts of  North and South Carolina considered 
factors beyond ancestry—physical appearance, character, and 
reception in society could all contribute to either the elevation of  
an individual to the superior white caste, or the relegation of  an 
individual to the inferior black caste. Relevant state statutes are 
referenced throughout. The research demonstrates that during 
the antebellum era regulations regarding interracial sex were 
less necessary as slavery ensured that boundaries in the racial 
hierarchy were well defined—the peculiar institution ensured the 
confinement of  black people to a degraded position in society.
Popular Neutralism in the English Civil War, 1642-49
Julia Levitan
 This thesis examines the everyday experiences of  
individuals of  the middling sort in six localities during the English 
Civil War (1642-1649) in order to assess the various nuances of  
popular allegiance expressed throughout the conflict. In doing 
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so, the findings of  this thesis undermine traditional notions of  
allegiance that fall into such clearly defined camps as the Marxist 
interpretation, the geographic interpretation, and the social 
deference interpretation. Instead, this work posits that popular 
neutralism pervaded England’s middling sort throughout the 
war years. Popular neutralism was not just a renunciation, but 
a capacious idea into which various defenses of  local identity, 
articulations of  social grievances, and patterns of  popular 
association could be accommodated. This argument for popular 
neutralism has a profound impact on the rest of  seventeenth-
century England, a period of  turmoil and change. It calls into 
question the authority upon which Oliver Cromwell took power 
and provides a better understanding of  the muddled motivations 
of  a people who removed the very institution of  monarchy only 
to quickly replace it.
In Search of  the Great Lies and the Clever Disguise: The 
Life and Legacy of  Baron Friedrich Wilhelm de Steuben
Aaron C. Mandelbaum
 After another dismal year of  fighting in the American 
Revolutionary War, the Continental Army limped into Valley 
Forge, Pennsylvania for the 1777-78 winter season. While this 
hiatus from the battlefield afforded the Patriots time to regroup 
and reassess their war strategy, much of  their attention had to 
address the blistering cold, pelting snow, rampant disease, and 
diminishing supply lines of  food, clothing, and firewood in the 
encampment. Indeed, as one observer noted, the Patriots had 
become a “skeleton of  an army.” 
 Curiously, though, it was in the midst of  these deplorable 
conditions that an unlikely hero, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm 
de Steuben, a former lieutenant general in the Prussian Army 
and aide-de-camp to Frederick the Great, emerged onto the 
scene. Almost instantaneously elevated to the role of  Inspector 
General of  the Continental Army, Steuben succeeded in 
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instilling organization and discipline into the Patriot soldiers 
and, as a result, transformed what was a ragtag militia into a 
formidable armed force in less than four months. In fact, after 
his experiences at Valley Forge, Steuben transcribed the first 
standardized drill manual in American military tradition, which 
helped solidify his promotion to the Pantheon of  American 
Military Heroes. Upon further review, however, Steuben’s self-
portrayal and commitment to the American Cause calls for 
deeper examination. This thesis, therefore, explores the life and 
legacy of  Baron de Steuben and, in doing so, concludes that the 
Baron committed one of  the greatest deceptions in American 
history. Specifically, this thesis analyzes Steuben’s European 
prosopography, revealing that Steuben was not an aristocrat, 
procured and liberally leveraged the title of  “Baron,” advertised 
himself  as a lieutenant general due to a mistranslation, and 
spoke no English whatsoever. Moreover, this thesis suggests 
why Steuben’s career in Europe had ended so abruptly, which 
some historians suspect emanated from the Baron’s rumored 
homosexuality. Thus, ultimately, this thesis argues that the man 
described as “indispensable to the Achievement of  American 
Independence” was a self-promoting charlatan who, through 
a series of  back room dealings, combined an exaggerated and 
opaque past with his adroit talent as an ambitious sycophant 
to dupe the inexperienced and nascent American military and 
political leadership to secure a position in the Continental Army, 
and attempt to obtain the wealth and distinction that had eluded 
him in Europe.
Thou Shalt Not Kill? Religious Violence in Seventeenth-
Century London 
Kathryn Marshalek
 Political turmoil and religious tensions plagued 
seventeenth-century London as the city underwent dramatic 
changes between the ascension of  King James I in 1603 and 
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the Glorious Revolution in 1688. During this period, tensions 
festered between Catholics and Protestants, erupting into violence 
centered around three key nodal points: the potential ‘Spanish 
Match’ between Prince Charles and the Infanta of  Spain in the 
early 1620s, the English Civil War and Commonwealth era of  the 
mid-century, and the panic surrounding the Popish Plot of  the 
late 1670s. This thesis traces the nature of  this violence across 
the changing political landscape to reveal the ways in which larger 
national anxieties surrounding religion materialized in small-scale 
interpersonal relationships. Specific cases of  violence are read 
as meaningful gestures that reflect popular anxieties, fears, and 
animosities that express fundamental features of  Catholic and 
Protestant relations in post- Reformation England. This work 
aims to augment the historical record, largely focused on state- 
sponsored action, by emphasizing religious violence committed 
by Catholics who felt the oppressive weight of  the state and by 
Protestants who felt the state’s negligence left them at risk. To 
demonstrate that the perpetrators of  violence viewed their actions 
as a conscious challenge to the prevailing order, three aspects 
of  these actions—motivation, justification, and response—were 
examined using an in-depth consideration of  rhetoric, theological 
defenses of  violence, and a number of  pointed case studies. The 
result challenges the traditional exclusion of  violence from the 
category of  social crime and shows that interpersonal religious 
violence was employed to defend a doctrine, to issue a charge, 
and to demonstrate that attitude of  the perpetrator toward the 
law differed from those who made and enforced the law.
Gone Viral: The Role of  the Press during the Dreyfus Affair
David Murrell
 On December 22, 1894, French captain Alfred Dreyfus 
was convicted of  treason for leaking military secrets to the 
German military attaché in Paris. Dreyfus did not, however, 
commit the crime. The press immediately joined the budding 
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polemic, both in defense and in condemnation of  the disgraced 
captain. This internal debate played a massive role in publicizing 
the Dreyfus case, turning a minor domestic scandal into a full-
blown international affair, which only concluded following 
Dreyfus’s exoneration in 1906. While many historians have 
analyzed the complex history of  the Dreyfus affair, the media is 
rarely treated as a central figure. This thesis attempts to recast the 
affair as one that was intimately shaped by the press. Indeed, the 
French government maintained daily reports on the writings of  
the domestic and foreign press, in what amounted to an attempt 
to control the narrative of  the affair. To this end, the government 
surveilled newspaper delivery boys at home and censored pro-
Dreyfus theater productions abroad, though it failed to censor 
any newspapers due to European free press laws. Ultimately, 
no one was sure how to harness the power of  the mass press 
for one’s own benefit. The strategies discussed by the thesis—
centralized monitoring of  the press, censorship, and government 
pressure exerted by the press—would become commonplace in 
the coming century. In this regard, the Dreyfus affair served as a 
preview of  the modern mass media and domestic pressures that 
would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
Collegiate Masculinity and the Rise of  American Youth 
Culture during the Roaring Twenties
Chloé Nurik
 Using a combination of  both archival sources (from 
Harvard, Yale, and the University of  Pennsylvania) and media 
depictions, this study examines the construction, representation, 
and lived reality of  collegiate masculinity in 1920s America. In 
particular, the factors of  consumerism, the increased public 
presence of  women, and the rise of  youth culture are analyzed 
for their impact on the way that young men viewed themselves 
and their peers. This thesis argues that multiple models of  
masculinity existed at this time, creating tension for young men as 
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they navigated these competing ideals and formed their identities 
in an increasingly complicated social environment.
“From Dump to Glory”: Robert Moses & Flushing 
Meadows-Corona Park
Mark Paraskevas
 This thesis explores the intricacies of  infamous New 
York urban planner Robert Moses’s park-planning process 
in regards to Flushing Meadows-Corona Park, with the two 
World’s Fairs hosted at the site (1939-1940 and 1964-1965) as 
bookends. Examining this gargantuan process piece by piece, we 
can determine Moses’s intentions for the park—both long-term 
and short-term—with confidence. With an overhead view of  the 
four-decade endeavor, it is possible to compare the earliest plans 
of  the project with the final product to determine what changed 
during the process and whether these changes were deliberate 
or due to circumstances not decided by Moses. This study also 
offers an analysis of  his managerial style and its effectiveness 
(or lack thereof) in efficiently furthering his agenda. Moses 
had an especially abrasive and blunt style of  management and 
communication that often alienated those he worked with, and an 
analysis of  the Flushing Meadows project shows that his attitude 
likely had a negative effect on the final result. Finally, this project 
considers the role that Flushing Meadows plays in modern 
Queens, and it also examines its relevance in the ongoing debate 
over the benefits and drawbacks of  Moses’s vast influence on 
the city in the twentieth century and their effects on today’s New 
York. The park-building process involved endeavors that Moses 
is lauded for, such as massive and unprecedented public works 
projects, and those he is criticized for, such as his preference 
for roadways and automobile travel over expansions to the city’s 
public transportation system.
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From Lamb to Lion: The East India Company and the East 
Indies, 1600-1630
May May Pau
 This study provides a counterpoint to the narrative of  
the unstoppable rise of  Western empires through situating the 
founding, struggle, and evolution of  the English East India 
Company in the narrative of  early modern Western expansion. 
Though it ultimately found fortune and fame through conquest 
of  the Indian subcontinent and trade with China, the Company 
struggled to achieve its founding mission of  gaining a trading 
foothold in the East Indies during its early years of  operation in 
the seventeenth century. The rise and fall of  the Company in its 
early years in the East Indies informed and shaped the norms 
and patterns of  Company operation in the Indian subcontinent, 
and the Company subjects in the East Indies played a significant 
role in shifting the focus of  the Company from relational trade 
in the East Indies to more direct territorial control of  India. This 
shift in Company operation is further incited by the English 
Company’s rivalry with their Dutch counterpart, the Dutch East 
India Company, and the English Company’s estrangement from 
the English Crown. The struggles confounding the Company in 
its early years suggest that the rise of  Western powers in Asia is 
a complex story of  intricate relationships, conflicting interests, 
and circumstantial innovation.
What was lost in the fire: Analyzing Representations of  the 
Bogotazo
Mariana Pavia
 On April 9, 1948, as he was walking out of  his office, the 
enormously popular leader of  the Colombia Liberal Party, Jorge 
Eliécer Gaitán, was mortally shot in broad daylight on one of  the 
busiest streets in Bogotá. His assassination immediately sparked 
a wave of  riots originating in the very spot where Gaitán fell 
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and radiating across the capital city and the rest of  the country. 
The violence that followed his assassination was complicated by 
the accusation that either communist forces or the Colombian 
conservative party were implicated in the assassination and by 
the presence of  North and South American diplomats gathered 
in Bogotá for the Pan-American Conference. In Colombian 
popular lore, the Bogotazo—as the riots are known—has come 
to be known as the day that “split Colombian history in two.” 
This thesis analyzes how this singular event has been represented 
politically, socially, and culturally. The belief  in the titanic impact 
of  the riot on the whole of  Colombian history is simplistic; 
however, by looking at the way that Colombians have come to 
terms with Gaitán’s death we can see how this singular day of  
violence stands out in a long history of  conflict. The research 
used includes oral history interviews, analysis of  literary and 
artistic representation, and immediate political reactions both in 
Colombia and abroad.
Who’s Invited? The Desegregation of  Emory University, 
The University of  Pennsylvania, and Princeton University 
Samantha Rahmin
 This paper deconstructs the desegregation of  Emory 
University, the University of  Pennsylvania, and Princeton 
University. Analyses of  these schools’ various archival collections 
reveal that each school desegregated when doing so would 
foster a more positive national reputation. Both local contexts 
and individual agents catalyzed each school’s desegregation 
process. While each school had desegregated by the early 1970s, 
the schools did not begin integration processes until a more 
significant proportion of  black students attended each university.
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Japanese Foreign Policy and Jews: Misconceptions and the 
Promotion of  National Interests
Hannah Rosenfeld 
 The story of  Jewish refugees escaping Europe to the Far 
East between 1938 and 1941 is generally little known and can 
easily be overlooked or even forgotten. The story of  the Japanese 
and Jews is a complex and protracted one, and this thesis sheds 
light on Japan’s Jewish policy before, during and after World 
War II. This study indicates that the Holocaust had far-reaching, 
complex repercussions that extended far beyond Europe. It is 
estimated that over seventeen thousand Jews reached Shanghai 
in 1939 and their number exceeded twenty thousand by the end 
of  1941. This influx of  a large number of  Jewish refugees to 
Japan and Japanese-occupied territories in the late 1930s was the 
result, not of  a military policy or a humanitarian cause, but rather 
the crude state of  Japanese immigration policies, the lack of  
coordination within the government, and their misconception 
of  Jews. This shift over time demonstrates the consistency in 
Japanese attitudes toward Jewish refugees: that Jews were simply 
a diplomatic apparatus in systematic efforts to appease other 
international powers and to fulfill Japan’s national agendas.
“An Outstanding and Unusual Contribution”: The 
Emergency Committee in Aid of  Displaced Foreign 
Scholars
Sarah Samuels 
 This thesis will investigate the efforts and impact of  the 
Emergency Committee in Aid of  Displaced Scholars. The first 
chapter delves into the obstacles faced by the committee because 
of  the social and political climate of  the time. Xenophobia and 
anti-Semitism were deeply entrenched in American culture, and 
many of  these tensions came to a head in the years surrounding the 
Second World War, impeding the acceptance of  refugee scholars. 
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The United States closed its borders to fleeing scholars, and 
American universities often followed suit. Though universities 
did not always make these reasons explicit, independent 
research conducted by the Emergency Committee, as well as 
private correspondence, reveals the pervasive anti-Jewish and 
anti-foreigner sentiments that hindered the immigration and 
placement of  refugee scholars. 
 The Emergency Committee sent scholars to different 
colleges and universities throughout America. Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities, or HBCUs, employed a small subset of  
refugee scholars. Chapter Two explores the tension inherent to 
the relationship between refugee scholars and HBCUs through 
two case studies. 
 Regardless of  their placements, refugee scholars endured 
ongoing struggles. They were thrust into a foreign society and 
expected to acclimate immediately. Chapter Three examines 
the scholars’ sense of  cultural dislocation. The Emergency 
Committee attempted to ease these transitions, advocating on 
behalf  of  the refugee scholars to the American government 
and university professors. More than just financial support, the 
Emergency Committee in Aid of  Displaced Foreign Scholars 
served as an invaluable resource to refugee scholars at a crucial 
turning point of  their lives.
 My research at the NYPL archives supported my 
hypothesis that the individual scholar’s transition to American 
university life was more turbulent than previously thought. The 
records revealed that xenophobia and anti-Semitism did obstruct 
some of  the committee’s efforts. Additionally, correspondence 
between the Emergency Committee and refugee scholars placed 
at HBCUs complicated the optimistic narrative presented by 
historians. The inter-office correspondence and application 
dockets suggest that the selection process was less randomized 
than I had assumed; certain refugee scholars requested to be 
placed at HBCUs. Finally, refugee scholars placed at various 
universities reported difficulties in adjusting to their drastically 
different surroundings. 
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Hugh Broughton, The Cantankerous Christian Hebraist: 
A Case Study in Sixteenth Century Jewish-Christian 
Boundaries and Borrowing
Logan M. Staller 
 This thesis explores the life and works of  Hugh 
Broughton, a sixteenth-century Christian scholar of  Hebrew 
texts. In particular, this study focuses on Broughton’s most 
controversial works, examining them through three different 
lenses and placing them in three different contexts. First, the 
work attempts to construct a previously neglected biographical 
history of  Broughton, the man, using his works and letters as 
primary sources to help piece together his life. Next, those same 
works are again examined from the perspective of  Christian 
intellectual history, placed into a larger English Puritan context. 
Finally, they are reviewed one last time from the lens of  Jewish 
history, revealing their previously uncovered Jewish significance. 
Thus, this work aims to bridge the gap and blur the lines between 
the fields of  Jewish and Christian histories of  sixteenth-century 
England. The research methods entailed primary research, both 
in person at various archives in London, and online utilizing 
records and archives from around the world. The research 
suggests that, while previously, historians have thought that 
English Jewish history begins in the seventeenth century, in fact, 
the sixteenth century is fruitful with Jewish elements, albeit more 
subtle and less pronounced. Thus, through this study, a greater 
understanding of  the broader intellectual history of  Early 
Modern England is achieved.
Defrocking Cuba’s Clergy: The Catholic Church’s Struggle 
for Autonomy in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959-1961 
Daniel Thompson
 Scholars studying the Cuban Church from 1959 to 
1961 generally concur that its conflict with the government 
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arose from gradually escalating tensions between clergymen 
and government officials. Indeed, the clash between clerics 
and government leaders progressively intensified, eventually 
culminating in violence and the large-scale expulsion of  most of  
Cuba’s Catholic clergy in 1961. However, previous scholarship 
has largely ignored that clerical opposition to the government did 
not progress in a linear fashion. Instead, the clergy’s resistance to 
the government fluctuated, intensified, solidified, expanded, and 
finally collapsed.
 The first chapter of  this thesis compares Church 
responses to major socialist reform in two areas: land and 
education. The Catholic clergy’s varying reactions to agrarian and 
education reform reveal that clerics were more concerned with an 
expansion of  the government’s power than socialist reform. The 
second chapter discusses the role of  clerical power, as defined 
by intra-clerical unity, support from the Cuban people, and the 
Church’s political legitimacy and influence. Contrary to current 
scholarly assumptions, the Catholic Church gained increasing 
power from 1959 to the beginning of  1961. The final chapter 
examines the role of  violence in the conflict between Catholics 
and government officials. Government authorities and other 
anti-Catholic groups specifically targeted Catholics in churches 
and at Catholic gatherings because these places functioned as the 
clergy’s main platforms to spread dissent. 
 Over the ensuing decades, the Cuban Catholic hierarchy 
began to tentatively recognize the legitimacy of  the Cuban 
communist regime. Nonetheless, the confrontation between 
the Church and the government in Cuba from 1959 to 1961 
captures a moment in the history of  the Cuban Church—and 
transnational Latin American Church—before many clerics 
accepted that Marxist precepts could be integrated into Catholic 
thinking.
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The Enemy of  My Enemy: Motivation and Disillusionment 
Among British Volunteers to the International Brigades
Miranda van Dijk
 This work explains some of  the more detailed aspects of  
motivation and disillusionment among British volunteers to the 
Brigades by examining initial ideological positions and attitudes 
towards the Spanish Civil War among British communists.  It 
focuses on profiles of  six men: Will Paynter, Fred Copeman, 
David Crook, John Angus, Bob Cooney, and James Jump. 
This thesis contends that the motivation of  volunteers was 
substantially different for hard line communists, described as 
“Real Communists,” than it was for anti-fascists, described as 
“Popular Front Communists.”  This work then tracks how the 
process of  disillusionment originated from tensions between 
these two groups and affected each of  them in unique ways. 
By identifying distinct sources of  motivation and processes of  
disillusionment, this work is able to show the breakdown of  
morale among British Volunteers to the International Brigades 
without the need to place blame on a certain group.  
Orange, Green, and Blue: Sectarian Politics and Police 
Reform in Northern Ireland, 1922-2001 
Alec Ward
 This paper examines the ways in which political 
processes and interests affected attempts to reform Northern 
Ireland’s policing infrastructure in three major moments during 
the twentieth century. In each of  these cases, a major political 
event prompted the creation of  an expert committee charged 
with proposing a set of  reforms; the Committee produced a 
recommendation to “de-sectarianize” Northern Irish policing; 
and the suggested platform was modified during the political 
processes of  passing it into law. In tracking these processes, the 
paper explores the linkage of  policing, conflict, and political 
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power in a region which has remained deeply divided in ways 
that make it, in the author’s view, illustrative of  trends in politics 
and policing which have broad implications for communities and 
challenges worldwide.
  
